The Andean region continues to present some of the greatest challenges to our thinking about democracy and human rights. Political democracies appear to be relatively resilient in the Andean region, yet social and economic conditions have steadily declined through the 1990s and into the new millennium and substantive social and civil rights for a majority of citizens remain elusive. The thinness of citizenship in the region’s seemingly durable political democracies presents perhaps the greatest paradox and challenge for international engagement in the region.

Over the past decade, political and social scientists have clarified key threats to democracy in the Andes. From the political-institutional perspective, it is the problems of inadequate political representation, weak institutions, hyper-centralization of power, ineffective rule of law, and corruption that stand out. The associated weakness of social and civil rights are receiving increasing attention—particularly given their interconnected and somewhat paradoxical relationship with the deepening of political democracy, as poverty and inequality prevent a majority of citizens from participating in basic social, political, and economic life.

The persistence of these post-transition problems has given rise to varied research on deepening the quality of democracy in the Andean region. However, the translation of these analyses into tangible recommendations for domestic and international actors, particularly in light of significant political shifts in the region in the past year, remains to be addressed.

The Andean Forum set out to explore these issues with a focus on their implications for the international community. Panels on day one addressed the four title themes: The State of Democracy in the Region: An Overview; Political Parties, Representation, and Social Exclusion; the Impacts of Economic Reforms on Democratic Processes; and Shifts in Security in the Region. The second day focused on their implications for future international engagement.

Organized by the Canadian Foundation for the Americas (FOCAL) in partnership with the Peacebuilding and Reconstruction Initiative at the International Development Research Centre (IDRC), the Forum also received funding from the Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development (CCFPD), the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), the Centre for Security and Defense Studies (CSDS) of the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs (NPSIA), Carleton University, and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA).

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Report on the 2002 Andean Forum

This report highlights many of the key ideas generated by panelists and participants during the Forum, including the current political contexts of individual countries and major regional trends and challenges to improving the quality of democracy. Although the report does not aim to provide simple solutions, it identifies issues and areas for further research and policy development. The information contained in the report is based upon the presentations and discussion that took place during the Forum.

Changing political landscapes: instability and increasing polarization

Over the past year, the Andes have been characterized by change. Presidential elections in Colombia, Bolivia, and Ecuador have signaled significant political and policy shifts in the region. Political instability, a chronic condition in Ecuador, has resurfaced most dramatically in Venezuela with extreme political polarization leading to a failed coup and continued unrest. Instability has also been surprisingly persistent in Peru, despite a return to democracy and significant economic and social gains. Plummeting support for Toledo was reflected in regional elections dominated by Alan Garcia’s opposition APRA party. In Colombia, bi-partisan power-sharing came to an end with the election of Uribe, a dissident liberal with a hardliner platform to crack down on armed insurgents. This section looks at these shifts, their implications in each country, and goes on to ask what they signal for the state of and directions for democracy in the region.

A reconfiguration of party politics in Bolivia

Bolivia, known as a relatively stable political democracy in the region in recent history, has had an “equilibrated party system” in which power was shared alternately between two of the three dominant parties (the MNR, ADN and MIR), with alliances formed with two populist parties (Condepa and UCS) since return to civilian rule in 1982. However party stability came at the expense of the political inclusion of marginalized (indigenous) majority and contributed to the overall disengagement of the electorate from what had become a self-sustaining pact-making (vs. ideologically-driven) system. This configuration of traditional political parties came to an end in the 2002 elections with the successful emergence of new parties representing previously excluded indigenous and peasant communities. Together, the new parties (MAS and MIP) won 27% of the vote, representing what was referred to during the Forum as a shift from ‘systemic’ to ‘anti-systemic’ party competition. Evo Morales, the leader of MAS, representing coca-growing peasant organizations, came second overall in the elections with 20.94% of the vote, less than 2% behind the MNR under President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada. Key factors considered to have contributed to this political reconfiguration include: the development and consolidation of indigenous and peasant social movements following two decades of rigorous mobilization; institutional changes that broadened political participation (municipal decentralization and constitutional reform of National Congress); the dissolution of three of five traditional parties (ADN, Condepa, UCS) as a result of internal divisions and decline in support following the deaths of their founders; disenchantment with neoliberal economic policies and poor economic performance; failure of alternative development to compensate for elimination of coca crops affecting significant portion of rural population, and associated perception of US intervention in domestic policy (see Van Cott 2002).

