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Obama, Cuba, and Latin America: Renewal and Reconciliation?

Archibald R.M. Ritter

The deterioration of United States relations with Latin America since 2000 has been momentous.

The Bush era has been characterized by serious mismanagement of policy toward the region. Moreover, Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez has succeeded in constructing an anti-US alignment which includes Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and perhaps Paraguay. Chavez has hurled insults at Bush and literally demonized him in the UN General Assembly. On September 9, he fabricated a confrontation and expelled US Ambassador Patrick Duddy. Will a Barack Obama Administration be able to turn this situation around and establish normal and friendly relations with the region?

An Obama presidency will have an unprecedented opportunity to improve the US’ relationship with Latin America and the Caribbean. Obama is a powerful symbol of the authenticity and vitality of democracy in the United States. His candidacy and likely election signify the beginning of a new era in which the baggage of past segregation and discrimination are set aside. This is a powerful message in the region and the world that demonstrates the “American Dream” lives. Obama’s election will be of particular interest to those countries where there are large Afro-Latino populations such as Brazil, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Peru and Venezuela as well as the Afro-Caribbean countries.

On the other hand, a McCain electoral victory–now improbable–would most likely lead to further deterioration in the US-Latin relationship.

The most eloquent and persuasive means of changing the reputation of the US in Latin America, indeed in much of the world, would be a policy of reconciliation toward Cuba. The US approach has been dysfunctional for 50 years. It has permitted Fidel Castro to portray himself as the nationalist champion defending Cuban sovereignty against the US. It has also provided a pretext for denying basic human rights to Cuban citizens and maintaining the Communist Party monopoly on power.

Undoubtedly an Obama Administration will be preoccupied with the economic crisis that likely will continue after the inauguration as well as with other issues. Relative to these, Cuba may seem of secondary significance. However, in view of the broader importance for its relations with Latin America and the world, it will be worth while for an Obama Administration to focus on US-Cuban relations. Moreover, Obama’s freedom of action regarding Cuba will improve after the elections. If the Democrats win large majorities in the House and the Senate, Obama could ignore the hard-line Cuban-American lobbies and legislators. The Cuban-American community also has become more moderate vis-à-vis Castro’s Cuba.

How might a new Obama Administration proceed regarding Cuba?
One approach would be to “cut the Gordian knot” and normalize relations unilaterally and immediately. This has been rejected by Obama who stated that full normalization and an end to the embargo would come only with “meaningful democratic change” in Cuba. On the other hand, a “tit-for-tat” approach requiring major reciprocal Cuban action for US policy initiatives would likely fail as Cuba under Raul Castro is unlikely to move toward political liberalization any time soon.

Perhaps an intermediate step-by-step approach in which the US takes major initiatives unilaterally and then awaits changes on the Cuban side is a preferable option.

One possible intermediate approach might include the following:

Phase 1:
• A re-statement that the ultimate objective of US policy, such as that of most countries in the western world regarding Cuba, is the establishment of a pluralistic democratic political system and full respect for basic human rights;
• Re-assurance that the US has no territorial aspirations regarding Cuba, a claim often made by Fidel Castro in the past;
• Freedom for Cuban-Americans to travel and to make remittance payments to their families in Cuba, already proposed by Obama and welcomed in Miami;
• Renewed dialogue between governments on issues such as migration and drugs;
• Removal of Cuba from the list of terrorist countries;
• Closing the Guantánamo prison (existing Obama policy);
• Closing the ineffective “Commission for a Free Cuba” and dropping the Helms-Burton Act.

Phase 2:
• Extension for all Americans of freedom to travel and send remittances to Cuba;
• Support for Cuban membership in the IMF, World Bank, Inter-American Bank, and OAS, should Cuba wish to join;
• Full diplomatic relations and cancellation of the embargo.

Phase 3:
• Withdrawal from Guantánamo, perhaps with creative provisions regarding future access and opening to a free trade zone arrangement. Guantánamo produces no economic or strategic benefit for the US but could be a valuable new city, transport hub and “growth pole” for Cuba with possible benefits for the US as well.
• Agreement to deal with US compensation claims versus Cuba and Cuban claims versus the US in a creative and conciliatory manner.

Following Phase 1, Cuba would be expected to release all political prisoners, provide Cuban citizens with freedom to travel outside the country and drop the venomous invective used in dealing with the US. After Phase 2, Cuba would grant US enterprises the same rights as those from other countries to trade and invest. In Phase 3, Cuba would be expected to move toward pluralistic democracy, implement freedom of expression and of assembly and collaborate constructively on Guantánamo and the compensation issues. Cuba’s economic organization would not enter the picture. An authentically democratic Cuba would find its own way pragmatically toward a mixed economy.

Would Cuba participate constructively in a pro-active and generous reconciliation process initiated by the United States?

This is hard to answer. A key Communist Party ideologist, Armando Hart, 78, has stated that with Obama’s election “a new stage will begin in the ideological combat between the Cuban Revolution and imperialism.” If a hard-line view were to prevail in Cuba, a reconciliation process might stop after Phase 1. However, a new generation of leaders is likely to be more pragmatic and less burdened by the past. There are major advantages for Cuba in responding pragmatically in a process such as the above, namely a huge infusion of tourist revenues, new trade possibilities, the return of Guantánamo, and new technologies. Technology is especially important for petroleum extraction with an estimated 20 billion barrel deep-water deposit in the North Cuban Basin.

If Obama, with traditional American magnanimity, is able to restructure the relationship with Cuba and encourage its return to genuine democracy, the dead weight that damages US relations with the Latin America and the world will be released.

Archibald Ritter is a Professor Emeritus in the Department of Economics and the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University.

