I. POLITICAL CITIZENSHIP AND PARTICIPATION

A key factor underlying political instability in the Andean region is the wide-spread disenchantment with political democracy and its failure to translate into tangible improvements in civil rights and social and economic aspects of citizenship for a majority of the populations. This disjuncture remains a foremost challenge for development, and has lead to widespread patterns of sometimes-violent mobilization and in some cases the toppling of governments.

Effective political participation is crucial for engaging the electorate, linking citizens and state institutions. Currently, political participation is constrained by a variety of factors, including the decline of political parties in the region as well as pervasive inequality, poverty. However counter trends in citizen participation include the emergence of viable indigenous parties, effective mobilization within civil society, and the use of democratic channels to effect significant political change. Drawing upon country-contexts, the first two panels of the FOCAL-FLACSO Forum addressed the constraints to, and prospects for expanding citizen participation in political life, the rise of new political actors as well as the current crises of formal political parties and governability in the region.

Political Parties and Citizen Participation

In a recent paper, Hershberg and Drake (2003) identify four inter-connected aspects of this ‘Andean predicament’: the lack of a national project; the absence of viable alternative economic models for development; the prevalence of unregulated and unmediated forms of participation; and increased challenges to governability. These challenges were affirmed and looked at in more detail in the first panel of the Forum on Broadening Citizenship in the Andes. The panel took, as its starting point, the idea that relations between states and citizens in the Andean region are deteriorating due to...
domestic and international challenges and constraints. While citizen engagement in
democratic politics has been ‘shaky’ throughout the post-transition period, these
weaknesses have, in recent years, given rise to increased public reaction outside of
institutional channels leading to heightened political instability—what F. Gutiérrez Sanin
referred to as an “activation” of anti-political sentiment. (Reflecting a combination of
sustained economic problems, pervasive insecurity, and unmet expectations of
governance and democracy).

In addition to root causes of inequality and poverty, political exclusion was identified as a
critical factor exacerbating dissatisfaction and increasing the alienation of low and
middle-income sectors. Panelists emphasized that this discontent has manifested itself
in disparate ways throughout the region—the challenges confronting parties and citizen
participation are by no means homogeneous, ranging from ousting Presidents in Bolivia
and Ecuador, mass mobilization and extreme polarization in Venezuela, anti-party
politics in Peru, and prohibitive political violence in Colombia.

The disintegration and/or failure of political parties to fulfill their role in representing and
mediating between citizens and the state has appropriately become a priority of research
as well as domestic and foreign policies. Panelists also noted that the increasing
polarization—social, political and economic—is reflected within legislatures, resulting in
what several panelists termed a crisis of alliance formation and coalition governance.
The inability of governing parties and presidents to form political alliances in turn has
lead to an incapacity to implement social and economic reforms, creating a cycle of
discontent.

A crisis of alliance formation...

“...in all countries, the capacity to govern and implement social, political, and economic reforms is contingent upon the ability to construct alliances in what are increasingly polarized societies...”
The weakness and ineffectiveness of institutions was also emphasized as a key obstacle in this regard. One panelists pointed out, for example, that electoral systems that combined corporatist politics with second round run-off elections inhibit coalition-building among parties by design, making majority government in Congress an impossibility. Ultimately, however, effective citizen participation requires political stability as well as the resources and will to build working institutions that garner public trust.

Latinobarométre’s 2003 survey on citizen confidence in democratic institutions highlights the validity of this concern—as the graph below shows, political parties, the primary vehicle for citizen participation, have the lowest level of public confidence, and continues on a downward trend, dropping to well below 20% in 2003:

Box. 1 - Declining Confidence in Institutions in Latin America 1996-2003

There was agreement around a set of key issues & challenges facing political parties (albeit in different contexts) that need to be addressed in order to improve citizen-state relations:

- That the problems underlying ineffective citizen participation in political life stem, in large part, from the weakness (and in some cases the decline), of political parties, recognizing that political democracy unquestionably requires parties, as the most important means for potential participation.

