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Canada's Spotlight on the Americas

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Brazilian foreign policy after Lula

João Augusto de Castro Neves

(Portuguese translation follows)

He put the spotlight on Brazil's diplomacy, but how sustainable will it be without his leadership?

Since announcing his bid for the Oct. 3 presidential elections five months ago, Brazilian opposition candidate José Serra has heightened the tone of his attacks on President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's government. This behaviour is to be expected from rival political parties, namely Serra's Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB) and Lula's Workers Party (PT). However, the novelty lies in the electoral emphasis on foreign policy issues. Over the past months, Serra has accused Bolivia of being complicit in drug traffic entering Brazil; he has denounced an alleged PT link with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC); and he has criticized dealings between Lula's government and authoritarian regimes such as Cuba and Iran.

As an electoral strategy, this criticism toward Lula's foreign policy initiatives will have little impact on the ballot. Notwithstanding Lula's efforts to make his diplomatic actions more visible, historically the political debate in Brasilia has not focused much on international relations issues and this lack of interest is mirrored in public opinion. Yet, Serra's strategy of politicizing Brazilian diplomatic relations is forcing the country's main political forces to explain and more extensively discuss their respective foreign policy projects.



Photo: Courtesy Government of Brazil

The successor of Brazilian President may face some trying challenges.

This debate is pressing since Brazil has repositioned itself globally during the last decade. In South America, its foreign policy's increased assertiveness has given way to the creation of new institutions such as the Union of

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FOCAL Views: Canada and Colombia: Building on progress

Colombia's new president symbolizes the strength of Colombia's democratic institutions.

The 59th president of Colombia, Juan Manuel Santos, took office last month. This is both good news for the region and a validation of Canada's support and faith in that country and its institutions.

Canada and Colombia sealed a free trade agreement in June 2010. This deal advances the Harper government's bilateral trade goals set out in its Americas Strategy, goals that now seem prescient when one contrasts the U.S. economic slump with the growth seen in Latin America.

Earlier this year, the Colombian Supreme Court ruled against an attempt by outgoing former president Álvaro Uribe to change the constitution to allow him to run for a third consecutive term. In a country still technically in the midst of a civil war and listed on this year's Foreign Policy's failed states index as one "in danger," it is notable that the ruling was accepted without national protests or threats to stability. The election of Santos symbolizes the strength of Colombia's democratic institutions, warranting Canada's closer involvement.

President Santos has demonstrated his intention to lead a clean and competent government by appointing an overwhelmingly technocratic cabinet, which also includes opposition figures. The new foreign and agricultural ministers are good examples in this regard.

Yet only a month ago, some analysts considered Colombia on the verge of war. Renewed charges from Uribe that Venezuela was harbouring and actively supporting the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) led his counterpart Hugo Chávez to cut diplomatic ties with the country and deploy


the air force and infantry along the border. Countries in the hemisphere fled into well-worn positions and took sides, but mostly avoided becoming entangled in the fracas.

Flash forward to changes brought about this past August. Astonishingly, Chávez has re-established diplomatic ties with Colombia, and the Aug. 22 meeting of ministers of foreign relations set up bilateral commissions on security, trade and border control to normalize and strengthen relations. In another promising development, the recent Aug. 17 Colombia Supreme Court ruling required Congress to approve a controversial treaty that allowed for greater U.S. presence on military bases. Most analysts believe that this heralds the demise of the agreement. Similarly, Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa launched discussions to renew diplomatic relations and even attended Santos's inauguration. This comes two years after bilateral ties were breached following the controversial 2008 raiding of a FARC camp in Ecuador by the Colombian military, which resulted in the death of paramilitary leader Raul Reyes and seizure of his computers. These computers are believed to contain evidence of Chávez's support for the FARC; shortly after taking office, Santos turned this material over to the Ecuadorian government. The Ecuadorian arrest warrant for Santos that had been issued in relation to his implication in the raid was revoked in late August.

Talks with FARC will be more challenging for Santos. Though FARC has offered to negotiate with the new government, there is no sign of change in its position to reflect the fact that it has

been crippled militarily and weakened politically. As a defence minister in the Uribe administration, Santos is well aware of this state of affairs and will not easily bargain away recent gains. He also had experience in making concessions to the FARC under former president Andrés Pastrana when he helped create a demilitarized zone in a failed attempt to facilitate peace negotiations. Yet, Uribe who left office with approval ratings nearing 75 per cent could have the power to scuttle any deal he disagrees on.

On the broader hemispheric stage, the warm welcome for the new government is both a validation of Canada's commitment to the country and a good boost to its engagement in the region. Canada will be working closely with Colombia as it prepares to host the 2012 Summit of the Americas. Colombia has also emerged as a much sought after source of technical assistance on security issues in Haiti, importantly, but also in Guatemala and Mexico.

As Canada seeks to accomplish more for security in the hemisphere this could become a new area for cooperation with Colombia. 

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Brazilian foreign policy after Lula

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South American Nations (UNASUR) and the South American Defence Council (CDS). Brazil has also intensified its investments in the region. On the international stage, Brazil played an enhanced role in the Doha Round negotiations of the World Trade Organization (WTO), and more recently it was called upon by the G20 Summit on Financial Markets, along with other emerging countries, to discuss recovery measures in the context of the 2008-2009 international financial crisis. Brazil has also been more assertive in climate change and nuclear proliferation discussions.

Part of the significant changes in the country's traditional stand on the international arena can be attributed to Lula and his political choices and popularity both inside and outside the country. How can one explain Lula's good relations with presidents of such a mixed bag: France's Nicolas Sarkozy, Iran's Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the U.S.'s Barack Obama and Venezuela's Hugo Chávez, among others? Even after making highly controversial declarations in defence of the Iranian nuclear program or against Cuban political dissidents, his charisma seems unabated. In the face of this remarkable leadership, the October presidential election will be an important benchmark for Brazil's international relations in the coming years. Ultimately, regardless of who wins the elections and takes office in 2011, one thing is for certain: Brazil's next president will be less popular than Lula.

