The Bolivian economy has grown over the last three years due to a positive international context, where prices were high for Bolivian exports and gas prices were also high, among other factors. However, at the outset of the fourth quarter of 2008 a disastrous international financial crisis has changed dramatically the environment for almost all of the world’s economies, including Bolivia.

Official forecasts of specialized organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), project a global contraction of -1.3 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP); industrialized economies will face a larger fall of -3.8 per cent. The world’s biggest economy, the United States, could face a fall of -2.8 per cent, the Euro Zone -4.2 per cent, Germany -5 per cent. Japan and Russia show negative figures beyond -6 per cent. All these projections reveal an economic downturn of a severe magnitude, similar to the Depression in the Thirties.

In Latin America, the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) has publicized its estimates: Brazil -1 per cent; Mexico with -2 per cent; Chile (0 per cent); Ecuador (0 per cent) and Paraguay with -0.5 per cent. In contrast, ECLAC shows a forecast of three per cent growth for Bolivia, the IMF suggests 2.2 per cent, while the Bolivian government is projecting 5.7 per cent of growth. The Bolivian government’s optimistic projections

(Continued on page 3)
For the last three years, Bolivia has experienced important political and economic changes. After 20 years of “neoliberal” regimes in the country, the election in 2005 of the country’s first indigenous president, Evo Morales, has been the most significant occurrence since the 1952 revolution and the return to democracy in 1982.

Morales, who reached power in 2006 supported by 53.7 per cent of the popular vote, aims to give more power to the poor communities by means of land reforms and redistribution of gas wealth. He also wants to include the country’s Indigenous Peoples in the political, social and economic life of the country, a goal that has been neglected since the creation of the republic in 1825.

The challenge facing Morales is huge. His government must deal with the always difficult task of striking a political and economic balance. To date, his administration has focused its efforts in the political arena rather than on the economic agenda. The August 2008 recall referendum, where 67.4 per cent supported Morales, the referendum approval of a new political constitution, the legal approval of a new electoral law for the upcoming elections in December, preceded by a four day hunger strike by the president, demonstrate this tendency.

In the economic arena, the most important decision that Morales’ administration has made is the hydrocarbons nationalization. This recent nationalization has brought short term benefits such as an increase in Bolivia’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) that surpassed US$10 billion in the last two years. However, this new revenue is mainly due to a rise in the natural gas price rather than due to a “productivity effect”. There is also the negative effects from the uncertainty generated such as whether oil companies like the Spanish Repsol and the Brazilian Petrobras will invest in more exploration and development or not.

Nationalization in Bolivia is nothing new; it’s a process repeated in the last century with the 1937 nationalization of Standard Oil, the 1952 nationalization of tin mining companies, and the 1969 nationalization of Gulf Oil. This interesting feature of the Bolivian economic history shows mainly two things. First, a continuous dilemma on how to administer the economy: strong intervention of the state (supported by the “nationalizers”) or through market forces (supported by the “liberals”). Second, Bolivia has focused its efforts in developing an economic pattern based on the exploitation of a small set of natural resources that are exported with almost no value added.

Furthermore, the average GDP growth rate in the last 50 years has reached 2.8 per cent per year, an extremely low growth rate to overcome poverty levels especially considering that the ideal growth rate to neutralize demographic growth under the poverty line is six per cent. In addition, Bolivia shows a big inequality in income distribution. So the discussion in the economic arena should not be about choosing between nationalization or privatization models, but rather in how to change the economic pattern based on the exploitation of natural resources which has fallen far short of the desired results.

In this edition of FOCALPoint focusing on Bolivia, we seek to highlight the challenges ahead for the Bolivian economy and the significance of the effectiveness of economic policies in the administration of this country, since the success of its implementation will lead to better days for the Bolivian population.
International Crisis Impact on Bolivia

(continued from page 1)

are worrisome as no specific anti-crisis actions are being taken.

In fact, this kind of optimism generates concern among the private sector because it shows that the economic management does not appear to be in consonance with the reality facing the world and the region.

While Bolivia’s domestic financial system has few links to the rest of the world, there are other transfer channels for the crisis to reach the Bolivian economy. First, there is the fall in the price of raw materials; second, the steep fall in world demand for final products exported from Bolivia such as basic manufactured goods and textiles, among others; and third, the contraction in capital in-flows, both in the form of foreign direct investment and domestic investment with external financing. Also, a contraction in international remittances, which have reached nearly six per cent of GDP, would affect growth by reducing domestic demand. Remittances are estimated to fall by US$500 million and, with it, thousands of migrants are expected to return to Bolivia which might increase unemployment.

In the external sector, the trade balance reported a fall of -77 per cent in the first quarter of 2009. The final balance remains positive, although marginal compared to last year’s data. Still, the magnitude of the contraction is significant. The nominal exchange rate is overvalued and this acts against exports and it promotes a rapid growth in imports of inputs and finished goods. Smuggling also has increased with the overvalued local currency. The final result is the substitution of local production, a fall in sales and, eventually, more unemployment, estimated to be at 10 per cent at the end of 2008. In some poor cities such as El Alto, this figure is higher at 13.5 per cent.

The deterioration in the trade balance will have an impact on the income stream of the Central Bank’s Net International Reserves, totaling US$7.8 billion as of December 2008. The authorities have presented the reserves as a sort of armor to defend the economy. We are afraid the armor will become thinner in time as the in-flow of new foreign exchange declines because of lower exports and imports begin to consume greater fractions of the balance. Due to the high dollarization of Bolivia’s financial system, Net International Reserves in this case are not only a guarantee for international trade, but are also the assets required by the monetary authority to fulfill its role as lender of last resort.

Imports in 2008 surpassed US$5 billion and deposits denominated in dollars in the financial sector reached US$3.4 billion. Thus, if reserves decline significantly, this could create uncertainty and less confidence in the local banking sector. Reserves are a guarantee for savers, but the authorities are planning to use them to finance the expenses of the national budget.

New gas price adjustments will come in July and we expect a further decline in the gas rent, reaching a contraction of 50 per cent. The impact of this decline will be quite hard, considering that several social policies like direct transfers for children, pregnancy, old age and many others depend on this financing. As private sector producers, we support social policies since they benefit the poor and create more internal demand. However, we are afraid that many of these policies have political motivations and are not sustainable. This year, we will have general elections in December, so we believe that few politicians care about the long-term sustainability of these benefits.

In terms of trade and the need to expand foreign markets for Bolivian products, decisions taken over the past three years have reversed Bolivia’s direction. Bolivia has lost the duty-free access to the United States granted by the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA) and the impact of this is already evident in the export sector. Bolivia has also removed itself from the regional negotiations for a trade agreement with the European Union.

Non-traditional exports have fallen related to both price and volume effects. In the case of the mining sector, there is a combination of two forces for 2008 and a clear forecast for this year. In 2008, the mining sector grew by 58 per cent because of the San Cristobal project, led by Apex Silver and Sumitomo Corporation that was under construction for the past 11 years. In 2008, the project began commercial operations and reached its production peak and had a huge impact on Bolivia’s GDP. GDP growth for the past year reached 6.15 per cent, but without this project, the figure would have only reached 3.78 per cent.