- Although recent resurgence of ‘anti-politics’ and the informalization of politics in the region has, in some cases opened spaces for citizens to voice demands, extra-institutional action is not a sustainable option for systematic democratic participation. For this reason, building effective political parties must be a priority.

- The failure to reach consensus within coalition governments as well as opposition in many of the countries in the region prohibits the implementation of long term
agendas for development. Perpetual blockage of new legislation or reform also increases the likelihood of tendencies to centralize power within the presidency and look to less democratic ways to move agendas forward.

- These issues present significant challenges for international donors, given the domestic and political nature of parties and participation. Innovative ways to provide resources, exchange lessons learned, build capacity of civil & political actors and resources for mediation & conflict resolution should all be considered.

**Political Citizenship II: New Political Actors**

The deterioration of relations between states and citizens in the Andean region, exacerbated by domestic and international challenges, and characterized in many cases by the circumstances outlined in the previous section, has given rise to increased political and social activity inside and outside of institutional channels. The emergence of these actors – labeled by some the “anti-politics” or “anti-systemic” movement – has caused further fragmentation and heightened political instability. However, others have noted the positive and possibly transformative potential associated with the effective mobilization of communities and civil society, and the use of democratic channels to effect significant political change.

The second panel on political citizenship set out to examine the forms and potential of these new political actors, assessing their role in expanded citizen participation in political life, and how they will affect the consolidation or reformulation of representative political parties. To do this, panelists were interested in examining instances of this new participation in action, as well as the exploring existing relations between citizens and political parties – argued too be one of the root causes of the decline of traditional systems and a barrier to transformed and strengthened citizenship.

(Forum Panelists, from left to right: Aldo Panfichi, Carlos de la Torre, Carmen Martínez, Gabriel Murillo, Fernando Bustamante).

During discussions panelists reaffirmed that although all of countries in the region were affected by the problems outlined in the first panel – weak political parties, ineffective
states, weak state-citizen linkages and the growth of non-traditional actors – these “crises” did not affect all of the Andean countries in the same way or with the same results – nor did they necessarily have the same underlying causes. All presenters underscored the fact that theory is rarely translated uniformly into reality and there is a need for empirical research to determine the context and variables of each situation.

Box. 2 – New Political Actors at the Local level – Decentralization in the Andes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Key Points</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>In the 2000 elections, 12 years after decentralization was introduced 62% of municipalities were under one of two traditional parties. 11% of all winning municipal candidates had the backing of more than one party. In total there are more than 40 political parties, in addition to the Liberals and Conservatives that govern at the local level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>The 1989 decentralization law mandated the election of state governors and over 300 mayors. By 2000, fragmentation of traditional parties had taken hold, with independent and coalitions parties firmly in command: 76% of mayoralities were coalitions of large and local, independent parties. 12.3% were one-party independent candidates, while the two traditional parties – AD and COPEI – who ran one-party candidates won only 6.3% of municipalities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>The decentralization law was passed in 1994. In the 1999 elections the three traditional parties (MNR, ADN and MIR) were able to maintain 51% of local council wins, however, despite provisions requiring all parties to have a national-level affiliation, 11 ethnic and local-level parties tripled their votes to capture 28% of the vote share.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>In 2002 newly elected President Toledo’s reinstated mayoral and sub-national posts, holding elections for governors and mayors in November of that year. At the departmental level regional parties won 8 (32%) of the governor spots, capturing over 40% of the popular vote. In the local elections 398 municipal parties presented candidates in at least one municipality, and small or local parties won 53% of the mayorships.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


For example, one panelist argued that despite claims of a regional “crisis of representation”, political parties in Ecuador are weak nationally, but are strong at the local level, buoyed by recent decentralization and the growth of parties/movements responding to particular interests. Instead it was argued that the crisis is related not necessarily to the absence of representation, but rather is a function of the type of relationship that exists between state/political parties and the electorate, which has in turn affects the concept and exercise of citizenship in Ecuador.