Even with a relatively unchanged technocracy—the Ministry of Foreign Relations (Itamaraty)—in conducting the country's diplomacy, the

incoming president will take up an office that now has greater international visibility than ever before and will face difficult international choices both regionally and globally. How will the presidential candidates deal with these challenges?

It is reasonable to expect that the Lula-backed PT candidate and former minister Dilma Rousseff would try to follow in her predecessor's footsteps; however, her lack of experience and leadership demands caution. First, if she maintains the administrative design inherited from Lula's administration, Rousseff would likely have to deal with diverging opinions on foreign policy within her own ministerial team, particularly on the Petrobras, the National Development Bank (BNDES), Itamaraty, Defence, Foreign Trade, Agriculture and other ministries. Second, Rousseff would have to deal with a Latin American region susceptible to political disputes and crises and would have to prevent a possible process of regional disintegration, besides defending Brazilian investments in neighbouring countries. Finally, Rousseff would certainly have to invest time and political capital to explain controversial issues such as Brazil's relations with Iran and other authoritarian regimes.

José Serra (PSDB), for his part, has already voiced some criticism that provides an indication of the nature of his would-be foreign policies. Foreseeable actions include an administration with fewer cabinet positions that could reduce dissident voices on foreign policy. Further, Serra would most likely distance his country from regimes considered authoritarian. However, there are still many doubts

about actions on the regional front and commercial policy. In spite of Serra's harsh words on the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) and some neighbouring countries, it is difficult to imagine which alternative his government could envisage. After all, even if the PSDB has put forward the idea to render the MERCOSUR more flexible by allowing each member state to decide freely on its own trade policy, it is still uncertain whether a Serra administration would push a free trade agenda with major economies outside the region.

Many more issues will pose a challenge for the future Brazilian president: participation in multilateral trade negotiations and climate change talks, relations with other emerging economies, Brazil's role in forums such as BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) and IBSA (India, Brazil and South Africa), and relations with the developed world (Canada, the European Union, Japan and the United States). President Lula put Brazilian diplomacy in the spotlight at home and on the global stage; as he steps down in October, it will be possible to evaluate with more clarity the sustainability of Brazil's foreign policy without his leadership. 🌐

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A política externa brasileira depois de Lula

João Augusto de Castro Neves

Quanto é sustentável é a política exterior do Brasil sem a liderança e a popularidade do presidente?

Com as eleições presidenciais ocorrendo no próximo mês de outubro, José Serra, candidato à presidência pelo Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB), elevou o tom das críticas ao governo do presidente Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, do Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT). Nada mais natural, em se tratando de partidos políticos rivais. A novidade, no entanto, ficou por conta da exploração eleitoral de temas de política externa. Desde maio deste ano, a candidatura oposicionista acusou a Bolívia de ser cúmplice do tráfico de drogas que entram no Brasil, denunciou uma suposta ligação do PT com as Forças Armadas Revolucionárias da Colômbia (FARC) e criticou as relações do governo Lula com regimes autoritários como Irã e Cuba.

Como estratégia eleitoral, as críticas à política externa conduzida pelo governo Lula terão um impacto reduzido. Apesar do esforço do presidente Lula em dar mais visibilidade à sua ação diplomática, o debate político em Brasília nunca deu muito espaço para temas de relações internacionais e a opinião pública brasileira não se interessa muito pela questão. Mas, ainda assim, as críticas são válidas uma vez que ao politizarem a ação diplomática brasileira, as principais forças políticas do país ficam obrigadas a explicitar e discutir com maior clareza seus respectivos projetos de política externa.

Sob vários ângulos, essa discussão é de extrema importância já que, na última década, o posicionamento do Brasil no mundo mudou de patamar. Na América do Sul, uma maior assertividade da política externa brasileira se traduziu na criação de novas instituições como a União de Nações Sul-Americanas (UNASUL) e o Conselho de Defesa Sul-Americano (CDS), e na intensificação de investimentos brasileiros em países da região. No plano global, o Brasil teve papel de destaque nas negociações da Rodada Doha da Organização Mundial do Comércio (OMC) e, juntamente com outros países emergentes, foi chamado para discutir, no âmbito do G20 financeiro, medidas para combater a crise financeira internacional de 2008-2009. Nas discussões sobre mudança climática e proliferação nuclear, o país também se manifestou de forma mais assertiva do que de costume.

Parte significativa dessa mudança de status do país no cenário global é atribuída ao governo Lula, às suas escolhas políticas e à sua popularidade dentro e fora do país. Mas como podemos explicar, afinal, a desmontagem de Lula com líderes tão díspares como os presidentes Barack Obama (Estados Unidos), Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (Irã), Nicolas Sarkozy (França), Hugo Chávez (Venezuela), entre outros? Nem mesmo declarações polêmicas, como a defesa do pro-

grama nuclear iraniano ou a crítica à dissidentes políticos cubanos, parecem arranhar o carisma do líder brasileiro. Diante dessa realidade, a eleição presidencial de outubro deverá se tornar um marco importante para as relações internacionais do Brasil nos próximos anos. Afinal, independentemente de quem vencer as eleições, um fato é certo: no início de 2011, o próximo presidente do Brasil será bem menos popular que o presidente Lula.

Mesmo contando com a mesma tecnocracia do Ministério das Relações Exteriores (Itamaraty), que conduz a diplomacia do país, o novo presidente brasileiro assumirá o comando de um país com maior visibilidade internacional e estará diante de escolhas internacionais difíceis de serem tomadas, tanto no âmbito regional como no âmbito global. Como os dois principais candidatos à presidência se comportarão diante desses desafios?

É razoável esperar que a ex-ministra Dilma Rousseff (PT), candidata de Lula, tente seguir os passos de seu antecessor. Contudo, sua falta de experiência e de liderança políticas sugerem cautela. Em primeiro lugar, se ela mantiver o desenho administrativo deixado pelo governo Lula, Rousseff terá de lidar com possíveis diferenças de opiniões dentro de sua própria equipe ministerial no que se refere à política externa (Petrobras, BN-

DES, Itamaraty, Defesa, Comércio Exterior, Agricultura, etc.). Segundo, Rousseff herdará de Lula uma região suscetível a contenciosos e crises e, além de defender os investimentos brasileiros nos países vizinhos, terá também que evitar um possível processo de desintegração regional. Por fim, Rousseff certamente terá de consumir tempo e capital político em torno de questões polêmicas como a relação do Brasil com o Irã e com outros regimes autoritários.