It is still too early to tell what impacts this new configuration of party politics will have on socio-economic policies and more importantly on the day to day life of a primarily poor indigenous population. It is unlikely that inter-party pacts will be formed at the expense of ideologies to the same degree as before, as support for the MAS, for example, is contingent upon maintaining its supportive stance vis-a-vis cocaleros and Indigenous rights. If Morales is perceived to be trading
his position for more formal political capital, his popularity would likely quickly decline. The Sánchez de Lozada government will therefore have to make greater concessions on social and economic issues of the disenfranchised, brought to the table via MAS, than its predecessors have done. To do so without alienating the international financial institutions (IFIs) and foreign investment will be a key challenge. It will likely find itself in an increasingly conflictual relationship with the United States, particularly vis-à-vis drug policy, and ultimately might be confronted with legislative ‘stagnation’ in the face of strong, new party opposition.

However in many respects, this new configuration of party politics in Bolivia has positive implications for deepening democracy. It provides greater intra-institutional representation of a previously excluded majority. It also demonstrates significant resilience and capacity for adaptation and integration of the existing party system, which was more severely tested in these elections than in previous ones in recent history.

**Ecuador’s new government: new alliances, unlikely bedfellows…**

The victory of former army Colonel Lucio Gutiérrez of the Patriotic Society Party in Ecuador’s presidential elections in November 2002, on the one hand represented ‘politics as usual’: eleven different parties, former Presidents and wealthy populist-industrialist front-runners, and highly regionalized representation. The persistent problems of fragmented politics, severe political instability (six presidents in six years), extremely weak institutions (even relative to the region), important ethnic and class divisions, and looming economic crisis, created a familiar backdrop for the elections. On the other hand, the further decline of traditional center-right parties, an increasing polarization of politics, and the emergence of a successful alliance between ethnic movements and the military-left which brought Gutiérrez to power, all point to substantial changes in the Ecuadorian political landscape.

As the co-leader of the coup that ousted former President Jamil Mahuad in 2000, Gutiérrez’ track record as a democrat is not stellar. However it was his role in the coup that laid the groundwork for his recent election, as it forged an alliance with the largest indigenous movement – crucial to his Presidential win. The coalition between the indigenous movement and Gutiérrez’s party marked, for the indigenous movement, a return to alliance formation with non-ethnic movements which it had moved away from in the 1980s and early 1990s. Although Ecuador’s main Indigenous movement (under the umbrella of CONAIE – Confederacion de Nacionalidades Indigenas de Ecuador) had recognition throughout the hemisphere for strength of organization, political gains made in indigenous rights, and the increasing success of the Pachakutik political party, it had never occupied a majority space in formal national politics. Although its alliance with non-ethnic leftist parties backing Gutiérrez was a strategy to achieve this, it also reflected persistent internal divisions within CONAIE itself.

We are unlikely to see any dramatic policy shifts from the new President, despite his left-leaning campaign, critics’ innuendos of a “second Chavez”, and a tendency to promise all to everyone. His decisions will be constrained by the tenuous alliance of unlikely bedfellows that make up his coalition, which, even if it remains cohesive holds only 22 of the 100 seats in Congress. He is also constrained by the fact that he has very little room to maneuver, exacerbated by the economic policies imposed by dollarization – a main focus of all candidates’ election campaigns. Gutiérrez has already made it clear that he will not significantly disrupt the existing economic order, promising to meet debt obligations to the IMF. His post-election switch from campaign army fatigues to conservative suits and ties, reflect the center-left policy orientation that can be expected from his government. Despite too-high expectations and an anticipated continuation of political instability, greater indigenous representation in Ecuador’s formal political arena, particularly at the cabinet level, is a positive step forward for democratic representation.
Contradictory politics in Peru