In the first quarter of 2009, consumer confidence and local demand has also contracted, which explains the deflationary process we face now.
Natural Gas and Poverty in Bolivia

Mauricio Medinaceli Monrroy

References to the Bolivian government’s spending to expand natural gas networks is regularly reported in the Bolivian press. On April 29, 2009, Bolivian daily El Diario ran the headline, “Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB) will invest $100 million to reactivate household connections for natural gas.”

In fact, there is a general perception that this expansion, especially in residential areas, will enhance the well-being of Bolivians, as natural gas is cheaper than other alternatives, specifically electricity and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG).

It is worth asking whether this is, in fact, true. This article will discuss some of the results on whether expanding the distribution networks of natural gas has had a progressive impact. Since the amount of money that is spent on this sort of project is hardly trivial, it is necessary to ascertain exactly who benefits from it.

Incoming connections and natural gas consumption

An incoming connection links the household with secondary networks of natural gas, which run along streets and avenues. If a household has such a connection, it can use natural gas as a source of energy for the home. On this point, Bolivia has made a great effort to increase the number of families that have access to natural gas. Table 1 is composed of figures provided by the Superintendencia de Hidrocarburos (which is Bolivia’s regulatory institution for hydrocarbons) and by household surveys performed by the country’s National Statistics Institute (INE). This table contains the author’s estimate of the percentage of Bolivian families in different urban centres that have access to natural gas. Given the time period, the growth rates of connected households are quite high. The jump from 0.7 per cent coverage to almost 8 per cent between 1999 and 2007 is not a small one.

However, when one compares Table 1 with the estimated number of households that use natural gas to cook, the figures do not fully match up. According to Figure 1, between
2002 and 2006, natural gas networks were under-utilized by Bolivian families, given that only about 70 per cent of the families that have access actually use natural gas.

**Regression analysis**

This section compares the results of the question, “what fuel do you use to cook?” from INE’s household survey with reported household income per capita for the 1999-2006 time period. The goal is to analyze the income level of those Bolivian families that use natural gas.

Table 2 is constructed using the data mentioned above. The table shows the percentage of families that reported using natural gas in their home, ranked by income quintile. Results are self-evident: families in quintile five (the richest) use natural gas more frequently, and those in quintile one (the poorest) do not show a significant increase. Therefore, Bolivian families are using natural gas, but those with a higher income per capita use it in greater proportion.

Why these results? The 2005 article “Natural Gas Consumption in the Domestic Urban Market: Does it benefit the Poor?” by Medinaceli & Zeballos, published in INE’s Revista de Estudios Económicos y Sociales provides the following answers:

1) In general, Bolivia’s poorest live in the countryside and use wood and guano as fuel; therefore the expansion of natural gas networks within cities has no effect on their standard of living.

2) Even in cities, poor people usually do not cook because they work all day.

3) Many families, despite having an incoming connection installed, do not use it because they do not have enough resources to reconfigure their durable goods portfolio; in other words, they do not have the money to convert their stove from LPG to natural gas. It is fascinating to see that, in parts of Bolivia, a home with a dirt floor and no kitchen can have a sparkling new natural gas installation.

4) Many families do not use natural gas because subsidies make LPG cheaper.

**Recommendations**

What can be done? In a scenario of little investment in hydrocarbons, plummeting value of natural gas exports, subsidized domestic prices, and hydrocarbon production problems, it is necessary, at least in the short run, to not throw a single dollar away.

The following measures may help to improve the situation:

1) Do not keep installing natural gas networks in regions where a good LPG distribution system would be more efficient and less expensive, even with
2) Many households cannot afford the US$20 that is necessary to convert the stove. Therefore, it would be a good idea to implement financing strategies towards this goal.

3) It does not make sense to install a natural gas intake in a home without having enough gas to supply it. Investment for domestic market procurement is a pressing matter.

Mauricio Medinaceli is an economist specializing in hydrocarbons, who worked several years as sector analyst in Bolivia. He previously served as Bolivia’s Minister of Hydrocarbons and now works as Hydrocarbons Coordinator for the Latin American Energy Organization (OLADE).

Gas Natural y Pobreza en Bolivia

Mauricio Medinaceli Monroy

No son pocas las veces que las noticias en la prensa Boliviana hacen referencia al gasto que realiza el Estado en la ampliación de redes de gas natural, como el publicado en el periódico boliviano El Diario del 29 de abril 2009 que dice: “Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB) reactivará conexiones de gas natural a domicilio con una inversión de 100 millones de dólares.”

De hecho, existe la percepción casi generalizada de que dicha ampliación, sobretodo en el sector residencial (familiar) tendrá un efecto positivo sobre el bienestar de las personas, toda vez que el gasto en este energético es menor a las alternativas, en particular, la energía eléctrica y en segundo lugar del Gas Licuado de Petróleo (GLP).

Entonces, bien vale la pena preguntarse si estas afirmaciones son ciertas. Por ello, en este texto se presentarán algunos resultados relacionados con la progresividad de una ampliación en la red de distribución de gas natural. Puesto que la cantidad de dinero que generalmente se destina a este tipo de proyectos no es trivial, es necesario conocer quiénes realmente se benefician de ellos.

Acometidas y consumo de gas natural

Por acometida se entiende a la conexión de la red secundaria de gas natural (que pasa por la calle o avenida) con el domicilio, de esta forma, si una familia tiene instalada la acometida puede comenzar a utilizar gas natural como energético dentro el hogar. En este punto, Bolivia hizo un gran esfuerzo por incrementar el número de familias con acceso a este producto. Utilizando las cifras publicadas por la Superintendencia de Hidrocarburos (institución reguladora Boliviana del sector hidrocarburos) y los resultados de las Encuestas de Hogares realizadas por el Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas de Bolivia (INE) se construyó la Tabla 1, que muestra el porcentaje de familias con acceso a este producto. Utilizando las cifras publicadas por la Superintendencia de Hidrocarburos (institución reguladora Boliviana del sector hidrocarburos) y los resultados de las Encuestas de Hogares realizadas por el Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas de Bolivia (INE) se construyó la Tabla 1, que muestra el porcentaje de familias, estimado por el autor, con acceso al gas natural en las distintas ciudades del país. Queda claro que, dado el plazo considerado, el número de familias con acceso a este producto tiene tasas de crecimiento elevadas. No es trivial que de un 0.7 por ciento de cobertura nacional el

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>La Paz</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oruro</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potosí</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Cruz de la Sierra</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cochabamba</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chuquisaca</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarija</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
<td>23.6%</td>
<td>35.8%</td>
<td>45.3%</td>
<td>64.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fuente: Encuesta de Hogares - MECOVI
año 1999 al año 2007 este porcentaje casi llegue al 8 por ciento.

Contrastando los resultados de la Tabla 1 con el número estimado de familias que utilizan gas natural para cocinar, las cifras no son completamente satisfactorias. De acuerdo a la Figura 1, durante el período 2002-2006 la red de distribución de gas natural está siendo subutilizada por las familias Bolivianas, dado que aproximadamente el 70 por ciento de las familias con este acceso utilizan el producto.