Printed from:	November 2008, Volume 7, Issue 8 ISSN 1703-7964
Obama, Cuba, and Latin America: Renewal and Reconciliation? Archibald R.M. Ritter The deterioration of United States relations with Latin America since 2000 has been momentous. The Bush era has been characterized by serious mismanagement of policy toward the region. Moreover, Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez has succeeded in constructing an anti-US alignment which includes Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and perhaps Paraguay. Chavez has hurled insults at Bush and literally demonized him in the UN General Assembly. On September 9, he fabricated a confrontation and expelled US Ambassador Patrick Duddy. Will a Barack Obama Administration be able to turn this situation around and establish normal and friendly relations with the region? An Obama presidency will have an unprecedented opportunity to improve the US’ relationship with Latin America and the Caribbean. Obama is a powerful symbol of the authenticity and vitality of democracy in the United States. His candidacy and likely election signify the beginning of a new era in which the baggage of past segregation and discrimination are set aside. This is a powerful message in the region and the world that demonstrates the “American Dream” lives. Obama’s election will be of particular interest to those countries where there are large Afro-Latino populations such as Brazil, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Peru and Venezuela as well as the Afro-Caribbean countries. On the other hand, a McCain electoral victory–now improbable–would most likely lead to further deterioration in the US-Latin relationship. The most eloquent and persuasive means of changing the reputation of the US in Latin America, indeed in much of the world, would be a policy of reconciliation toward Cuba. The US approach has been dysfunctional for 50 years. It has permitted Fidel Castro to portray himself as the nationalist champion defending Cuban sovereignty against the US. It has also provided a pretext for denying basic human rights to Cuban citizens and maintaining the Communist Party monopoly on power. Undoubtedly an Obama Administration will be preoccupied with the economic crisis that likely will continue after the inauguration as well as with other issues. Relative to these, Cuba may seem of secondary significance. However, in view of the broader importance for its relations with Latin America and the world, it will be worth while for an Obama Administration to focus on US-Cuban relations. Moreover, Obama’s freedom of action regarding Cuba will improve after the elections. If the Democrats win large majorities in the House and the Senate, Obama could ignore the hard-line Cuban-American lobbies and legislators. The Cuban-American community also has become more moderate vis-à-vis Castro’s Cuba. How might a new Obama Administration proceed regarding Cuba? One approach would be to “cut the Gordian knot” and normalize relations unilaterally and immediately. This has been rejected by Obama who stated that full normalization and an end to the embargo would come only with “meaningful democratic change” in Cuba. On the other hand, a “tit-for-tat” approach requiring major reciprocal Cuban action for US policy initiatives would likely fail as Cuba under Raul Castro is unlikely to move toward political liberalization any time soon. Perhaps an intermediate step-by-step approach in which the US takes major initiatives unilaterally and then awaits changes on the Cuban side is a preferable option. One possible intermediate approach might include the following: Phase 1: • A re-statement that the ultimate objective of US policy, such as that of most countries in the western world regarding Cuba, is the establishment of a pluralistic democratic political system and full respect for basic human rights; • Re-assurance that the US has no territorial aspirations regarding Cuba, a claim often made by Fidel Castro in the past; • Freedom for Cuban-Americans to travel and to make remittance payments to their families in Cuba, already proposed by Obama and welcomed in Miami; • Renewed dialogue between governments on issues such as migration and drugs; • Removal of Cuba from the list of terrorist countries; • Closing the Guantánamo prison (existing Obama policy); • Closing the ineffective “Commission for a Free Cuba” and dropping the Helms-Burton Act. Phase 2: • Extension for all Americans of freedom to travel and send remittances to Cuba; • Support for Cuban membership in the IMF, World Bank, Inter-American Bank, and OAS, should Cuba wish to join; • Full diplomatic relations and cancellation of the embargo. Phase 3: • Withdrawal from Guantánamo, perhaps with creative provisions regarding future access and opening to a free trade zone arrangement. Guantánamo produces no economic or strategic benefit for the US but could be a valuable new city, transport hub and “growth pole” for Cuba with possible benefits for the US as well. • Agreement to deal with US compensation claims versus Cuba and Cuban claims versus the US in a creative and conciliatory manner. Following Phase 1, Cuba would be expected to release all political prisoners, provide Cuban citizens with freedom to travel outside the country and drop the venomous invective used in dealing with the US. After Phase 2, Cuba would grant US enterprises the same rights as those from other countries to trade and invest. In Phase 3, Cuba would be expected to move toward pluralistic democracy, implement freedom of expression and of assembly and collaborate constructively on Guantánamo and the compensation issues. Cuba’s economic organization would not enter the picture. An authentically democratic Cuba would find its own way pragmatically toward a mixed economy. Would Cuba participate constructively in a pro-active and generous reconciliation process initiated by the United States? This is hard to answer. A key Communist Party ideologist, Armando Hart, 78, has stated that with Obama’s election “a new stage will begin in the ideological combat between the Cuban Revolution and imperialism.” If a hard-line view were to prevail in Cuba, a reconciliation process might stop after Phase 1. However, a new generation of leaders is likely to be more pragmatic and less burdened by the past. There are major advantages for Cuba in responding pragmatically in a process such as the above, namely a huge infusion of tourist revenues, new trade possibilities, the return of Guantánamo, and new technologies. Technology is especially important for petroleum extraction with an estimated 20 billion barrel deep-water deposit in the North Cuban Basin. If Obama, with traditional American magnanimity, is able to restructure the relationship with Cuba and encourage its return to genuine democracy, the dead weight that damages US relations with the Latin America and the world will be released. Archibald Ritter is a Professor Emeritus in the Department of Economics and the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University.
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