O candidato da oposição, José Serra (PSDB), por sua vez, já teceu algumas críticas que permitem algumas suposições sobre a política externa de seu governo. No lado das ações prováveis, um ministério mais enxuto deverá reduzir as vozes dissonantes sobre a política exterior. O distanciamento do país de regimes considerados autoritários também seria um movimento esperado do governo Serra. Já em relação à ação regional e à política comercial, muitas dúvidas permanecem. Apesar das críticas ao Mercado Comum do Sul (MERCOSUL) e a alguns países vizinhos, é difícil imaginar quais medidas seriam tomadas pelo governo Serra. Afinal, mesmo tendo sido aventada a possibilidade de flexibilizar o MERCOSUL, permitindo que cada país adotasse sua política comercial livremente, não se pode afirmar que o PSDB conduziria uma agenda de livre comércio.

Além dessas questões, o futuro presidente brasileiro terá de lidar com a participação do Brasil nas negociações multilaterais de comércio e sobre mudanças climáticas, a relação do país com outras potências emergentes em fóruns

como os BRIC (Brasil, Rússia, Índia e China), IBAS (Índia, Brasil e África do Sul), e a relação com o mundo desenvolvido (Estados Unidos, União Europeia, Canadá e Japão). Se o governo Lula ajudou a atrair atenção —doméstica e internacional— à diplomacia brasileira, sua saída do cenário político permitirá avaliar com maior clareza o quão sustentável é a política exterior do Brasil sem a liderança e a popularidade do presidente Lula. 🌐

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Elections

Venezuelan elections could hold weighty consequences

Venezuelans will turn to the polls on Sept. 26 for legislative elections, the outcome of which could signal a turning point for Venezuela's politics. Similarly to those of the U.S. mid-term election, the results will help portray the voter's evaluation of the ruling party's performance.

Some polls indicate that voters are nearly equally divided between the Unified Socialist Party of Venezuela of President Hugo Chávez, and those of the opposition candidates. Nonetheless, it is expected that the opposition parties will make significant gains in these elections since they had boycotted the previous 2005 legislative elections, which resulted in a landslide win for government party candidates.

The upcoming election comes at a time of increased political competition. This year, Hugo Chávez's government faced major criticism due to power and food shortages, inflation and high crime rates, among others. The results of the election will give an indication of government performance and popularity. Should the opposition parties win a substantial number of seats, they could limit the executive power and have a greater say in policy-making. The next presidential election is slated for 2012.

Latin America: A threat to Canada's security?

Stephen J. Randall

Canada faces new, non-traditional challenges in the region.

The recent violence and low voter turnout in Mexico's July 2010 gubernatorial elections serve to remind us how fragile democratic processes can be in Latin America and how vulnerable politics is to the rising power of narcotics cartels. The Mexican situation is also a critical reminder of the fact that what most challenges Canadian interests in Latin America and the Caribbean are non-traditional security threats, and not the traditional threats posed by states.

The events in Mexico are one example of a much wider threat from organized crime and the violence it engenders. There have been isolated cases of Canadian tourists who were murdered in Mexico. A few years ago Canadian-operated oil pipelines in Mexico were targeted by terrorists. In the past few months Jamaica was also caught up in a major military effort to suppress organized crime in Kingston. Central America has seen rising levels of violence in recent years, much of it associated with organized criminal groups that have spread into many parts of the United States as well as some Canadian cities. Colombia, with which Canada has recently approved a free trade agreement, has been wracked by narcotics-fuelled civil strife for several decades.

In January this year Canadian emergency forces along with the international community responded swiftly to the devastating earthquake in Haiti which took the lives

of more than 200,000 people. Barely a month later Central Chile was hit by an earthquake and tsunami, which brought several million dollars in Canadian humanitarian assistance.

These are not the kind of developments that either academic analysts or government officials tended to associate with security challenges in the years of the Cold War. However, since 1990, and especially since the 9-11 terrorist attacks on the United States, perceptions of what constitute security challenges have altered. The collapse of the Soviet Union and its significant level of support for Fidel Castro's government in Cuba contributed to weakening Cuban influence in the region, especially with the end of the Central American crisis in the 1980s. Although there continues to be concern about the threats posed by states, the focus has increasingly been on non-traditional threats and non-state actors. That blend of the traditional and non-traditional was evident in the comments made by Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper during his 2007 tour of several Latin American and Caribbean countries when he identified Canadian policy goals as responding to terrorism and "stopping the spread of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, bolstering fragile states, helping rebuild societies shattered by chronic conflict, tackling climate change, sustaining and spreading economic growth and prosperity." The government's

Americas Strategy, launched two years later, was even more explicitly focused on non-traditional security threats: narcotics, organized crime, health pandemics and natural disasters.


What seems evident is that Canada does not face any traditional state-to-state threats in the Americas even if regional security is threatened by the destabilizing impact of tensions between states in the area, such as those between Colombia and Venezuela. Some analysts have suggested that Iran constitutes such a threat in Latin America by exporting terrorism through its support for Hezbollah, particularly in Venezuela, where it is reputed to be tolerated if not encouraged by President Hugo Chávez's government, as well as in the tri-border area shared by Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay. There has also been some concern about Russia's enhanced influence in the region. Chávez has provided landing rights for Russian heavy bombers, purchased fighter aircraft from Russia and been granted licence to manufacture AK-47s. There has also been some concern about the significant economic presence in Latin America, again especially in Venezuela, of resource-hungry China, but that presence appears to be exclusively commercial in nature.

Even the insurgent groups, which were so influential during the 1980s and 1990s, *Sendero Luminoso* and *Túpac Amaru* in Peru, or the National Liberation Army (ELN) and

the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), do not possess the influence they once had. Even earlier they lacked the capacity to project their power outside the borders of the country in which they operated. The Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) remains active in southern Mexico but its issues are local as well.