Análisis de Regresividad

En esta sección se contrastarán los resultados (de las Encuestas de Hogares realizadas por el INE) de la pregunta “Qué combustible utiliza para cocinar” con el ingreso per cápita reportado por los Hogares, durante el período 1999-2006. El objetivo es, entonces, analizar cuál es el nivel de ingresos de aquellas familias que utilizan gas natural en Bolivia.

Utilizando las bases de datos ya mencionadas se construye la Tabla 2, donde se muestra el porcentaje de familias que reportaron utilizar gas natural en el hogar, al interior de cada quintil de ingreso. Los resultados son evidentes, mientras las familias del quintil 5 (las “más ricas”) utilizan con más frecuencia gas natural en la cocina, aquellas familias del quintil 1 (las “más pobres”) no presentan un crecimiento significativo. Entonces, ciertamente las familias en Bolivia están utilizando el gas natural, pero en mayor proporción lo hacen aquellas que poseen un mayor ingreso per cápita.

¿Por qué se dan estos resultados? En el artículo “Consumo de Gas Natural en el Mercado Interno Urbano: ¿Beneficia a los Pobres?” de Medinaceli & Zeballos publicado en 2005 en la Revista de Estudios Económicos y Sociales del INE, se proponen las siguientes respuestas: 1) En general la gente pobre en Bolivia utiliza leña y guano para cocinar (vive en el campo) por ello, políticas de expansión del gas natural a nivel urbano no repercuten directamente en su calidad de vida; 2) aún en las ciudades, la gente pobre usualmente no cocina, porque trabaja todo el día; 3) muchas familias, pese a tener instalada la acometida de gas natural en su hogar, no hacen uso de este servicio porque no tienen los recursos suficientes para reconvertir su portafolio de bienes duraderos, dicho de otra manera, las familias no tiene dinero para remodelar su cocina de GLP a gas natural. Es curioso ver cómo en algunas regiones de nuestro país, existen hogares con una flamante instalación de gas natural, pero sin servicio de alcantarillado, con piso de tierra y sin un espacio donde cocinar; finalmente, 4) el subsidio al precio del GLP hace que muchas familias no utilicen gas natural, la razón es clara, el GLP es más barato.

¿Qué se puede hacer? En un panorama con poca inversión en el sector hidrocarburos, disminución del valor de las exportaciones de gas natural, precios subsidiados en el mercado interno y problemas en la producción de hidrocarburos, es necesario, en el corto plazo, no desperdiciar ni un solo dólar. Algunas

Tabla 2: Consumo de gas natural por quintil de ingreso – Área urbana de Bolivia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quintil</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003 2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fuente: Encuestas de Hogares del Programa MECOVI
Elaboración: Propia
We Want Partners, Not Bosses: Returning Oil, Gas to State Control

Susan Spronk

In the past decade, popular protests against privatization policies have contributed to the downfall of two presidents and the election of President Evo Morales, the country’s first indigenous president. Responding to popular demands, Morales announced the first so-called nationalization in the oil and gas sector in May 2006 claiming that “We want partners, not bosses.” With this change, the Morales administration has begun to lay the foundations for a new statist model of development that aims to redistribute social wealth.

By international standards, Morales’ policy is not technically “nationalization” but a policy of joint ventures. It involved no expropriation of private companies. Instead, following the example of ally Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, the law passed by the Bolivian Congress required multinational oil and gas companies to sign new contracts that establish public-private partnerships with the state oil company, Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB). The previous contracts were not signed by Congress, a step that was bypassed in the Nineties’ privatization process although it was required by the Constitution, so the government had legal grounds to cancel the former contracts.

Under the new policy, oil and gas companies are required to pay an estimated total of 54 per cent of the profits derived from the extraction of oil and gas to the state, up from 18 per cent to 32 per cent stipulated by the previous neoliberal regime. While the new policy is clearly less favorable to corporate interests than the neoliberal one, all the foreign companies that were operating in the country decided to stay. Bolivia possesses the second largest natural gas reserves in South America and regional demand for natural gas is expected to continue to grow over the next decade. The government has also negotiated new bilateral agreements with Argentina and Brazil which raised the price of the natural gas that is exported to Bolivia’s more industrialized neighbours.

The most dramatic effect of the new policy has been a remarkable improvement in state revenues. In 2007, the Bolivian government’s income from oil and gas increased almost ten-fold from US$173 million in 2002 to an estimated US$1.57 billion. Unlike previous regimes where benefits of natural resource exploration accrued to a small elite, the government has promised to distribute these resources equitably and spur development to benefit the population. The two most visible programs invest in education and pensions. The Juancito Pinto Stipend provides families with about $25 a year for each child enrolled in primary school. The Renta Dignidad provides a small pension of about $20 per month to Bolivians over 60 years old.

Mauricio Medinaceli es economista especializado en hidrocarbores. Trabajó varios años como analista de este sector en Bolivia. Fue Ministro de Hidrocarburos y actualmente se desempeña como Coordinador de Hidrocarburos para la Organización Latinoamericana de Energía (OLADE).
years of age. While these targeted social programs do not amount to a national development plan, they do help to alleviate the worst effects of poverty amongst vulnerable populations such as young families and the elderly.

The increase of resource rents has also exacerbated regional tensions, which has complicated the government’s agenda for redistribution. About half of the funds accruing from resource rents are distributed to municipal governments, departmental governments and universities. As the government remains locked in a policy that was formulated in the politically tumultuous climate of 2005, the funding formulas for distributing rents are highly uneven. In 2007, Tarija, which produces about 68 per cent of the country’s natural gas, received just over $600 per person annually from the exploitation of natural gas deposits, while a non-producing department such as La Paz received only $31, even though La Paz’s population was among those who fought for nationalization in the “Gas Wars” of 2003 and 2005. In the resource-rich departments of Tarija and Santa Cruz, the influx of cash has been so fast that departmental governments were only able to spend a third of the money within the first year, leading the Morales administration to threaten to channel the resources elsewhere, exacerbating tensions between the central government and gas-rich departments.

The other serious challenge faced by the Morales administration has been to attract new investment into the oil and gas sector. The increase in state revenues is largely due to high international prices and changes to the tax regime, not an increase in production. Of the 44 new contracts with oil and gas companies that were signed as a result of the reforms, only seven were for exploration. At its current rate of production capacity, Bolivia cannot meet its export commitments to Brazil and Argentina nor satisfy its growing internal demand. Indeed, foreign investment in the Bolivian oil and gas sector has been dropping since the political turmoil in 2003. The government hopes that new joint ventures with the Venezuelan oil company and Russia’s Gazprom announced in February 2009 will raise the level of investment to pre-nationalization levels, but the inability to meet demand represents a lost opportunity that could contribute to Bolivia’s development.

The YPFB is also slowly rebuilding its capacity, having been stripped down to a mere regulatory institution in the 1996 privatization. As previous experience returning enterprises to public control in the water sector suggests, rebuilding a public company is no easy task. Corruption is endemic, and the YPFB appears to have its fair share. In January 2009, the Morales administration was hit with another corruption scandal involving the head of the YPFB, who was allegedly running the public company with total disregard for official Bolivian procurement rules and regulations. Santos Ramirez was replaced by Carlos Villegas, the sixth chief executive officer of the YPFB since Morales assumed office three years ago.