Unlike the relationships found in theoretical examples and consolidated liberal democracies, which are based in principle on societies of equals and often involve adherence to a social contract between representatives and the electorate, in Ecuador this “contract” takes on a very different form. As one panelists argued, the electorate delegates power to the elected representatives in order to be “taken care of”. This relationship, based on a society of difference, has its roots in the colonial encomienda system and generates political relationships based on corporatism, family ties, difference of status and the creation of networks of reciprocity. This system underscores the
fundamental gap between the formal methods and theory of liberal democracy, and the sociological reality that exists in the country.

These dysfunctional relationships, based on inequality and maintained by the absence of the rule of law, have produced a citizenry that lack avenues to exercise power or ways to have their needs met apart from the skewed and tenuous systems of clientelism and corporatism. In this context, the “new political actors” may indeed be including the voices and concerns of diverse and previously marginalized groups. However, in many cases the fundamentals of the system do not change with the emergence of these actors – who tend to direct their attention to new group of citizens (women, poor, indigenous) but continue to link citizenship and access to services to membership in a particular group. There is not necessarily a change in the type of relationship between elected and elector or a strengthening of state-society links; nor is the way the system or political parties integrate and aggregate interests altered. Instead, it was argued that what is needed to effect substantial change is to “secularize” the concept of citizenship so that it does not fluctuate with style or affiliation of the leader: The rule of law must be strengthened and rights of all citizens must be acknowledged and respected equally.

Case Studies – Peruvian Mesas de Concertación

In addition to a redefinition and expansion of citizenship, a community-based study of collective action at the local level also underscored the fact that not all of the new forms of participation and political action have the same impact. Recounting the findings from a case study of two Peruvian communities that survived the violence of the 1980s, a panelist highlighted the practical and real characteristics/ experiences that shaped the ability of citizens and civil society organizations to effectively mobilize and interact with municipal leaders. The scale of the study provides some interesting insights into community dynamics and underscores the need for empirical study, warning against the tendency to generalize problems at the national or regional level.

In both of the communities studied, the populations live in extreme poverty, speak Quechua and live in post-war zones, where between 1980 and 1995 65,000 people were killed – 90% of whom were peasants. In both cases the communities tried to form mesas de concertación (consultation groups) to engage with the local municipalities and devise a functioning regional plan. However, the communities had different degrees of success in creating these consultation mechanisms.

Upon reflection, key differences were identified that affected communities success at generating improved citizen-municipality links. In the first instance the effect of violence on society played a role. In the case of Huanta, the violence was generalized and caused many, including community leaders, to flee. In the second community the violence was not as intense, allowing for the survival of some community unity and leadership. The effects of violence in turn affected the nature of the civil society that emerged after the violence, and the role of individuals in leadership of these movements: in the first case community leadership was undertaken mainly by individuals from outside of the community, and was taken over by a personalistic leader. In the second community, surviving leaders renewed participation efforts and created a community-supported process.
Box. 3 – Characteristics of Participation in *Mesas de Concertacion* – Peru

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Huanta</th>
<th>Chuscampa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Most affected war zone</td>
<td>Transit zone of troops, but not the heart of the conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mesas led by a new leadership, who had left the community and returned when the violence had ended</td>
<td>Community resisters stayed in the zone and survived the war and led renewed participation efforts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership became was taken over by personalistic/charismatic leader</td>
<td>Leadership was not centered on one person or group, but was a community leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation of participatory budget</td>
<td>Space of deliberation and dialogue with economic, social and political actors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased polarization between municipality and civil society, loss of credibility and return to clientelism</td>
<td>Development of a vigilant civil society, transparent and supported by the community base</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


From the discussions key ideas emerged that merit further thinking to support active citizenship and the productive inclusion of new political actors:

- There is the need for a more detailed look at what is understood – in theory and practice – by citizenship in these countries. How do citizens relate to states/parties? What do they expect from them? What rights and responsibilities do they confer on their elected leaders? Does this conception create accountable and responsive representatives?