There is evidence that both Russian organized criminal organizations as well as Middle East terrorists have established links with Mexican narcotics cartels, but this has no connection with state-sponsored terrorism. In the case of Middle Eastern and Mexican groups there is mutual benefit. The Mexican cartels gain access to Middle East narcotics supplies to supplement what they obtain from the Andean region, and the Middle East interests through the Mexicans gain access to narcotics trafficking routes into the United States. The profits generated can then also be used to fund weapons purchases and terrorist activities in the Middle East. Such connections are more indicative of the massive profits to be made from narcotics and weapons trafficking than of any interest on the part of the actors to undermine state authority or to export terrorism into the United States.

Yet, regardless of intent their actions do undermine state authority, placing more pressure on Canadian immigration and refugee policy in the process, just as the civil conflict in Colombia did in the course of the 1980s and 1990s. Such weak and fragile states, which in some instances lack the resources to respond to either natural disasters or to contain organized criminal activ-



ity, place increased strain on Canadian resources. Canada initially had a significant military presence in Haiti under the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and has continued through the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and a small number of Canadian military officials to contribute to the efforts to enhance the security situation through the training of the Haitian National Police, reinforcing the capacity of the Haitian coast guard to patrol its own shores, improving Haitian border security with the Dominican Republic, and attempting to strengthen Haiti's justice system.

Canada is thus faced with challenges in the Americas that in large part do not directly threaten Canadian society but rather tax Canadian resources and threaten Canadian

interests in the region. The one major exception to that conclusion is organized crime, particularly trafficking in narcotics and small arms, both of which impact Canadians on Canadian soil. It is thus in the Canadian national interest to continue to work with its fellow nations in the Americas to strengthen their capacity to contain the power of criminal organizations. 🌐

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Crime and crisis in Jamaica

Don Robotham

The country's economic downturn and political sclerosis are inextricably related to its crime crisis.

Jamaica hit the international news in late May of this year. Gunmen from the Tivoli Gardens section of the capital, Kingston, launched attacks on police stations as part of an attempt to resist the capture of a drug fugitive, Christopher “Dudus” Coke. When the dust had settled, 73 people lay dead.

The United States had sought to extradite Coke but this was resisted by the Government of Jamaica for seven months. The reason: Coke was the “Don” of Tivoli, the command and control centre of the governing Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) — a constituency represented in parliament by none other than the prime minister himself, Bruce Golding.

This close relationship between criminal gangs and politics is by no means confined to one side. The opposition — the People's National Party (PNP) — arguably has even more gunmen at its disposal. When Jamaica gained political independence in 1962, the murder rate was 3.9 per 100,000 inhabitants — among the lowest in the world. In the last 10 years, homicide rates averaged 55 per 100,000 inhabitants, soaring to 62 in 2009, or the astonishing figure of 1,680 murders in a population of just under 2.7 million. In comparison, in 2009 drug violent Mexico had a homicide rate of 14 per 100,000 inhabitants while Brazil had one of 25 and South Africa of 37; Canada, for its part, had a rate of 1.8.

Economic stagnation

The root cause of violence in Jamaica has been the stagnation of the Jamaican

economy over the last three decades and the resulting decline in living standards. Figures from 2009 led the World Bank to classify Jamaica as an “upper middle income” country with a per capita GDP of US\$4,800 where only a fifth of the population lives below the poverty line and literacy rate is high. But these data conceal more than they reveal. Wealth distribution is extremely unequal and the quarter of the population that is in the 15-29 age group faces high unemployment rates of roughly 20 per cent. Of all unemployed youth, 74 per cent have no educational certification of any kind, which makes it more difficult for them to find jobs. To illustrate the seriousness of the skill gap, between 2005 and 2007, when Jamaica received over US\$5 billion in tourism investment, construction workers had to be recruited from the Dominican Republic: an economic decline of 1.7 per cent followed the significant investment.

This youth crisis is inextricably linked to the crime crisis in Jamaica. Approximately 85 per cent of all homicides are committed by young men from the 15-29 age group. Likewise, an overwhelming number of victims are in this age group.

Political stagnation

This crisis in the economy has produced a dangerous political crisis. Since 1938 Jamaican political life has been dominated by two political parties which arose out of the social protests sparked by the Great Depression. The left-of-centre PNP dominated the urban areas up until 1964 when what

is universally agreed in Jamaica to be the “mother of all garrisons” — Coke's redoubt of Tivoli Gardens — was built by former Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) prime minister Edward Seaga. A “garrison” in Jamaican political parlance is a political constituency ruled by a strong core of gunmen and dominated by a single political party. These garrisons have seen not only rigged elections where the dominating party secures a unanimous vote but also ones where the number of ballots cast is higher than the number of eligible voters. The gunmen are also strategically deployed at election time to intimidate opponents in other constituencies. There are roughly 20 such garrisons in Jamaica: 11 for the opposition PNP and nine for the governing JLP.

When the economy was relatively buoyant, politicians controlled the gunmen by providing them with contracts from the public purse. But as the budget racked up deficits, contracts dried up. The gunmen increasingly turned to the export of marijuana and crack cocaine to New York, London and Toronto to maintain their wealth. They became the masters of the politicians to whom they had been formally subordinate and in the process they corrupted significant sections of the Jamaican elite. Hence Prime Minister Golding's seven-month resistance to the U.S. extradition request, which finally culminated in the attack on the army and police in May when, under intense U.S. pressure, Golding finally succumbed and ordered the army and police into Tivoli.

Where to go from here

There have been sharp reductions in the homicide rate since the police onslaught on Tivoli Gardens, the accompanying state of emergency, and the capture and extradition of Coke. In June, murders declined by roughly 49 per cent, and this dip continued through July and August. However, huge problems remain. The gunmen are in retreat but have hardly been defeated. The link between gunmen and politicians remains strong. Above all, the basic long-term socio-economic problems remain unaddressed, even though tourism has been doing phenomenally well. Gloom grips the normally rambunctious Jamaican spirit and the island nation has lost confidence in a political leadership viewed as profoundly compromised. A poll published in July showed that 48 per cent feel alienated from the governing JLP and 50 per cent feel alienated from the opposition PNP. It is hard to see the current gains against crime being sustained unless ways are found to address the deeper long-term problems facing society.