Many economists consider that the discovery of valuable natural resources such as oil or gas is a curse rather than a blessing for poor, developing countries such as Bolivia. Thus far, the oil and gas industry has created few jobs and the government has been criticized for its failure to implement a coherent development strategy. According to “ecological” critics of the government, it is unclear whether industrialization should even be the goal.

Focusing on installing domestic connections in each household in Bolivia to replace the more expensive canisters currently in use would be a good place to start, but the Morales administration, even with more revenue than previous governments, still has a long way to go to improve the quality of life of average Bolivians.

The Morales administration, even with more revenue than previous governments, still has a long way to go to improve the quality of life of average Bolivians.

Susan Spronk is an assistant professor in the School of International Development and Global Studies at the University of Ottawa. She can be reached at susan.spronk@uottawa.ca.
Bolivia’s Teachers, Quality of Education and the New Constitution

Maria C. Mejía

Education in Bolivia has improved considerably both in quality and fairness. Access to primary education nears 100 per cent, and the number of girls who attend school is equal to that of boys. Access to secondary education has also increased considerably in the last decade, reaching 60 per cent in 2004.

However, in more isolated rural areas, problems of late registration, lack of completion, and repetition of grades persist, although they seem to be decreasing. Currently, the main problem is the poor quality of education, which affects the entire education system. This article will discuss various aspects related to elementary school teachers, a crucial factor in the quality of education.

Every year in Bolivia, around 40,000 hopefuls apply to Teacher Training Colleges (TTC). For example, in 2005, some 16,000 candidates applied for 500 admission places at the Escuela Normal Superior de la Paz and were examined through a test. In general, the test scores of these would-be students are low. On the other hand, despite that both schools and number of teachers exceed the real needs of the country, there is very strong pressure on the Ministry of Education to greatly increase the number of teacher training colleges and to increase admission quotas.

The recruitment and proper training of teachers are conditions for the success of any education system. In many countries, teaching is one of the most prestigious and sought after careers, and the road to receiving a teaching designation is difficult, as teaching capacity and social skills are valued as much as knowledge.

Teaching is one of the most sought after careers in Bolivia, as well. However, the principal motivations for applying for entrance to TTC and for going into teaching seem to be the on-the-spot hiring, the labour immobility, the half-time work (students of all levels in the public schools work only four hours a day), and the interesting vacations. The creation of incentives to enroll in teacher training programs and the offer of automatic hiring, which have been necessary since halfway through the last century to deal with a teacher shortage, have become grave problems for the state in budgetary and lobbying terms.

The career of teacher has become a prized secure job in which one is unable to distinguish, from among the thousands of applicants, who is really called to it. As for learning, students apply all kinds of pressure in order to pass with marks below 50 per cent (blockades, strikes, and other "by force" measures are common), without realizing that the quality of the teaching they will do depends largely upon the knowledge acquired through, and effort put into, their training.

The teacher training system itself, until now, hasn’t shown much attachment to the “vocation of service”. Not long ago it cancelled the two years teachers were required to spend in the provinces, which had ensured the presence of trained teachers in isolated areas and indigenous communities. There are teachers who have not studied that which they teach and yet the teacher’s unions are opposed to accept university graduates as teachers subject to the same working conditions, in their areas of specialization. It is important to stress that there are teachers who do make an effort and who have gained their knowledge themselves. Unfortunately, they are few.

These days, in rural areas, temporary positions (those exercised by teachers with no training or prior experience) predominate because qualified teachers do not accept relocation to these areas. Also, permanent movement of teachers prevails. It was only a few years ago that the rule barring teachers from changing schools until the end of the school year was overturned.

Urban areas suffer less from the problems caused by temporary positions and teacher’s migration, but they share with rural areas prob-
problems such as the reduced number of classroom hours and the tendency to give increasing time to subjects and activities that do not precisely meet pedagogical criteria.

The selection of teachers and the monitoring of their work are practically nonexistent at the regional level because of the lack of necessary systems and standards. Although the prefectures and municipalities are responsible for the provision of educational materials and various competencies, they lack the authority to evaluate, select, and appoint principals and teachers.

These and other aspects ensure that the quality of education is being degraded ever further. The real breach then, the injury to Bolivia’s future, lies in the field of educational quality, rather than in that of access to education.

Bolivia’s new constitution says, “It is the State’s responsibility to train and prepare the educational establishment through public teacher training”, “This training […] will improve through social commitment and vocation to service” and “Postgraduate training will be coordinated through an application shaped by the universities.”

It is laudable that the constitution itself makes reference to social compromise and the vocation to teaching. Now is the time to broach carrying these things out. The latter is possible if we can achieve the proper selection and evaluation of new generations of teachers, if we select educational personnel based on suitability and competence, if we reinstate the requirement that teachers must work for two years in the provinces, if we abolish temporary positions, if we could provide the conditions to prevent teachers from constantly changing positions during the school year, and if we require candidates and teachers to show solid knowledge of the subject matter they teach, or will be teaching, and also to demonstrate that they have a vocation as a teacher.

On a global level, there are important examples of practices to adopt for teachers. In Cuba, for example, each teacher takes personal responsibility for monitoring not only the performance, but also the general well-being, of each student. The same practice exists in Finland, a country in which students are evaluated as being among the best prepared in the world. To become a teacher in Finland, one must take a minimum seven year degree, including 6,400 hours of training and the completion of a thesis.

In order to carry out the constitution, the priority must be the public interest, the youth, the children and the human capital of the future. The measures to be taken should reflect the primacy of serving the public interest and teacher union’s demands should be evaluated under this perspective.

Maria C. Mejia has a degree in both Education and Public Administration, specializing in Planning. As a public servant, she held various offices, including that of Minister of Education.
Maestros de Bolivia: La Calidad de la Educación y la Nueva Constitución

Maria C. Mejia

La educación en Bolivia ha mejorado notablemente en términos cuantitativos y de equidad de género. La cobertura en el nivel primario se acerca al 100 por ciento, y el número de niñas que asisten a la escuela es igual que el de los niños. La cobertura del nivel secundario se ha incrementado también de manera notable en la última década hasta alcanzar un 60 por ciento el año 2004.

Aunque en las áreas rurales más aisladas persisten – con tendencia a la disminución - problemas de ingreso tardío, abandono y repetición, hoy en día el problema principal es la baja calidad de la educación, que afecta a todo el sistema educativo. Este artículo hace referencia a algunos aspectos relacionados al maestro, factor crucial en la calidad educativa.

En Bolivia, cada año, se presentan alrededor de 40,000 postulantes a las Escuelas Normales y los resultados de las pruebas de ingreso muestran que el nivel de logro de estos jóvenes postulantes, es bajo (el año 2005 se presentaron 16,000 postulantes para 500 plazas de la Escuela Normal Superior de La Paz). A pesar de ello, existe una presión muy grande para que Ministerio de Educación amplíe tanto el número de escuelas normales como de plazas para los miles de postulantes, cuáles son los jóvenes con “vocación”. Y en cuanto a los conocimientos, los postulantes usan todo tipo de presión para aprobar con notas menores al 50 por ciento (bloqueos y huelgas son comunes) sin pensar que de su conocimiento y esfuerzo depende, en gran parte, la calidad de la enseñanza que impartirán.