- Panelists underscored the need for detailed and empirical research to provide greater understanding of specific circumstances to identify key factors and move beyond generalizations. For example, the “crisis of representation” label must be deconstructed for each country to uncover the particular relationships, structures and challenges that countries face.

- There is a need to “secularize” the terms and understanding of citizenship and provide unalienable foundations grounded in the rule of law.

- Policy makers and practitioners must distinguish between national and local level circumstances and phenomena, as different levels present different problems and challenges.
Box. 4 – Linking political citizenship and socio-economic exclusion

The practical constraints of inadequate political citizenship are outlined below, based on research on social exclusion in Bolivia undertaken in 2002-3 by the Pro Citizens’ Participation Consortium. The everyday challenges faced by many non-citizens in the region shed light on the links between political, social and economic dimensions of citizenship. As the points below demonstrate, those without legal citizens status “face a situation of illegality for which they are not responsible. There are a series of obstacles in the administrative system that do not allow them to access state services and so inhibits the full realization of their rights. This lack of documentation facing many poor people leads to further impoverishment, as their exclusion from identification services means they cannot exercise other rights.”

Examples of such impediments include:
- Lack of documentation is an obstacle to obtaining birth certificate, necessary to enroll in primary or secondary schools.
- It is difficult, if not impossible, for an undocumented community leader to get a formal community leadership position, particularly if they are illiterate, as their lack of documentation would make it impossible to negotiate official proceedings or projects for their community.
- Without documentation, individuals cannot legalize the status of their property (land, housing) in public registries.
- They are not able to access a loan in micro-finance schemes, even from those programmes designated for the extreme poor.
- They are unable to initiate legal proceedings, nor take on their own legal defence when sued.
- Paradoxically, they cannot access social benefits aimed at the “poorest,” which often require documentation.
- The undocumented do not have legal access to natural resources, for example titling of collective lands.
- They face difficulties when receiving mail packages or remittances sent in their name.
- They cannot participate in the democratic process, not as voters and even less as candidates.

Source: Social Exclusion, Rights and Chronic Poverty In Bolivia, research by the Pro Citizens’ Participation Consortium p. 4 (2002)

II. SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP AND SECURITY

In addition to the challenges of formal political citizenship, the broad set of social, economic and civil rights also associated with citizenship under democracy have yet to be realized in most countries in the region. The paradox of electoral democracy co-existing with high levels of inequality, exclusion, violence and human rights abuses presents perhaps the greatest challenge for thinking about democracy and development. These challenges give rise to two distinct lines of analysis which were addressed in the third and fourth panels of the Forum. On the one hand they have resulted in a growing body of research and thinking about social dimensions of citizenship, and on the other, the links between citizenship and issues of security in the region.

Social Citizenship & Citizen Participation: Beyond Formal Political Spheres

The first panel focused on the conceptualization of social citizenship as well as concrete examples of citizen participation beyond formal political spheres from the region and Canada. Ideas about ‘social citizenship’ find their roots in the mid-twentieth century, (notably T.H. Marshall), and the distinction between the formal legal and political rights and those associated with social and economic well-being, including access to health, education, a livelihood etc., formally recognized in international guidelines and U.N. legislation.

Panelists highlighted the failure to address the social dimensions of citizenship throughout the region, and the tensions and trade-offs that exist between the implementation of political versus social aspects of citizenship. In spite of the
weaknesses of political participation raised in preceding panels, the focus on formal political rights and subsequent individual economic rights in the post-democratic transition period, has come at the expense of social citizen rights. Although development policy in the region has addressed basic needs such as housing, health and education, these have had a tendency to be conceptualized as ‘charity’—distinct from the notion of fundamental ‘citizen rights.’ Similarly, in domestic regional politics, these rights have been part of corporatist political processes, whereby social goods were allocated as a means to influence political incorporation, reinforcing patterns of social stratification. Panelists emphasized that the “de-politicization” of social rights remains a practical and conceptual challenge for researchers and policy-makers in the region.