But all is far from lost. The youth crisis, which lies at the root of the crime crisis, can be addressed. The economy can be put on a sounder footing. New leadership can emerge. The country has an extremely vibrant set of civil society organizations, including a vigorous and effective free press. With the help of long-standing external partners such as Canada, economic and political solutions can and must be found. 🌍

Don Robotham is Professor of Anthropology at the Graduate Center, City University of New York.

FOCAL Interview

Bombardier invests in Mexican aerospace industry

Canadian businesses in Mexico see benefits in creating value chains in North America to increase their global competitiveness and access different markets. FOCAL interviewed Andrés Friedman, Manager of Supply Chain for Bombardier Aerospace in Mexico, to get a better sense of the importance of establishing local roots in key markets.

How does Bombardier see Mexico within its business development strategy?

Bombardier Aerospace set up its Mexico operation in 2006, adding to the already important presence of Bombardier Transportation. Our presence in Mexico gives us the advantage of increasing our competitiveness and having a better understanding of the Latin American market. Whether in regional, business aircraft or amphibious aircraft, we see the globalization of our industry as very positive and have been progressively extending our presence around the world directly or through partnerships. This has allowed us to take advantage of local knowledge, improve our competitiveness by reducing costs and better understand local needs.

What features of the business model Bombardier implemented in Mexico enhance the company's competitiveness?

Our competitiveness depends on developing the manufacturing

capacity in emerging economies, where some of our competitors have the advantage of already operating or having developed partnerships with suppliers. Our presence in Mexico will allow us to benefit from lower production costs, open the door to new markets and strengthen our supply chain.

What are Bombardier's prospects in Mexico's domestic market?

Bombardier Aerospace is the market leader in Latin America for business aircraft with over 26 per cent of the installed base, including more than 175 aircraft in Mexico. Commercial aircraft placements in the region tops over 70 Bombardier regional jets and turboprops with aircraft operating in Mexico, Latin America and the Caribbean.

Last year, we welcomed *Grupo Mexicana* to our network of CRJ aircraft operators. From its base in Guadalajara, *Mexicana Link* operates 13 regional jets, while Mexico City's *Estafeta Cargo* uses the same model configured for cargo operations. Additionally, the Mexican Navy and *Banco de México* operate different models of turboprop aircraft.

What are Bombardier's future plans for Mexico?

We expect to grow as Bombardier's position in the market is enhanced. The Learjet 85 aircraft program now represents an investment of approximately US\$250 million for a project which will take seven years to mature, and could generate up to 1,000 jobs. This is in addition to the current 1,000 employees and contrac-

tors hired in the last few years and the original investment of US\$200 million made in equipment, buildings and start-up costs for the period 2005-2012.

Our facility in Querétaro, Mexico will manufacture the fuselage, wings and electrical harnesses for the Learjet 85 aircraft. All of these components will be shipped by truck to Wichita, U.S., for final assembly, interior completion, test flights and final delivery.

Despite the recession, construction of the new Learjet 85 aircraft facility in Querétaro is progressing according to plan. We expect to install equipment and tooling in the new facility in the second half of 2010. The early stages of production are scheduled to begin thereafter. Bombardier keeps investing in its new aircraft programs to position the company for growth.

Youth violence and organized crime: A research agenda

Markus Gottsbacher

Growing levels of insecurity in the region are partly caused by youth violence, but effective policies to curb this growth have yet to be developed.

The Caribbean, Central America and Mexico have been suffering increasing levels of insecurity, reaching worrisome peaks and seemingly still climbing. Part of this insecurity is caused by youth violence, which appears to be increasingly tied to organized crime. But more research is needed to develop comprehensive and long-term policy recommendations to address this situation.

In Central America and Mexico, public opinion polls show that security is regularly a top-ranking issue on the list of problems perceived at the national level. Much the same is true for Caribbean countries such as Haiti and Jamaica, where crime rates are of great concern for society. These regions are increasingly used as a hub by organized crime.

Youth are at particular risk of becoming victims but also perpetrators of violence, especially in urban and suburban contexts. But the relationship among youth violence, public insecurity and organized crime is complex and research has to be further developed. More insight on these links and on prevention and mitigation strategies will be necessary to formulate policy recommendations for more sustainable approaches to this issue.

In Central America notably, youth has been used as a scapegoat for all tendencies of violence. The youth gangs called *maras* and other youth groups have been declared guilty for a

vast variety of violent crimes by politicians and media, leading to politics of *mano dura* (tough hand). Such policies, which are currently under review in some of the countries, focus almost exclusively on law enforcement measures, entailing tougher sentences and overcrowded detention centres. Gross human right violations —extrajudicial executions and disappearances of youth are common in Central America— are followed by a criminalization of youth as a general tendency. Prevention of violence and integration of former members of youth gangs are rather weak and unsystematic.

These trends can be observed not only in the context of post-conflict societies, such as El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua, but also in neighbouring countries and in some Caribbean countries. They are set against a background of scarce public resources and a lack of long-term policies to attend to social problems, and to create opportunities of development for youth. Structural violence, in the form of social exclusion, economic marginalization and lack of political participation is a reality, as is the disintegration of families due to factors such as migration or increasing levels of alcohol and illicit drug use. The recent increase in rates of deportations of illegal migrants from the U.S. to their lands of origin presents additional challenges.

The actual or perceived lack of a future makes the search for social iden-

tities a priority for many youth. Youth gangs often meet basic functions of social recognition and protection, which are denied and neglected by society. There are many such forms of youth culture, the vast majority being non-violent. However, there are also clear signs that violence inflicted by organized youth gangs is on the rise, some of it extremely brutal.