By most measures, democracy in Peru has improved under Toledo, however public support for the new government continues to decline, to the point that many feel he many not complete his term. Gains made by the Toledo government include a rising GDP of about 3.5-4%, controlled inflation, new housing and work programs, the truth commission, signing of a list of common policy objectives, investigations into corruption, and tangible support for decentralization, with new regional government elections. This, apparently, is not enough to maintain the support of the electorate. Toledo's popularity has plunged since his election to less than 25%. Some decline was anticipated given the typically high expectations, a failure to reduce unemployment, and personal scandal that has haunted him since inauguration, but in spite of a capable cabinet, he seems unable to maintain public support. As a result, public backing for his only opponent, Alan Garcia of the APRA party, continues to grow, apparent in the regional elections in which Toledo's party, Peru Posible, won only one province out of twenty-five, with Garcia capturing twelve. Some analysts see Garcia’s likely victory in the next elections (if not sooner) as further evidence of a regional political shift to the left. An interesting contributing factor flagged during the Forum was the role that the media, and specifically polls on the president’s popularity, might be playing in exacerbating declining support (Conaghan 2002). Polls are being taken and published at a much greater rate than ever before, raising new questions about the media and its relation to democracy. Although the necessity of free press for democracy is well known, the role of the media in enhancing or undermining democratic rule requires further examination.

Colombia’s new government: security at the expense of democracy?

One of the most significant of the recent shifts in the Andean region was the victory of Alvaro Uribe in Colombia’s presidential elections, the independent candidate (dissident liberal) who took power in August of 2002. His election was unprecedented not only by its rupture of the longstanding two party system, but due to his hardline agenda which promoted military crackdown on insurgent groups towards ending the conflict, in contrast by the peace talks promised by previous presidents, and in the level of political support that he garnered and has held on to across the political / class spectrum. His victory was attributed to several factors including: disillusionment with decades of failed peace negotiations, an urbanization of violence which threatened populations that had previously felt insulated from the conflict, and a global shift in the discourse on terrorism.

It is on the subject of democracy that Uribe’s critics have voiced the most concern. Uribe’s hardliner platform hinges upon increases in military spending and U.S. involvement, and the implementation of controversial security measures involving civilians, including: a million-strong network of paid “informants”; which, in a country with rampant poverty and unemployment, is ripe for abuse; and the arming of peasants in areas with little state presence, increasing the likelihood of civilian targets. Under state of emergency powers, he has also implemented questionable policies on search and seizure, and begun to close or centralize key judicial offices. Critics fear that these measures will have repercussions for the democratic rights and protection of Colombian citizens.

Standing out as a right-wing exception to new presidents in the region, Uribe’s sustained popularity (over 70%) is contingent upon successful reduction of the conflict and reassertion of control over long-held rebel territories. His greatest challenge in the short term is the financing of his program, with a retracting economy that is predicted to grow by only 1.6% in 2002 and formal unemployment at an approximate 18+. Uribe’s victory and policy agenda also represent a new approach to security in Colombia, with repercussions for the region as a whole. This shift is explored as part of regional trends in a later section of the report.
Disappearing democratic stability: political crisis in Venezuela

Venezuela, for most of modern history, has been characterized as a resource-rich, politically stable democracy. It is currently one of the most politically polarized countries in the region, exacerbated by the election of Hugo Chávez in a landslide victory in 1998 (and again in 2000), on a socialist platform promoting a “Bolivarian Revolution.” Similar to other countries in the region, his election reflected the collapse of the two predominant traditional political parties, combined with increased poverty resulting from the economic decline of the oil-based economy during the 1990s. His populist economic policies, centralization of power through the reform of key institutions, politicization of the military, and fiery anti-elite and anti-business rhetoric radicalized political debate in Venezuela, and rapidly alienated middle and upper classes as well as key commercial and civil society sectors. Their opposition, and divisions within the military, which increasingly viewed him as a liability, lead to the brief coup in April 2001. The coup provoked international condemnation that underscored the lack of support for an undemocratic rupture in the constitutional order; the invocation of the new Inter-American Democratic Charter, and ended with Chávez’s reinstatement. Although many of his promises to improve their quality of life remain unfulfilled, support for Chávez continues to hover at approximately 25%—remarkably high relative to other leaders in the region.

In the Fall of 2002, political crisis loomed again, with months of general strikes, near economic collapse with the halt of oil production, and increasingly violent protest. Historically this type of unrelenting opposition combined with divisions within the military, have lead to coup d’etats in Latin America. Coup was again avoided, under international pressures and with the fragmented opposition unable to maintain the strike, facing economic crisis and without military backing. Chavez has emerged more determined than ever to stay in power, with retaliatory rhetoric and a tightening of the reigns of power that continue to cast doubt on his credentials as a democrat.