The inadequate focus on social rights emphasized by members of this panel, was attributed in part to: the high costs associated with fulfilling social rights as compared to political and legal processes; the complexities that the scope and implementation of these rights entailed; and the tension between reducing the size of states, that has been a significant development thrust of the past several decades, and state capacity to address these obligations. (This has begun to be been reconsidered in the post-Washington Consensus period, with a renewed focus on integrating economic growth with social priorities).

Panelists highlighted that research and discussion about social citizenship has tended to focus on the bottom-up struggles to claim rights, which have increased in the wake of states’ failure in addressing social rights, attention to the capacity of states to fulfill these rights merits further attention. It was also suggested that in fact rights were more likely to be negotiated and agreed to by ‘weak’ states, given greater pressure to bargain and need for consent. By the same token, however, ‘weak states’ are also more susceptible to “violating their end of the bargain” and not following through, or dismantling particularly more costly social rights.

It was also pointed that out that although rights are set and implemented at the national level, a more nuanced (or “multi-scalar” approach) is useful in understanding how social
rights are claimed and fulfilled at local, regional, national and international levels. This in turn focuses attention on the relation between decentralization and the transfer of social rights from the national to local levels throughout much of the region.

Several trends and key points regarding the realization of social citizen rights were raised by panelists, including:

- The capacity of weak states to implement social rights associated with citizenship;
- Even with public and political will to implement these elements of ‘substantive democracy,’ to what extent do states in the region have the institutional capacity and resources required to implement and sustain them?
- Research is needed on social citizen rights at local, regional as well as national levels, how they are inter-related and affected by political processes including decentralization.

Box 5 – Successful struggles for socio-economic rights – Example from Bolivia

Successful Resistance: Water Wars in Bolivia.

“The Water Revolt: in 1997 the World Bank told the Bolivian government that $600M in debt relief depended on the privatization of the water in Cochabamba. In 1999 Bechtel in a one-bidder process got the contract and immediately price of water went up for up to 200%. A coalition of farmers, workers and environmental groups was formed to challenge the privatization “Coalition for the Defense of Water and Life, La Coordinadora. It organized a city wide general strike that shut down the city for three days. Blockades closed two main highways, the airport was shut, and thousands of Cochabambinos’ occupied the city’s central plaza. The government promised to review water tariffs but broke its word and the Coordinadora announced a march that was declared illegal. More than 175 people were wounded. The government lost legitimacy and announced a rollback rate for six months. The Coordinadora leaders demanded the cancellation of the contract: they announced a general strike and blockade of highways until Bechtel would be forced to leave. A meeting with the archbishop as mediator took place and then President Banzer, imprisoned all Coordinadora leaders in a remote jail, and soldiers forced TV and radio to shut down. The public response was quick, and revolt spread. Alerted by Democratic Center reports, hundreds of people sent emails to Bechtel’s CEO demanding that the company leave. Ultimately the company left, the water contract was cancelled and a new publicly controlled company was established.”


Citizenship and Regional Security

The need for security and the absence of violence is a basic prerequisite for effective citizenship and the exercise of its attendant rights. Conversely, weak and limited citizenship tends to exacerbate social costs – which create situations prone to violence, crime and conflict. The fourth and final panel examined the diverse aspects of security in the Andean region, as a fundamental material dimension of citizenship, examining the causes, as well as the constraints to the successful resolution of these situations. On one hand deteriorating political and economic circumstances have increased the incentives and space for violence and conflict – on the other hand weak institutions, fractured congresses, disintegrating political parties and large budget constraints have made it more difficult for national governments to deal effectively with these problems.