Tampoco el magisterio ha demostrado hasta ahora gran apego a la “vocación de servicio” porque hace pocos años logró hacer anular los dos años de provincia que aseguraban la presencia de maestros formados en las áreas dispersas y en las comunidades indígenas. Hay maestros que no han estudiado lo que enseñan y sin embargo el magisterio se opone a que los graduados de universidades enseñen, en igualdad de condiciones laborales, la materia de su especialidad. Hay que destacar que existen maestros que se esfuerzan, que actualizan sus conocimientos por cuenta propia, que tienen vocación y sentido del bien común, pero lamentablemente son pocos.

Hoy en día, en las poblaciones alejadas predomina el interinato (ejercicio de la docencia sin haber estudiado para maestro ni tener experiencia previa) porque los maestros egresados o titulados no aceptan ir a ellas, y también prevalece la migración permanente de maestros, pues también hace pocos años se suprimió la norma que establecía que los maestros no podían cambiar de escuela sino al finalizar cada año escolar.

Las áreas urbanas sufren menos los problemas de interinato o migración, pero comparten con el área rural problemas como el reducido número de horas aula, más una tendencia al aumento de materias y actividades que no responden preci-
samente a criterios pedagógicos.

La selección y el seguimiento al trabajo de los maestros es prácticamente nula, pues los niveles subnacionales no cuentan con las normas ni los sistemas necesarios. Si bien las prefecturas y municipalidades tienen a su cargo la provisión de insumos educativos y algunas competencias, carecen de autoridad para evaluar, seleccionar o nombrar directores y maestros.

Estos y otros aspectos hacen que la calidad de la educación esté deteriorándose cada vez más. Es decir, la brecha está ahí, como una herida en el futuro de Bolivia, ya no en el ámbito del acceso sino en el de la calidad.

La nueva Constitución señala “Es responsabilidad del Estado la formación y capacitación docente para el magisterio público... La formación... se desarrollará con compromiso social y vocación de servicio.” y “La formación postgral será coordinada por una instancia conformada por las universidades.”

Es loable que la Constitución misma haga referencia al compromiso social y a la vocación en la educación. Ahora toca cumplirla, y esto será posible si se logra evaluar y seleccionar bien a las nuevas generaciones de maestros, si se selecciona al personal docente con criterios de idoneidad y competencia, si se restituye los años de provincia, si se suprime el interinato, si se evitan ejemplos que pueden servir para las medidas a adoptar respecto a los maestros. En el modelo cubano, por ejemplo, la vocación y el conocimiento son elementos evidentes, cada maestro se ocupa personalmente de hacer un seguimiento permanente no sólo al desempeño de cada alumno, sino a su bienestar general. Asimismo, en Finlandia, país en el que los alumnos han sido evaluados como los mejor preparados del mundo, “para ser maestro de primaria se requiere un mínimo seis años de carrera con 6.400 horas de formación, además de realizar una tesis como proyecto final de carrera; donde el profesor de secundaria se forma en las facultades de su especialidad, y después de graduarse debe hacer 1.400 horas de formación pedagógica, en la Facultad de Educación. Y donde los maestros más competentes son enviados a los primeros cursos de primaria, considerados los fundamentales para sentar las bases de la educación de un niño” según Consumer Eroski en 2007.

Para que se cumpla la Constitu-

---

**Importancia de la permanencia del maestro en un solo establecimiento**

La permanencia de un maestro en un solo establecimiento, y en el mismo curso durante todo el año escolar contribuye a mejorar la calidad educativa por cuanto garantiza, entre otros aspectos:

- la continuidad en el uso de técnicas y métodos de enseñanza-aprendizaje;
- la confianza que los alumnos pueden desarrollar cuando hay estabilidad y continuidad en el ejercicio de la docencia;
- la posibilidad de coordinar con otros maestros del mismo ciclo, a fin de eslabonar adecuadamente planes y contenidos, así como transmitir al maestro del siguiente curso la información pertinente;
- el conocimiento individual y grupal de los alumnos, de sus fortalezas y de sus diferencias;
- el seguimiento individual del desempeño escolar durante el año lectivo, y mejor aún cuando se prolonga durante al menos un ciclo;
- el seguimiento que debe realizar el director de escuela y el director distrital al trabajo y al desempeño docente;
- la posibilidad real de coordinar esfuerzos y compartir logros y dificultades con los padres de familia y con la comunidad educativa en general; y
- el conocimiento, por parte del maestro, de la comunidad y el ámbito donde viven los alumnos y por tanto de las experiencias en las que se puede apoyar la aplicación del conocimiento.
Indigenous Universities: A New Vision of Higher Education in a Plurinational State

Diego Pary Rodríguez

The creation of three intercultural indigenous community universities in Bolivia, which will serve the Aymara-Quechua-Guarani nation and the Tierras Bajas peoples, is based on a historical demand. It is a different educational model, one that is based on another type of professional and will create a space for the knowledge of the original peasant and Indigenous Peoples and nations of Bolivia. This will be complemented by the knowledge of other peoples, and disseminated with communications technology.

This will not meld two different visions of development; it will simply reveal two different ways of taking advantage of the world’s available knowledge. In terms of Andean plateau agriculture, for example, the universities will incorporate the Aymara worldview, who they are, how they think, what their culture represents along with the creation of terraces for intensive farming, the determination of the appropriate terrain gradient, and the knowledge of what additional elements should be put into the soil, of when to sow, and of how deep the seeds should go. These systems and knowledge are developed within and by the people.

Canadian aid minister announces new program themes for Canada

Canada’s Minister of International Cooperation, Beverly Oda, announced on May 20 three new themes —increasing food security, stimulating sustainable economic growth, and securing the future of children and youth—as part of an ongoing revision of Canadian aid policy.

These initiatives complement the Canadian government’s Americas policy pillars of promoting democracy, ensuring security, and building prosperity in the Americas.

“With greater efficiency, focus, and accountability, our Government’s new approach to Canadian aid will be even more effective. This is what the poor of the world need, and this is what Canadians demand of us,” Oda told students at Toronto’s Munk Centre for International Studies.

The changes to Canadian aid, which were based in part on consultations held by Oda with non-governmental organizations and the private sector during her visits to the region, include the February announcement that Canada was untying food aid from having to buy products or services from Canadian sources, with a full untying of all aid by 2012–2013. It also includes plans to redeploy Gatineau-based staff of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) to the field. CIDA’s also announced that it would focus aid on 20 countries, including: Bolivia, Colombia, Haiti, Honduras, Peru, and the Caribbean, in the Western Hemisphere.

CIDA also will hire independent auditors to measure results, and produce a public “Development for results” report every six months, to increase taxpayer accountability.
The traditions of Indigenous Peoples are mostly oral, and written records exist only in weavings. This time, all new and recovered knowledge will be recorded in written documents so that it can be further disseminated.

The creation of indigenous universities is an irreversible process that will transform post-secondary education. These universities will have a decision-making and coordination body, the so-called community councils, where all the social organizations of the relevant region will participate.