In terms of lessons to be learned from this crisis, what was particularly interesting was the role of the international community, which at times appeared disjointed yet ultimately came together to support the OAS’ search for a peaceful resolution. International involvement took different forms: initially driven by commitment to mediate the standoff by the OAS Secretary General Gaviria himself, it was followed by the formation of the “Group of Friends of Venezuela”, spearheaded by Brazil and including the US, Mexico, Chile, Spain and Portugal. The Group provided additional support for the OAS initiative and together they backed third intervention: two alternatives for resolution proposed by Jimmy Carter. Carter presented two options: a constitutional amendment, shortening the presidential term from the current six to four years, and a binding referendum that could revoke Chávez’s mandate in August 2003. Neither of these proposals were new, but the fact that they came from the international community, and not from government or opposition, made them more palatable.

In broader terms, the crisis in Venezuela underscores some of the key dilemmas of post-transition politics in Latin America. The fact that a military coup did not occur, and the apparent ‘institutional/constitutional’ loyalty of the military (which many attribute to purged pro-Chavez personnel and little capacity to rule) is a novel, positive trend for the region. On the other hand, the undemocratic use of democratic tools such as the early call for elections may set a dangerous, unsustainable precedent for the region. Although Chavez is clearly a creeping dictator, he has astutely not breached sufficient democratic norms to warrant his removal or even the invocation of the Inter-American Charter. He was also overwhelmingly elected in free and fair elections. It is not feasible for elections to be held whenever there is disapproval of a leader – it is an unaffordable and undemocratic option, that ignores the rules of the game of a Presidential system, and undermines the democratic channels that are in place for legitimate protest (including scheduled elections).
The media has also played a controversial role in Venezuela’s democratic life. Chavez has dominated the limited public media, including weekly radio broadcasts, while the private media is allied firmly with the opposition, resulting in extremely biased coverage of the ongoing unrest. Beyond the immediate instability, there are deeper concerns for Venezuela’s political future. There is no apparent political leader or party capable of bridging the growing rift between rich and poor, and the military is showing signs of restlessness along the sidelines, casting doubt on the resilience of Venezuelan democracy.

The involvement of the international community and OAS was extremely significant, and important that it persist with longterm support for what is bound to be a very unstable political decade. The crisis also highlights the growing need to strengthen civic culture and the promotion of democratic norms not only for governments but also (importantly) opposition parties and organizations and citizens at large. This is clearly a value-added area for Canadian engagement.

Some emerging regional trends
Given these country-specific shifts, what can be said about the region as a whole? Three trends stand out: the further decline of traditional political parties and related problems of representation; the associated exhaustion with economic reforms of the 1990s and the resulting turn to alternative leadership, and post 9-11 shifts in security discourse and doctrine in the region. The proceeding section will review these themes and the related trends / avenues for international engagement.

Decline of traditional political parties and related problems of political representation
Governments in Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador and Bolivia are testament to the deepening decline of traditional political parties in the region. The problems plaguing political parties have been well known for sometime: clientalism, fragmentation, poor linkages with society, weak or absent organizational structures for citizen participation beyond voting, and a perceived inability to respond to new contexts - globalization, market reforms, worsening inequality and poverty. These weaknesses, increasingly internalized by the parties themselves, have contributed to the dramatic decline in traditional party legitimacy and success, and increasing citizen disengagement from political participation through the late 1990s and new millennium. It was this disengagement, exacerbated by the failure of economic and political reforms to improve the lives of the poor, that created spaces for independent leaders / alternative actors to come to the fore and reconfigure regional politics. It is not the populist tendencies of the recently elected that are particularly new – rather it is the resurgence of substantial support for left leaning platforms that reflect political disenchantment and fatigue with consensus-style reforms.

In some cases, notably Bolivia and Ecuador, this shift has improved political representation for previously marginalized populations, arguably expanding the public sphere and democratizing political processes. In other cases, such as Venezuela, it has eroded the political center and served to radicalize politics to a dangerous degree. In most cases, it has lead to leaders winning on ‘anti-systemic’ platforms, which have little likelihood of translating into the promised policy shifts, given the narrow scope for policy changes available in fragmented governments and dependent economies.