As internal conflicts have intensified, the groups of actors involved has diversified and the profits become more lucrative (particularly in Colombia), there has been a regionalization of the conflict. As the character of drug production and trafficking becomes multinational, and displaced persons, laundered money and guerilla groups
increasingly cross boarders, the response to these situations has also become progressively “internationalized”, keeping step with globalization of trade, financial and economic processes. The regionalization of the problem and the internationalization of the response has further affected national governments’ policies and their ability to deal with domestic and foreign security questions. In many cases international input has caused a “reframing” of domestic issues (both security and non-security) according to external concerns and values – asymmetry of power relationships leads to “the imposition of the most powerful actor’s agenda”.

Table. 1 – US Aid to Colombia (millions of dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Aid</th>
<th>1997</th>
<th>1998</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003*</th>
<th>2004**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military and Police Assistance</td>
<td>88.56</td>
<td>112.44</td>
<td>308.81</td>
<td>765.32</td>
<td>224.68</td>
<td>374.61</td>
<td>532.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic and Social Assistance</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>8.75</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>5.65</td>
<td>127.5</td>
<td>154.8</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: compiled by the Center for International Policy – Colombia project (www.ciponline.org)
* Estimate plus supplemental request
** Requested

To illustrate these changes, panelists pointed to: the proliferation of negative interdependences regarding security and terrorism; the decrease of positive interdependence in commerce; economic fragmentation; and the negative affects on migration, which use be a positive exchange, but has been converted into a dangerous security issue. Panelists also highlighted the increasing militarization of security issues, which has been driven in part by the US tendency to focus almost exclusively on subversive “terrorists” groups and narcotraffickers. For example, the US government has turned its relation with Colombia into a “narcotraffic relation” – with the “War of Drugs” being one of the main (if only) ways the US engages the region. Finally, beyond the militarization of security there has also been a tendency to “securitize” things that were once social issues and under the control of civil authorities. As a result some countries have witnessed the increasing presence of the military in “political” or civil affairs (natural disasters, citizen security, social programs), which is in part caused by the weakness of civilian institutions.

This increasing “negative interdependence” and the privileging of the external conflict and security perceptions has placed priority on the stability of institutions, over their ability and efficiency to protect and serve citizens. The case of Colombia was provided as an example: Plan Colombia was originally conceived by former President Pastrana to have three consecutive steps: pacification, eradication of drugs and demobilization of guerrilla soldiers. However, these objectives were inverted after September 11 with the main focus placed on demobilization of guerrilla soldiers, supporting a hard line in Colombia. Unable to process internal demands the regionalization of both conflicts and their solutions has found governments hard pressed to adapt and respond to evolving, external challenges.

One area where there is some potential for positive development is the increasing participation of citizens in the area of security and related matters. Traditionally there has been little participation of sectors other than the military and executive in the
formation of defense and security policy – at the regional as well as sub-regional level. However, there is a limited but nascent movement among civil society organizations to contribute to both national and multilateral policy formation in this area. For the most part regional and multilateral bodies are responding slowly but positively to these efforts. Increased civil society activity supports the formulation of security policies that support both state and human safety.

Some key points challenges for citizenship and security, and points for potential research:

- There is a need for renewed research on current civil-military relations:
  - The existing paradox between the renewed emphasis on security, driven by the US, and the traditional concerns about the role of the military in Latin American democracies.
  - The blurring of the lines between civilian – military relations and activities in Venezuela and Ecuador).
- What are citizens’ and civil society’s priority themes in the face of these official agendas?
- Concern for the militarization of the security agenda (focused on narcotraffickers and “subversive” terrorists groups) and the effect that this thrust has on human rights and citizens in the region.
Agenda, FOCAL-FLACSO Andean Forum
Broadening Citizenship: Political Parties and New Trends in Participation
February 19-20, 2004, FLACSO-Quito, Ecuador

9:00-9:10 Opening Remarks: Canadian Ambassador O. von Finckenstein
Fernando Carrión, Director, FLACSO-Quito