The universities will offer degrees in Andean plateau agriculture, food industry, forestry, fish farming, tropical agriculture, hydrocarbons, veterinary medicine, and animal breeding. Curricula will be proposed and built by those social organizations and representatives of the original peasant and indigenous nations and peoples, therefore responding to their stated needs.

Different peoples within Bolivia speak different languages, but each of them will receive instruction in small groups, with a strong individual component, so the educational process can take place in their own language.

There is some experience with the use of cross-trained teachers in rural areas that can deliver two or three different courses, but the new universities will still require a more specific system to be developed.

Indigenous universities will teach in three languages: Spanish, English, and each group’s first language. This will help teach a second language, improve communication, and facilitate the use of knowledge from other peoples that speak English. Additionally, for that knowledge that is transmitted in, say, Quechua, students will have to learn Quechua. New methodology and teaching and learning systems will be incorporated along the way.

The creation of indigenous universities is an irreversible process that will transform post-secondary education.

It has been decided that indigenous communities will choose what students attend their universities, because the goal is for these students to commit to their communities. Students should return to their communities after completing their studies, not become isolated from them.

These students should become development promoters within their own communities, people with their own identity that can think and implement ways for the community to develop and “living well.” Communities will have better basic living conditions, and will be able to utilise and transform production, therefore generating financial resources that will allow them to lead a dignified life.

Bolivia wants to strengthen post-secondary education through a process of decentralization and diversification. This will consolidate its status as a fundamental right for all Bolivians.

Indigenous universities will give access to higher education to those segments of the population that never had the chance to attend public universities. Bolivia is building a new space for those that have been historically discriminated against.

It is also a way of strengthening Bolivia’s plurinational character. Bolivians are diverse, they represent different cultural characteristics, identities, worldviews and peoples, but we all have the same rights.

Indigenous universities will strengthen original peasant and indigenous nations and peoples, because today their knowledge has become stagnant. Before colonization, these peoples had their own organization and production systems, even their own form of state. The colonial power imposed a way of life that dismantled these systems.

Today, it is clear that Indigenous Peoples can create knowledge and innovation, and we can base it on our own vision and cultural identity. Indigenous universities will help us accomplish this.

Diego Pary Rodriguez is Bolivia’s Deputy Minister for Post-Secondary Education and Professional Training.
Universidades Indígenas: Una Nueva Visión de Educación Superior en un Estado Plurinacional

Diego Pary Rodríguez

La fundación de las tres Universidades Indígenas Comunitarias Interculturales Productivas de Bolivia, para la nación Aymara-Quechua-Guaraní y Pueblos de Tierras Bajas, responde a una demanda histórica. Es una propuesta educativa distinta que tendrá otro tipo de profesionales y creará un espacio que recoge los conocimientos de los pueblos y naciones indígena originario campesinos de Bolivia, los complementa con conocimientos de otros pueblos para proyectarlos aprovechando la tecnología de comunicaciones.

No se van a unir dos visiones de desarrollo. Se van a conocer dos modalidades para aprovechar el conocimiento existente en el mundo. En agronomía altiplánica, por ejemplo, se incorporará la cosmovisión de lo Aymara, de cómo son, de cómo piensan, su cultura: saber preparar terrazas para la producción intensiva, saber cuánto de inclinación debe tener el terreno, qué elementos deben incorporarse en la tierra, cómo hacer la siembra, a cuánto de profundidad. Son sistemas y conocimientos que están desarrollados en los pueblos.

Los pueblos indígenas siempre desarrollaron la oralidad y el único registro escrito que se tiene son los tejidos. Ahora se registrará en documentos todo lo que se haga y todo lo que se pueda recuperar de la sabiduría y los conocimientos existentes para luego difundirlos.

La creación de las universidades indígenas es un proceso irreversible que permitirá cambiar la educación superior y que tendrá una instancia de decisión y coordinación, los denominados consejos comunitarios donde participarán todas las organizaciones sociales de la región.

En las carreras elegidas, agronomía del altiplano, industria de alimentos, forestal, piscicultura, agropecuaria tropical, hidrocarburos y veterinaria y zootecnia, se aplicará una currícula propuesta y construida por las organizaciones sociales y representantes de los pueblos y naciones indígena originario campesinos que responderá a las necesidades que se le demandan.

Se tiene diferentes pueblos con diferentes lenguas, pero la atención para cada uno de ellos será por grupos pequeños, de forma individualizada, para desarrollar el proceso educativo en su lengua propia.

Se tiene experiencia con maestros polivalentes en el área rural, que tienen capacidad de atender dos o tres cursos, pero se tendrá que desarrollar un sistema específico para realizar ese trabajo.

En las universidades indígenas se enseñará en tres idiomas: castellano, lengua originaria, y inglés. Por un lado, permite aprovechar el aprendizaje de una lengua extranjera, facilitará la comunicación y se aprovechará el conocimiento de otros pueblos que se escriben en inglés. Por otro, para aquellos conocimientos que se escriben en lengua quechua, deberá aprenderse quechua y en el camino se irán incorporando nuevas metodologías, sistemas de enseñanza y sistemas de aprendizaje.

Se determinó que las comunidades indígenas elijan a los estudiantes que ingresan a las universidades,
porque se quiere que éstos se comprometan con la comunidad. Sus profesionales no se aislarán de su comunidad, regresarán a ella.

Se pretende que en éstas comunidades haya promotores de desarrollo, con identidad propia y gente que esté pensando, diseñando, cómo su comunidad va a tener un mejor desarrollo y un sentido de “vivir bien”. Donde todos tengan condiciones básicas y aprovechen la producción, la transformen y generen recursos económicos que les permita vivir con dignidad.

Se busca fortalecer la educación superior al desconcentrarla, al diversificarla, al contribuir a su consolidación como un derecho fundamental de todos los bolivianos y bolivianas.

Con las universidades indígenas se da oportunidad de acceso a aquellos sectores que nunca pudieron ingresar a la Universidad Pública Autónoma. Se construye un espacio para los sectores más discriminados.

Es una forma de fortalecer la plurinacionalidad. Los bolivianos y bolivianas somos diversos, tenemos características culturales, identidad, visión y representación de pueblos diferentes, pero son todos y todas iguales en derechos.

Las Universidades Indígenas van a fortalecer a los pueblos y naciones indígena originario campesinos porque hasta hoy su conocimiento quedó estancado. Antes de la colonización, el pueblo tenía su sistema de producción, su organización, su propia forma de Estado. La colonia les impuso formas de vida que los desestructuró.

Hoy queda claro que los indígenas podemos crear conocimiento e innovarlo, pero desde nuestra propia visión, con identidad cultural propia y las Universidades Indígenas van a cumplir y fortalecer ese camino.

Diego Pary Rodríguez es el Viceministro de Educación Superior de Formación Profesional en Bolivia.

---

**Canadian and Bolivian women councillors build their skills in municipal government**

*Micheline Caron*

Women municipal councillors throughout Bolivia are celebrating a new electoral law approved in April 2009 by the Legislative Assembly of Bolivia, which confirms and enhances the political rights of women and Indigenous Peoples.