Despite the positive inclusion of ‘others’ in formal politics, the further decline of traditional political parties will likely exacerbate the chronic problems of political representation in the region and the failure of political parties to represent the interests of the citizenry. This decline is widening a political void that cannot be filled over the longerterm by interest groups or social movements. As was pointed out in the Forum, the challenge of representation is to adequately reflect the
complexities and diversities that exist within society in political life and integrate them into decision-making processes. Although there are strong social movements in the region, in general, civil society organizations have been unable to replace parties as intermediaries between society and state, or mobilize sufficient national scope to substitute for party decline.

In fact, it is the combination of increasing strength and momentum of civil organizations, combined with a lack of capacity or inclination to take on a formal, political role, that has lead to situations of near-permanent mobilization, democratic ruptures, and more recently the election of outsiders, and in some cases undemocratic leaders. Lack of experience in political party building in the region has resulted in an absence of successful development of new, durable parties. Accordingly, despite two decades characterized by constitutional and institutional reforms, including significant redistributions of state power to subnational levels, political representation and accountability remain the key ‘Achilles heels’ of democracy in the region. Creating linkages between state and society and new mechanisms for accountability remain foremost challenges for research and development practise, in a climate of clientalism, informalism, and recurring populism and personalistic leadership.

Reform exhaustion
It is impossible to understand the changes in the Andean region without taking into account the impact of the latest round of political and economic reforms that came to the fore through the 1990s. The neo-liberal or “Washington Consensus” agenda was the singular focus, becoming part of loan conditionality and economic development. Through this period, economic policy-making became increasingly subordinate to the global economy. Critics alternately argue that the reforms came at the expense of increasing inequality without requisite social reforms, or that the reforms were never properly implemented. Regardless of the viewpoint, reform exhaustion has become pervasive, and was a key factor in the apparent shift to the left and recent reconfiguration of political landscape in the region. As was pointed out repeatedly in the Forum, democratization and the implementation of neo-liberal reforms has not diminished inequality (in fact has worsened it in many places). The relationship between the two requires careful consideration particularly given the tendency to divorce economic development from political analysis of the democracy in the region.

What can we expect as fall out from reform exhaustion that seems to have hit the region? Despite seeming rejection of neoliberal policies in the campaign promises of left-leaning leaders, once in power there seems to be a return to ‘more of the same’ with only slight modifications. This is largely the result of narrow scope for economic policy-making, the need to maintain favourable terms with IFIs and economic powerhouses such as the United States, and lack of viable alternatives. This discrepancy between promises and policies can undermine confidence in governments and leaders, deepening disillusionment. It was also emphasized during the Forum that reforms need to produce results in the everyday lives of citizens and suggested that a ‘back to basics’ approach might be one of the best options for economies in the region. What also became clear from discussion was the need to take a closer look at the impact of economic policy-making and reform on political processes and democracy as a whole. They are too often treated distinctly in both research and practise, however their inter-relation was evidenced in the shift in politics in the region and growing political disillusionment, in part due to the failure of economic reforms to make democracy felt in the everyday.
Areas of focus for policy and program-related research include:

- **political party (re)building**, strengthening the potential for social movements to engage in formal politics, and assessing the advantages and disadvantages of doing so;
- **promotion of civic culture** and democratic practices not only for government but equally as importantly for opposition parties and organizations (as evidenced by Venezuela crisis);
- the importance of a free media for the proper functioning of political democracy is well known; requiring more research / analysis are the role(s) played by the media in deepening or weakening (as in Peruvian case) democracy, including the impact of polls which have become more prevalent / frequent in era of expanded communications;
- **impacts of economic reform exhaustion**, and lack of results of a decade of reforms, not only on poverty but on support for democracy – recently called into questions with support for ‘anti-systemic’ leaders through the region;
- **policy options for new governments** – how they will balance policy-making constraints - both domestic (e.g. political fragmentation) and international (IFIs, trade policy etc.) with mandates for change, and the political implications of their inability to effect significant changes;
- impacts of **new regional demographics** on democratic politics (younger, urbanized, politically disengaged, greater inequity);
- how can a culture of democracy and social cohesion be created / reinforced both through transformation of institutions and strengthening citizenship through local level initiatives;
- **the paradox of political democracy without social or civil rights** resulting in disillusionment with political system and election of neopopulist leaders – multifaceted approach required at institutional level (effective transformation still key challenge), local level – how do people experience everyday citizenship / participation / engagement in socio-economic and political life.