THEME 1: POLITICAL CITIZENSHIP AND PARTICIPATION
A key factor underlying political instability in the Andean region is the widespread disenchantment with political democracy and its failure to translate into tangible improvements in civil rights and social and economic aspects of citizenship for a majority of the populations in the region. This disjuncture remains a foremost challenge for development, and has lead to widespread patterns of sometimes-violent mobilization and in some cases the toppling of governments. Effective political participation is crucial for engaging the electorate, linking citizens and state institutions. Currently, political participation is constrained by several factors, including the decline of political parties in the region and weak state-citizen linkages. However counter trends in citizen participation include the emergence of viable indigenous parties, effective mobilization within civil society, and the use of democratic channels to effect significant political change. Drawing upon country-contexts, the two panels under this theme will address the constraints to, and prospects for expanding citizen participation in political life, the rise of new political actors as well as the current crises of formal political parties and governability in the region.

Thursday 19 February

PANEL 1: POLITICAL CITIZENSHIP I: POLITICAL PARTIES AND CITIZEN PARTICIPATION
Moderator: Felipe Burbano

René Antonio Mayorga, Centro Boliviano de Estudios Multidisciplinarios
Crisis in political parties & governability (Bolivia)

Simón Pachano, FLACSO-Ecuador
Actors, Vetoes & Political Parties (Ecuador)

Anamaría San Juan, Universidad Central, Venezuela
Politics and citizen participation (Venezuela)

Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín, Universidad Nacional, IEPRI, Colombia
Current trends in political participation (Colombia)

David Scott Palmer, Boston University
Disintegration of political parties in Peru – Consequences for civil society

PANEL 2: POLITICAL CITIZENSHIP II: NEW POLITICAL ACTORS
Moderator: Carmen Martínez

Aldo Panfichi, Universidad Católica, Perú
New political actors and civil society participation (Perú)

Fernando Bustamante, Universidad San Francisco, Ecuador
New trends in citizen participation (Ecuador)
Carlos de la Torre, FLACSO-Quito  
*Relations between citizens and political parties (Ecuador)*

Gabriel Murillo, Universidad Los Andes, Colombia  
*Political parties as interlocutors between civil society & the State (Colombia)*

**THEME 2: SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP AND SECURITY**

The broad set of social, economic and civil rights associated with citizenship under democracy have yet to be realized in most countries in the region. The paradox of electoral democracy co-existing with high levels of inequality, exclusion, violence and human rights abuses presents perhaps the greatest challenge for thinking about democracy and development. These challenges give rise to two distinct lines of analysis which are addressed in the two panels listed below. On the one hand they have resulted in a growing body of research and thinking about broader social aspects of citizenship, and on the other, the links between citizenship and issues of security in the region. The first panel includes conceptual thinking about social citizenship as well as concrete examples of citizen participation beyond formal political spheres from the region and Canada. The final panel addresses diverse aspects of security in the Andean region, as a fundamental material dimension of citizenship.

**Panel 3:**  
**SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP: BROADENING CIVIL SOCIETY AND COMMUNITY-LEVEL PARTICIPATION**  
Moderator: Betty Espinosa

Carmenza Gallo, CUNY, New York  
*Conceptual aspects of social citizenship (Bolivia/Colombia)*

Margarita Lopez-Maya, Universidad Central, Venezuela  
*Participatory Democracy and Social Policy: The Case of Bolivarian Venezuela*

Cristina Rojas, Carleton University, Canada  
*Expanding social citizenship and participation (Colombia)*

Rianne Mahon, Carleton University, Canada  
*Social citizenship / comparative conceptual approaches (Canada / region)*

**DAY 2**

**Friday 20 February**

**Panel 4:**  
**CITIZENSHIP AND REGIONAL SECURITY**  
Moderator: Oswaldo Jarrín

Adrian Bonilla, FLACSO-Quito  
*Ecuador / Region*

David Scott Palmer, Boston University  
*Local responses to threats to citizen security (Peru)*

Bruce Bagley, University of Miami  
*Colombia / Region*