Women councillors are celebrating because most of their demands were included in the new electoral law. Fifty per cent of each party electoral list must be women candidates for all electoral positions, from municipalities to the Legislative Assembly and the Senate. Each party electoral list also must alternate men and women so women candidates are not placed at the end of the list. All elected authorities must also resign through either the Electoral Court or before a legal authority to reduce the possibility of women officials being pressured into resigning so that they can be replaced. Incumbent mayors also will be able to run for reelection without having to resign three months prior to the election. Previously, the resignation requirement penalized both poor men and women who could not survive without a salary for more than three months. All of these changes were won through an intense advocacy campaign by a coalition of women’s organizations including the Association of Women Councillors of Bolivia (ACOBOL).

In the light of this reform, the Federation of Canadian Municipalities (FCM) is building on its relationship with ACOBOL to support a training program aimed at strengthening the capacity of women in municipal government. The partnership will begin with Bolivian delegates participating in campaign schools for women candidates in municipal elections in Canada. This experience is expected to help them during the next municipal elections in Bolivia in April 2010. The training project is a joint initiative with Montréal-based Rights & Democracy. Three Bolivian women councillors participated in FCM’s annual conference in June 2008, an opportunity to exchange their challenges and successes with various Canadian women elected officials and networks in Quebec and Ontario. This visit was followed by a March 2009 FCM delegation to Bolivia, which included Marguerite Ceschi-Smith, Councillor for the City of Brantford and a FCM board member and Elaine Hémond, director of the Centre de Développement Femmes et Démocratie. The delegates visited various municipalities throughout Bolivia and met with women representatives and elected officials in the municipalities of La Paz, Santa Cruz de la Sierra, and El Alto.
Social Public Policy in Bolivia: Are Demand-side Interventions Enough?

Ernesto Pérez de Rada

The evolution of living conditions in Bolivia in recent decades shows important advances in human development. Despite this, there are two causes for worry about the current situation in Bolivia.

First, it is obvious that there has been stagnation in the majority of the indicators over the past five years. The incidence of poverty has fallen from 63.1 per cent to 60.1 per cent between 2001 and 2007. Within the same period, the incidence of destitution has fallen only by a point, from 38.8 per cent to 37.7 per cent. The rate of elementary school completion has dropped slightly, from 77.5 per cent to 75.6 per cent between 2002 and 2005. Meanwhile, infant mortality has declined by only four points from 2003 to 2008.

This situation shows the limits of previous social policies such as the Education Reform, decentralization processes, and various initiatives in the area of rural public health, as well as the exhaustion of the “bonus” derived from the country side–city migration, which translated into better working conditions, reduction of poverty, and greater access to social services in urban areas. As this scenario shows, we cannot expect any substantial improvements to come from a situation of policy inertia.

Secondly, the Gini coefficient revealing increased inequality in the distribution of wealth has moved from 0.58 in 1999 to 0.61 in 2007. By 2007, Bolivia found itself second in Latin America in terms of inequality, preceded only by Brazil. Despite the fact that the entire region has suffered an increase in the concentration of wealth, the situation of countries such as Bolivia is worrying given the income disparity in society, which has certainly not only delayed development but also fueled high levels of conflict in the country.

Will a new generation of social policy arise?

This context of the exhaustion of the reforms initiated in the Nineties, which were basically centred upon the extension of the provision and coverage of public services, and of changing demographics across Bolivia, has given rise to new forms of intervention to improve human development indicators. These new policies will focus on promoting the demand of public services and on creating social welfare networks based on monetary or in species transfers to vulnerable groups.

The current government has outlined and been implementing various programs of conditional cash transfers such as the following:

1) The Juancito Pinto Transfer, a monetary transfer to families under the condition that their children attend primary school from the beginning until the fifth grade.

2) The Juana Azurduy Transfer, whose central component is a monetary transfer under the condition

Peru grants asylum to former Bolivian ministers

Peru has granted asylum to three former Bolivian ministers after they were accused of human rights violations in relation to a revolt against the government of then-president Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada in 2003. Sixty Bolivians were killed and hundreds wounded as state security responded with increasing violence to the growing opposition movement in 2003. the Bolivian Supreme Court began the trial of these three men on May 18.

Peru’s decision to accept the three, Jorge Torres Obleas, Mirtha Quevedo and Javier Torres Goitia, may result in heightened tensions with its neighbour, Bolivia. President Evo Morales said that the Peruvian government that accepting these prisoners would be a “serious crime.” Peruvian Minister Jose Antonio García Belaúnde responded that “we have no information from any independent judge that says that they are criminals.”
that expectant mothers assist for prenatal care and labour support within the formal health system.

3) The Renta Dignidad or Seniors’ Pension, an unconditional universal monetary transfer limited to those over 65.

Critics of these types of benefits have confined their objections to the potential clientelist network and the short-term political gains that would be generated, given that it involves dispensing money to potential voters. As well, there are doubts about the fiscal capacity of the government to prioritize such benefits over the long term, which implies a potential conflict when the sustainability of such benefits proves difficult. Laying aside political debate, it is interesting to analyze these types of interventions from the perspective of how they affect indicators of a population’s well-being.

The international experience: problems and limitations

If one takes into account the fact that policies of conditional transfers have already been tried in other parts of Latin America, it is worth re-examining the results found in other countries.

Despite the fact that transfer policies have been proven to be highly progressive, they have presented problems in their implementation. Policies’ impact evaluations (cases include Oportunidades in Mexico, Bolsa Escola in Brazil and Solidaridad in Chile) show that when the interventions are completed, indicators of educational coverage, levels of malnutrition, healthcare and diminished poverty, fall again. This fact shows that policies need to be applied within a long-enough life cycle to achieve sustainable improvements in these indicators. This finding comes from a study by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. At the same time, in certain areas, such as Bolivia, in which there has been no improvement in the supply and quality of services, the impact is much smaller than in areas in which interventions have comprised both supply (an improvement of service) and demand (the use of monetary transfers or another type of incentive).

The Bolivian case of transfer policies presents certain particularities that allow for the identification of various limitations. The case of the healthcare transfer shows that the provision of health services of poor quality and limited coverage in rural areas definitely reduces the impact of payments to expectant mothers. In the case of the education transfers, there are problems in program focus given that the attendance rates of primary school between first and fifth grade is over 95 per cent, but it is precisely at the beginning of sixth grade that the attendance rate drops dramatically. As well, there is a big gap between male and female attendance rates, an element that has not been considered by the policy makers.

Finally, in the case of Renta Dignidad, it is estimated that it has had little impact, since it is precisely those with higher incomes, higher life expectancy and those residing in urban areas who mainly receive the funding.

Conclusions

In light of this information, it remains clear that to achieve improvements in living conditions, the efforts and actions of Bolivian public policy must be better targeted to the objective populations as well as to incorporate a holistic vision to guarantee the provision of basic social services to everyone, and to develop mechanisms to foster a sustainable demand for the aforementioned services. To provide public services that no one wants is almost as inefficient as initiating demand for services that are of poor quality or nonexistent in certain parts of the country.