**Shifts in regional security, implications for international engagement:**

Democratic transitions through the 1980s and 1990s brought with them a shift away from traditional security doctrines in the Andean countries. However events post-9-11 returned international focus to security in the region, and provided a new lens (of terrorism) through which to interpret longstanding conflicts. Although this shift has perhaps drawn greater international attention to ongoing conflicts, notably in Colombia, repercussions include a growing militarization of the region, potential imbalances in civil-military relationships, and an increasing risk of undemocratic practices as tighter security measures are implemented.

In the Colombian context, security and military crackdown have taken primacy over negotiated peace, threatening a roll back of democratic freedoms under emergency laws invoked by Uribe immediately after taking power. Many feel that these new laws and increased state powers are likely to affect civil society organizations and individual citizens more adversely than armed actors, who operate outside of the state. Ever-rising U.S involvement has also raised many concerns: counter terrorism has replaced war on drugs - further simplifying a complex situation and rationalizing increased US military engagement in conflict, without clear objectives or ends.

At the same time as US involvement grows, there appears to be a stepping-back on the part of other international actors notably from Canada and Europe. This is, on one hand, not surprising, as official negotiations with the guerrilla, in which the internationally community had previously
played an active role (as members of Group of 10 etc.) are on hold, and military involvement in the conflict is not considered a viable strategy. On the other hand, it is precisely as the conflict threatens to escalate that non-military, international engagement in a variety of local and national level peacebuilding activities is required. A key reminder from the Forum was that the international community (beyond the US) should not stand on the sidelines ‘waiting for peace,’ but persist, despite the ongoing conflict, with multifaceted strategies from preventative diplomacy to local peacebuilding, and support research on unresolved issues including reintegration, judicial reform, capacity-building within civil society. More support must also be given to strengthen individuals’ and group capacity to put into practise citizen rights, towards expanding a culture of democracy, severely undermined by decades of conflict, human rights abuses and pervasive corruption.

The usefulness of strengthening citizenship and citizen rights amidst conflict was provided by the example of Bogota, where elected officials have taken important steps in improving governance (through increased accountability and actualizing citizenship through citizen self regulation, for example) towards creating a culture of democracy. The positive results of these efforts include: increased incomes, a significant drop in homicide rates, reduction in motor vehicle accidents, improved rates of literacy and access to education and health services, self regulation for example in water usage, as well as a recovery of public space.

With regard to the Colombian conflict, participants at the Forum also emphasized the inseparability of human rights concerns from security agendas, or goals of strengthening democracy and justice. Despite constructive work by non-governmental organizations working in many instances at the local level in monitoring / accompaniment capacities, Canada’s role in promoting human rights at a higher level is compromised by its own failure to ratify regional and international human rights treaties.

Although the Colombian conflict and uneasy civil-military relations in Venezuela and Ecuador continue to make security, in the formal sense of the word, an ongoing priority, it was pointed out during the Forum that definitions of ‘security’ have broadened to include narcotics, environmental degradation, migration, poverty and citizen rights, particularly that of justice. Many of these diverse components of ‘security’ can conceptually be understood as part of the rights and obligations of a democracy—i.e. democratic security.

One of the multilateral mechanisms through which democratic security (in its political dimension) is being addressed is through the OAS. The past three years have seen a significant increase in active OAS involvement as a mediating force for democracy in the region, specifically via the implementation of the Inter American Democratic Charter, put into place by the OAS in 2001. The Charter is generally considered to represent a positive step towards supporting democratic security in the hemisphere, part of a new brand of ‘fast-acting’ multilateralism. Still in its infancy, there are key aspects which need to be added or improved upon to ensure the Charter’s sustainability and usefulness. Critics point out the need to more clearly define what actually constitutes a breach of the democratic order. As it stands, the Charter states only that invocation would be based on an “unconstitutional alteration or interruption of the democratic order” (Article 19), however these terms remain undefined. There are multiple ways that ‘alteration or interruption’ might be interpreted, which on the one hand ensures that action is not constrained by a narrow definition, but on the other makes for very vague ‘rules of the game,’ and is unable to capture grey-area threats or precursors to political crisis that might enable the Charter to be implemented in a preventative capacity.