A second major trend in the region is the growing challenge posed by organized crime and its most violent expressions. The reasons and patterns for rising levels of public insecurity vary from country to country but there is no doubt that organized crime has a big share in these tendencies. Illicit activities such as drug and related human trafficking and assets laundering have reached alarming levels. As a result, armed violence is most alarmingly penetrating society. Organized crime often makes use of youth, their cultures and organizations, to carry out activities such as trafficking in drugs and human beings, extortion and kidnapping.

However, while some see a clear link to organized crime, and sometimes even portray youth gangs as terrorist groups, others would argue that such links are marginal and that organized youth networks have more of a cultural, identity-related nature and are generally non-violent. Correspondingly, the former group tends to advocate for policies to counter youth violence, while the latter argues that such policies are counterproductive and that the phenomenon is a symptom of other root causes.

Although there appears to be more evidence to defend the second point of view, there also seems to be a strong tendency of increasing use of youth by transnational organized crime, especially for drug trafficking. Specific



Photo: Ryan Anderson, Interpeace

The actual or perceived lack of a future makes the search for social identities a priority for many youth.

in-depth studies are few and much remains unknown. There is also a need to explore how the links between youth violence and organized crime could undermine the democratic governance of the countries in the region, and lead to more violent political mobilization and conflict.

The relationship between gender violence and youth gangs, and its links to organized crime, should also be of special interest to researchers. Femicide is extremely high in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico. Especially cruel cases of violence against women involving *maras* have been reported, but more information is needed to link these atrocities to youth gangs. Trafficking in women and children is also of growing concern throughout Central America, Mexico and the Caribbean.

It is important to compare experiences across the region in tackling youth violence linked to organized crime. What is the role of community resilience and local economic develop-

ment against these forms of violence? How can we better make use of cultural approaches to prevent youth violence? How can we strengthen youth as social and political actors? How can we improve policing, social policies and the justice system, and alternative measures for youth in conflict with the law?

There is an acute need for comprehensive and long-term policy recommendations to address youth violence; this guidance should be context-specific, harness the knowledge of various actors and encourage the participation of the private sector and civil society. The International Development Research Centre (IDRC) together with its local partner institutions, the Guatemalan Institute of Comparative Penal Studies (ICCPG), Interpeace in Central America, the Interchurch Organization for Development Co-operation (ICCO) in Guatemala, Colegio de México and the University of the West Indies in the Caribbean, are currently developing several research projects to

contribute to sound public policies on this subject in Central America, Haiti, Jamaica and Mexico. Several notable examples of policy uptake have already been achieved in Central America. Most recently on Aug. 12, Guatemalan President Álvaro Colom launched a new national youth policy framework, including substantive recommendations on youth violence prevention developed under IDRC partners' project. These research initiatives will continue to provide much-needed policy advice for decision-makers at local, national and international levels, and will supply evidence based on promising practices of prevention and attention to this problem. 🌐

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Trade

Mexico boosts tariffs on U.S. products

The Government of Mexico released a list in August 2010 of 99 U.S. products subject to higher tariffs as a strategy of pressuring the U.S. to lift an existing ban on Mexican cargo trucks.

Mexico says that the ban on trucks to the U.S. is a violation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and thus has implemented commercial retaliations by applying tariffs on U.S. products. Previously, the total number of goods necessitating tariffs was 89.

The products on the tariff list include cheese, fruits, juices, toilet paper, wine and more recently, some pork products; the tariffs range from five per cent to 15 per cent. The new tariffs will affect roughly \$2.5 billion of trade coming from 43 U.S. states.

Pérou : défis du développement local en région minière

Émilie Lemieux

(English translation follows)

Pour assurer la durabilité de ses efforts en RSE, le secteur privé devrait saisir l'opportunité de canaliser les leçons retenues.

Depuis deux décennies, le Pérou applique un vigoureux programme de libéralisation de son économie et d'ouverture de ses marchés à l'investissement direct étranger qui bénéficie tout particulièrement au secteur minier. Le traité de libre-échange entre le Canada et le Pérou, qui est entré en vigueur en août 2009, donne un accès privilégié aux entreprises d'exploration et d'exploitation minières canadiennes, déjà nombreuses à investir dans ce pays. Avec leurs politiques de responsabilité sociale, les entreprises minières cherchent à démontrer que l'industrie est en mesure d'appuyer le développement de la société péruvienne, qui demeure caractérisée par les inégalités socio-économiques, particulièrement en région éloignée. Toutefois, bien que ces entreprises multiplient les initiatives sociales, elles peinent à propulser un développement viable dans les régions affectées par leurs activités. Les apprentissages tirés des expériences récentes doivent permettre de repenser l'approche de l'entreprise, pour que celle-ci puisse favoriser la durabilité des projets et une meilleure intégration des acteurs locaux.

Il existe plusieurs définitions, parfois fort divergentes, de la responsabilité sociale des entreprises (RSE); l'une d'elles la définit comme un mécanisme à caractère volontaire qui permet d'élever les standards sociaux et environnementaux auxquels les

entreprises doivent répondre. Selon Alejandro Sánchez, directeur des relations publiques de la mine Lagunas Norte, appartenant au géant minier canadien Barrick Gold, située dans le département de La Libertad au Pérou, l'activité minière a tout à voir avec le développement : « Le concept de la responsabilité sociale des entreprises cherche à ce que la richesse générée par les mines soit profitable pour tous. »

Au Pérou, l'un des éléments clés du développement local et régional concerne le débat au sujet des mécanismes de redistribution de la richesse générée par l'activité minière. Trente-neuf compagnies minières installées au Pérou, dont Barrick Gold, participent au programme général de contributions volontaires dénommé « *aporte voluntario* ». Ce programme a été mis sur place en décembre 2006 grâce à une collaboration entre le gouvernement péruvien et le secteur minier. En intégrant l'*aporte voluntario* dans leur politique de responsabilité sociale, les entreprises décident d'apporter, sur une base volontaire, entre un et 3,75 pour cent de leurs profits après impôts à des projets de développement de la région où elles interviennent.

Ces contributions volontaires s'ajoutent aux redevances minières transférées aux provinces à travers du « canon minero », un mécanisme du gouvernement central qui redistribue 50 pour cent des impôts et des taxes

payés par les industries extractives aux localités où sont extraites les ressources non-renouvelables. Le *canon minero* relève d'une loi et représente un impôt obligatoire, tandis que l'*aporte voluntario* est sujet à l'évolution du prix des minéraux; les montants attribués dépendent des profits engendrés par l'entreprise durant l'année en cours.

Avec l'*aporte voluntario*, les entreprises contrôlent leurs interventions sociales, sans devoir se plier à une évaluation externe, ce qui apporte son lot de préoccupations chez les organisations de la société civile qui travaillent la thématique minière. « Comme ces ressources ne sont pas gérées par le gouvernement péruvien, les entreprises minières orientent leurs actions selon leurs propres intérêts », commente José de Echave, responsable du programme Droits collectifs et Industries extractives chez CooperAcción, une ONG péruvienne qui appuie les acteurs locaux affectés par les mines.

Pour réaliser leurs projets sociaux, les entreprises embauchent des experts en développement communautaire. Pour intervenir en santé, en nutrition ou en éducation, des compagnies établissent des alliances stratégiques avec des ONG expérimentées pour élaborer et mettre en œuvre des projets. Les entreprises travaillent donc le plus souvent avec des ONG non locales plutôt que directement avec les acteurs et les autorités concernés de la communauté. « Il n'y a pas de coordination avec les acteurs sociaux de la région pour propulser le développement local », admet Alejandro Sánchez. Les mines travaillent donc de façon verticale, en collaborant avec des organisations externes plutôt qu'avec les acteurs locaux concernés, pour concevoir et mettre en œuvre des projets dans les communautés vi-

sées. Ces initiatives ont pour la plupart des objectifs à court terme, une limite actuelle des initiatives en RSE au Pérou. De plus, elles se déploient parfois parallèlement à d'autres efforts de développement, dupliquant les efforts en ce sens plutôt que de les renforcer.

La compagnie minière Antamina, qui opère la plus importante mine combinée de cuivre et de zinc au monde dans le département d'Ancash et dont une part des intérêts sont canadiens, apporte 3,75 pour cent de ses profits au mécanisme de l'*aporte voluntario*. Gonzalo Quijandrilla, directeur des communications d'Antamina, admet que le projet de réduction de la malnutrition chronique infantile *Ally Micuy*, financé par la mine, n'implique pas directement la participation du Ministère de la Santé ou du Ministère de la Femme et du Développement social du Pérou. Ainsi, le personnel des institutions de santé locales ne joue pas un rôle de leadership dans ces projets, car tout le travail de sensibilisation de la population et de supervision est à la charge du personnel de la compagnie minière ou de l'ONG qui réalise le projet. Il en résulte souvent que, même involontairement, les institutions du pays, comme le Ministère de la Santé, soient ainsi en mesure de se détourner de responsabilités sociales qu'elles devraient normalement assumer aux termes de la loi.

Selon M. Quijandrilla, l'entreprise minière oriente ses initiatives de développement directement aux populations visées parce qu'elle considère que les institutions publiques et gouvernementales sont fragiles. Le personnel d'Antamina reçoit des formations de groupes-conseils pour orienter sa façon de travailler en RSE. M. Quijandrilla déplore : « On nous expose les acteurs avec lesquels nous devons travailler au niveau local, comme par

exemple le maire de la localité, des groupes communautaires. Mais souvent, ces institutions ne sont pas représentatives de la population. »

Pourtant, le fait que les acteurs locaux soient écartés du leadership des initiatives de développement instaurees par les compagnies minières compromet la légitimité apparente, l'impact ainsi que la durabilité des projets. « Tous les acteurs doivent contribuer au développement en zone minière », mentionne Antonio Jesús Limas López, gérant du budget de la municipalité de Huari, située dans la zone d'intervention de la compagnie minière Antamina. « Le défi auquel nous faisons face est celui de structurer notre façon de travailler et d'orienter nos actions vers une vision partagée du développement durable, afin d'améliorer la qualité de vie de la population d'un point de vue socio-économique. »

Le lien entre l'activité minière et le développement n'est pas facile à établir. Mais il existe à la fois une nécessité et une opportunité de canaliser les expériences et les apprentissages des dernières années pour favoriser un développement qui naisse à partir des besoins et des intérêts locaux, encourageant le développement d'une société civile mieux organisée et capable de négocier des bénéfices partagés avec le secteur privé. 🌐

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Peru: Challenges of local development in mining regions

Émilie Lemieux

For the private sector to make its CSR efforts sustainable, it will need to take stock of lessons learned.

For the past two decades, Peru has been enforcing a rigorous program to liberalize its economy and open its markets to foreign direct investment that has been particularly profitable for the mining sector. The free trade agreement between Canada and Peru, which came into force in August 2009, grants privileged access to Canadian mining exploration and exploitation companies, many of which already invest in the country. Through their social responsibility policies, mining companies are looking to demonstrate that the industry is able to support the development of Peruvian society, where socio-economic inequalities persist, particularly in remote areas. Nevertheless, although these companies are expanding these social initiatives, they are struggling to fuel sustainable development in those regions affected by their activities. The lessons learned from these recent experiences should enable mining companies to rethink their approach in order to prioritize project sustainability and better integration of local actors.

There are many quite divergent definitions of corporate social responsibility (CSR); one view defines it as a voluntary mechanism that makes it possible to raise the social and environmental standards to which companies must adhere. According to Alejandro Sánchez, director of public relations at the Lagunas Norte mine, owned by the Canadian

mining giant Barrick Gold and located in the Peruvian department of La Libertad, mining activity has everything to do with development. “The concept of corporate social responsibility aims to ensure that the profits generated by mines benefit everyone,” says Sánchez.

In Peru, one of the key factors affecting local and regional development is the debate regarding mechanisms for the redistribution of wealth generated by mining activity. Thirty-nine mining companies established in Peru, including Barrick Gold, participate in a general voluntary contributions program known as “*aporte voluntario*.” The program was established in December 2006 through collaboration between the Peruvian government and the mining sector. By integrating the *aporte voluntario* into their social responsibility policies, companies decide to contribute —on a voluntary basis— between one and 3.75 per cent of their profits after taxes to development projects in the specific region where they are involved.