The Charter is also criticized for lacking any real power to sanction, and is therefore unable to enforce its mandate. Hemispheric asymmetries of political and economic power make the issue of
sanctions, in relation to the non-compliance with the Charter, very sensitive and potentially controversial. Currently states can be threatened with expulsion from membership in the OAS, which has potential ‘shaming’ ability but does not carry ample weight. Additionally, the Charter is currently implemented on an emergency basis only, whereas ideally it should be able to help prevent political crises. This type of preventative capacity would require the development of a broader mechanism to report breaches in democracy, that was not restricted to government, but included non-governmental organizations in monitoring and forewarning. The inclusion of civil society organizations in a monitoring capacity would increase legitimacy of the Charter and its implementation. It is important that more research be undertaken on strengthening the preventative capacity of the Charter and the creation of a longterm reporting mechanisms drawing on lessons learned from similar mechanisms and experiences outside of the hemisphere, including existing human rights related instruments. It also apparent that the Charter, in order to be effective over the long term, needs greater financial and political capital from OAS member countries, not only to fulfill its current mandate, but to develop a preventative potential and learn from its early experiences through analysis and accumulation of best practises, by the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy (UPD) at the OAS.

A case in point is Venezuela, where the Charter was credited with helping re-establish democracy after the short-lived coup in April 2002. The OAS’ Secretary General Gaviria is attempting to build on this success in trying to initiate and mediate dialogue between the government and the opposition in the current political crisis. The ongoing crisis in Venezuela also emphasizes the need to define what counts as a constitutional breach, and deal with questions of by whom, as undemocratic practises have been deployed by both government and members of the opposition.

Areas of focus for policy and research include:

**Security related themes:**
- Implications of shift to post 9-11 ‘terrorist lens’ – what are risks for democracy and human rights from shifts in security doctrines and increasing militarization of the region?
- Canada, with likeminded countries, needs to engage in security-related intervention in Colombia despite an escalation of the conflict – in areas of peacebuilding, justice, human rights monitoring and migration; and reflect the intrinsic link between security and human rights, democracy and citizenship in its policies and programming;
- **Strengthening / support for the Inter-American System**
  - Creation of a monitoring mechanism for the Democracy Charter through which civil society organizations can participate;
  - Moving from crisis management to prevention;
  - Establishing clearer guidelines on democratic security and what defines a breach of democracy;
  - Financial and political support to the UPD for the development of the Democratic Charter (given Canada’s positive role in its conception and implementation it would be useful to take on leadership role in this area);
  - Analysis of (changing) roles of regional institutions – how can Canada more effectively engage?
- Multilateral efforts to prevent the persistent trend of elected leaders in the region to put democracy temporarily ‘on hold’ to enforce reforms and centralize power;
- Research (and resources) on longterm political life of the Summit mandate, focusing on ways to effectively translate the 2001 Summit principles and promises into practise, and put in place adequate mechanism for follow up.*

* It is important to note that many of the themes and key challenges highlighted by participants in the Forum...
were also addressed at the Summit of the Americas in 2001. Although the coverage of the Summit and its critics focused primarily on economic integration and the FTAA, themes relating to democratic development were also prioritized. Main themes addressing democratic development included: Electoral Processes and Procedures, Transparency and Good Governance, Media and Communications, the Fight against Corruption and Empowering Local Governments. Among the subsequent eighteen items in the Plans of Action resulting from the Summit were: Making Democracy Work Better; Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; Justice, Rule of Law And Security of the Individual; Hemispheric Security, and Civil Society. The Summit also laid the groundwork for the creation of the Inter-American Democratic Charter, subsequently signed in September 2001.