These voluntary contributions are added to the mining royalties transferred to the provinces through the “*canon minero*,” a central-government mechanism that redistributes 50 per cent of income and other taxes paid by extractive industries to the localities from which the non-renewable resources are extracted. The *canon minero* is required by law and is an obligatory

tax, whereas the *aporte voluntario* is subject to mineral price trends; the amount contributed through the former depends on the profits that the company incurs during the current year.

With the *aporte voluntario*, companies have control over their social involvement without having to abide by an external evaluation, a fact that worries civil society organizations that focus on mining issues. “As these resources are not managed by the Peruvian government, mining companies direct their actions based on their own interests,” observes José de Echave, director of the Collective Rights and Extractive Industries Program at CooperAcción, a Peruvian NGO that supports local actors affected by mining.

In order to carry out their social projects, the companies hire community development experts. Their approach to becoming involved in health, nutrition or education consists in forming strategic alliances with experienced NGOs for project development and implementation. Therefore, companies most often work with non-local NGOs rather than directly with relevant actors and authorities in the community. “There is no co-ordination with regional social actors to initiate local development,” admits Sánchez. Therefore, mines work vertically —collaborating with external organizations rather than with relevant local actors— to design and imple-


ment projects in the communities concerned. Most of these initiatives have short-term objectives, a current limitation of CSR efforts in Peru. Moreover, these initiatives are at times carried out in parallel with other development efforts, duplicating instead of reinforcing existing efforts.

Located in the department of Ancash, the company Antamina, which operates the world's largest combined brass and zinc mine, of which a share of the international interest is Canadian, contributes 3.75 per cent of its profits to the *aporte voluntario* mechanism. Gonzalo Quijandrilla, director of communications at Antamina, admits that the project *Ally Micuy* that is funded by the mine to reduce chronic child malnutrition does not directly involve the participation of either Peru's Ministry of Health or Ministry of Women and Social Development. Therefore, the personnel from local health institutions does not play a leadership role in these projects, as all work related to awareness-raising and supervision is the responsibility of the mining company's personnel or that of the NGO carrying out the project. An unintended consequence is often that the country's institutions, such as the Ministry of Health, are able to avoid social responsibilities that they would normally assume by law.

According to Quijandrilla, mining companies aim their development initiatives directly at the target populations because they consider public and governmental institutions to be fragile. The personnel of Antamina receives group consultancy training to help set the direction for their work in CSR. "We are presented with the actors we should

work with at the local level, such as the mayor of the town and community groups. But often, these institutions are not representative of the population," says Quijandrilla.

Yet, the fact that local actors are left out of the leadership process of development initiatives established by the mining companies compromises their perceived legitimacy and impact as well as sustainability. "All actors must contribute to development in mining regions," says Antonio Jesús Limas López, budget manager of the municipality of Huari, located in Antamina's zone of involvement. "The challenge we face is that of restructuring the way we work and orienting our actions toward a shared vision of sustainable development, in order to improve the quality of life of the population from a socio-economic point of view."

The link between mining activity and development is not easy to determine. There is a need and opportunity to channel the experiences and lessons learned in recent years into prioritizing development that springs from local needs and interests, encouraging the development of a better organized civil society, capable of negotiating mutual benefits with the private sector. 

Émilie Lemieux is recipient of the 2009-2010 Gordon Global Fellowship from the Walter and Duncan Gordon Foundation, an independent Canadian organization dedicated to the development of sound and innovative public policies. She worked for a few years as a volunteer in Peru, with the Canadian NGO SUCO.

Investments

Latin America: A burgeoning investment destination

Latin American countries and other emerging countries are becoming more attractive and important destinations for foreign investments. The 2010 *Foreign Direct Investment Confidence Index* prepared by the consulting firm AT Kearney reports that senior executives of the world's largest companies polled have notably rated China, India and Brazil in their top five of favoured investment destinations. This points to the success and increasing role of emerging countries in the global economy and highlights the relative success of developing countries facing the global crisis compared with the performance of OECD countries.

Brazil and Mexico have both substantially risen as attractive destinations for foreign direct investment. Brazil is the fourth favourite destination for investors worldwide. Further, in the past year Mexico has climbed the ranking list, from the 19th place in 2009 to the eighth place in 2010.

Peru has also become a key destination for foreign investment in the region. Peru's gain has been achieved notably in relation to China's increased investments, including in the mining sector. This year, Peru's exports to China have already exceeded those destined to the United States. Moreover, for the first time in 2009 China has been Brazil's main commercial partner.

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ANNOUNCEMENTS

FOCAL launches new website

FOCAL launched its new website on Thursday, Sept. 16. The new site features comprehensive and detailed information regarding FOCAL's various programs, publications, events and our experts. It also offers new ways to stay connected to FOCAL, such as through our Twitter news feed and our Facebook page. Please visit www.focal.ca.

FOCAL signs MOU with UNDP

On Aug. 13, FOCAL signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)-Bolivia to jointly produce research on education and health issues regarding the Millennium Development Goals.

These goals, which range from tackling income poverty to achieving universal primary education to maternal and child mortality, were adopted by world leaders in 2000 with the aim of achievement by 2015. The research is expected to give important insights on how to improve education and health outcomes in this country.

The Canadian Foundation for the Americas is an independent, non-partisan think tank dedicated to strengthening Canadian relations with Latin America and the Caribbean through policy dialogue and analysis. FOCALPoint helps us accomplish our mission as a monthly publication combining news and analysis that reaches decision-makers, civil society, private sector, academics and students with an interest in the region. Our goal is to bring together diverse perspectives to make FOCALPoint a dynamic analytical forum.

With the exception of FOCAL Views, which is the official institutional stance of FOCAL, the opinions and analysis in FOCALPoint are those of the author and do not reflect the institutional position of FOCAL, its staff or its board.

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