The Plan of Action is ambitiously all-encompassing, making it extremely challenging to translate into practice, monitor and follow through on commitments made. The financial, human and political capital required to make headway on these plans is also tremendous, not reflected in signatory countries’ budgets for development. Furthermore, although there is evidence that Summit-level thinking on democratic development has progressed since Miami 1994 in both scope and substance, some of the areas identified require further research and clarification. (For example political party re-building, capacity-building and scaling up of local movements, informal / alternative justice systems, and sites of citizenship-building etc.). The Summit Plan of Action does, however, provide a useful, agreed upon framework around which to structure bilateral and multilateral programming. See FOCAL Summit Follow-up Series for elaboration.
Annex 1 - Agenda

Forum on Democracy, Political Representation, Security and Social Exclusion in the Andes  
October 28-29th 2002

Location:  International Development Research Centre (IDRC)  
250 Albert St., Ottawa (14th Floor Auditorium)

Monday Oct. 28

8:15  Registration

8:45  Welcome  
John Graham, Chair, Board of Directors, FOCAL

Opening remarks  
Maureen O’Neil, President, International Development Research Centre (IDRC)

9:00 - 10:45  Panel 1: State of democracy in the region - new leaders, high expectations, prospects for change

Chair: Stephen Randall - Dean, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Calgary

Catherine Conaghan  Dept. of Political Studies, Director of Center for the Study of Democracy, Queen’s University “The Toledo Paradox”  
Donna Lee Van Cott  Dept. of Political Science, University of Tennessee “Political Change in Bolivia”  
Marco A. Palacios  Academic Coordinator, Colegio de México “Colombia’s current crisis: a historian view”  
Luis Verdesoto  Executive Secretary, Inter American Network for Democracy (RID), Ecuador “Ecuador: La Aglomeración de las Crisis”  
Margarita Lopez Maya  Dept. of Sociology, Universidad Central, Venezuela

10:45 - 11:00  Coffee Break

11:00 - 12:30  Panel 2: Impacts of economic reforms on democratic institutions and political processes

Chair: Karri Munn-Venn – Program Officer, Americas Policy Group, Canadian Council for International Cooperation (CCIC)

Augusto de la Torre  Senior Regional Financial Sector Advisor, World Bank  
Liisa North  Dept. of Political Science, Centre for Research on Latin America & the Caribbean, York University “Heading for the Past: (neo)liberal economic policies and political exclusion in Latin America, with special reference to Ecuador”  
Javier Portocarerro Maisch  Deputy Director, Consorcio de Investigación Económica y Social (CIES), Peru “El regimen de Fujimori: entre el neoliberalismo economico y el autoritarismo clientelista”
12:30 - 1:45  Lunch

2:00 - 3:30  Panel 3: Democracy, political representation, and social exclusion

  Chair:  Catherine Legrand – Dept. of History, McGill University

  Ana María Bejarano  Visiting Fellow, Princeton University
  René Mayorga  Senior Researcher, Centro Boliviano de Estudios Multidisciplinarios (CEBEM), Bolivia  “Democracy, Political Representation, and Party System Development in Bolivia”
  Cristina Rojas  Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University

3:30 - 3:45  Coffee Break

3:45 - 5:30  Panel 4: Emerging doctrines on security in the region: implications for democracy

  Chair:  Colleen Duggan - Sr. Program Specialist, Peacebuilding and Reconstruction Initiative (IDRC)

  Francine Jacome  Director, Venezuelan Institute for Social and Political Studies (INVESP)
  "New Security Threats and Agendas: Impact on Democracy in the Andean Region"
  Stephen Randall  Dean, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Calgary
  Adam Isacson  Senior Associate, Center for International Policy (CIP)
  Reinaldo Botero  Former Director of the Presidential Human Rights Program in Colombia

5:30 - 7:30  Cocktail Reception: IDRC
Tuesday Oct. 29

9:00 a.m.  Roundtable on international engagement in the Andes: Closing the Research-Policy Gap

Chair:  John Graham – Chair, FOCAL Board of Directors

Elizabeth Spehar  Director, Unit for the Promotion of Democracy, Organization of American States (OAS)
Hernando Gomez-Buendia  Director, UNDP's National Human Development Report Project, Colombia
José Herran-Lima  Director, South America Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT)
Kerry Max  Senior Economist, Americas Branch, Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)

10:15-10:30 Coffee Break

Colleen Duggan  Sr. Program Specialist, Peacebuilding and Reconstruction Initiative International Development Research Centre (IDRC)
Luis Van Isschot  Coordinator for Colombia, North American Office, Peace Brigades
Alex Neve  Secretary General, Amnesty International Canada “An International Agenda for Promoting Human Rights Reform in the Andes”
Hal Klepak  Dept. of History, Royal Military College

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