Within this framework, the fiscal efforts, the social policy design and the social welfare networks that are being put into place need to be precisely deepened, targeted, and complemented by interventions that will definitely have a better impact upon the most vulnerable groups. Only in this way will we see the alleviation of poverty and the reduction of inequality.

Ernesto Pérez de Rada is a specialist in Social Policy and works for the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in La Paz.
La evolución de las condiciones de vida de Bolivia en las últimas décadas revela importantes avances en materia de desarrollo humano. A pesar de esto, existen dos motivos de preocupación en el estado de situación actual en Bolivia.

En primer lugar, se ha evidenciado un estancamiento en la mayoría de los indicadores en el último quinquenio. La incidencia de pobreza ha retrocedido de 63.1 por ciento a 60.1 por ciento en el periodo 2001-2007, mientras que la incidencia de la indigencia sólo declinó un punto, de 38.8 por ciento a 37.7 por ciento, en el mismo periodo. La tasa de término de educación primaria ha tenido un leve retroceso de 77.5 por ciento a 75.6 por ciento entre 2002 y 2005; mientras que la mortalidad infantil declinó únicamente cuatro puntos entre 2003 y 2008.

Esta situación pone en evidencia los límites de las intervenciones previas de política social —tales como la Reforma Educativa, los procesos de descentralización y varias iniciativas en el campo de la salud pública— así como el agotamiento del “bono” derivado del proceso migratorio campo-cuidad que se tradujo en mejores condiciones laborales, reducción de pobreza y un mayor acceso a servicios sociales en las áreas urbanas. Ante este escenario, no se esperarán mejoras sustanciales siguiendo un escenario inercial de políticas.

En segundo lugar, el coeficiente de Gini, revelando un aumento de la desigualdad en la distribución del ingreso, ha subido de 0.58 en 1999 a 0.61 en 2007. Para 2007, Bolivia se hallaba en el segundo lugar en Latinoamérica en términos de desigualdad, sólo superado por el Brasil. A pesar de que toda la región ha sufrido un aumento en la concentración del ingreso, la situación de países como Bolivia son preocupantes dada la secular mala distribución del ingreso, que en definitiva no sólo ha significado un atraso en materia de desarrollo incluyente, sino también la fuente de altos grados de conflictividad en el país.

¿Surge una nueva generación de políticas públicas sociales?

En este contexto de agotamiento de la generación de reformas iniciadas en los años Noventa, básicamente centradas en la ampliación de la oferta y cobertura de servicios públicos, así como el estadio de transición demográfica que atraviesa Bolivia, se ha dado paso a nuevas formas de intervención para mejorar los indicadores de desarrollo humano. Dichas políticas están centradas en la promoción de la demanda de los servicios públicos y la construcción de redes de protección social basadas en transferencias monetarias o en especie a grupos vulnerables.

En el caso boliviano, la actual administración de gobierno ha diseñado y viene implementando varios programas de transferencias condicionadas:

1) El “Bono Juancito Pinto” que es una transferencia de recursos monetarios a las familias, condicionado a
la asistencia escolar de los niños del hogar hasta el 5to de primaria.

2) El Bono “Juana Azurduy” cuyo componente central es un bono monetario a mujeres en edad fértil condicionado a controles prenatales y atención del parto dentro del sistema formal de salud; y,

3) La “Renta Dignidad” centrado en una transferencia monetaria universal y no condicionada a las personas mayores de 65 años.

Las críticas a este tipo de intervenciones se han circunscrito a la potencial red clientelar y al capital político de corto plazo que generan, dado que se trata de entrega de dinero a potenciales votantes. Asimismo, se ha puesto en duda la capacidad fiscal para hacer frente a estas intervenciones en el largo plazo, lo que implica un potencial conflicto en los momentos en los que se hace difícil la sostenibilidad de este tipo de acciones. Pero más allá del debate generado en la agenda política, interesa analizar este tipo de intervenciones desde un punto de vista del impacto que se logra en la mejora en los indicadores de bienestar de la población.

**La experiencia internacional, los problemas y las limitaciones**

Si se toma en cuenta el hecho de que las políticas de transferencias condicionadas aplicadas ya han sido probadas en otros lugares de la región, vale la pena revisar los resultados hallados en otros países.

A pesar de que las políticas de transferencias han demostrado ser altamente progresivas, también han presentado algunos problemas en su implementación. Dichos problemas, detectados a partir de evaluaciones de impacto (casos de “Oportunidades” en México, “Bolsa Escola” en Brasil, “Solidaridad” en Chile) demuestran que una vez finalizada la intervención las tasas de cobertura educativa, retrocesos en desnutrición, atención en salud y disminución de incidencias de pobreza vuelven a caer, lo que implica que los programas deben tener un horizonte de aplicación, lo suficientemente largo para lograr mejoras sostenibles en los indicadores, según un estudio de la Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe.

Asimismo, en aquellos lugares –como Bolivia– en los cuales no ha existido una mejora en la oferta y calidad del servicio, se observa que los impactos son más reducidos que en los casos en los cuales las intervenciones han tenido un doble componente de oferta (mejora en el servicio) y demanda (transferencias u otro tipo de incentivo).

El caso boliviano de políticas de transferencias presenta varias particularidades que permiten identificar varias limitaciones. El caso del bono de salud presenta problemas asociados a una oferta sanitarias de mala calidad y baja cobertura en el área rural, que en definitiva reduce el impacto de la transferencia a las mujeres en edad fértil. En el caso del bono educativo existen problemas de focalización, dado que la tasa de asistencia entre primero y quinto básico es mayor al 95 por ciento y es precisamente a partir del sexto grado cuando cae pronunciadamente. Asimismo, las tasas de asistencia presentan una brecha significativa entre niños y niñas, aspecto que no ha sido considerado por los diseñadores de la política.

Finalmente, en el caso del Bono a la tercera edad, se estima que tiene un efecto poco progresivo dado que son precisamente las personas con mayores ingresos y residentes en áreas urbanas, las que presentan mayores esperanzas de vida y las que reciben este dinero.

**Conclusiones**

A la luz de lo expuesto queda claro que para lograr mejoras en las condiciones de bienestar, los esfuerzos y acciones de política pública boliviana deben perfeccionar la focalización de poblaciones objetivo, así como incorporar una visión integral, tanto para garantizar la oferta de los servicios sociales básicos a la población, así como para desarrollar mecanismos que promuevan de manera sostenible la demanda por dichos servicios. Proveer servicios públicos que no tengan demanda es casi tan ineficiente como promover la demanda por servicios públicos de mala calidad o simplemente inexistentes en determinados espacios territoriales del país.

En este marco, los esfuerzos fiscales y de diseño de política social y redes de protección social que se están llevando a cabo, precisan ser profundizados, focalizados y complementados con intervenciones que en definitiva mejoren los impactos sobre las poblaciones más vulnerables. Sólo de esta manera se lograrán efectos de alivio de la pobreza y reducción de las desigualdades.

Ernesto Pérez de Rada es especialista en Política Social y trabaja para el Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo (PNUD) en La Paz, Bolivia.
Boom or a Boomerang: Social Policy in Bolivia

Natasha Morales Escoffier

Two years ago, Bolivia was considered a low income country, but in 2008 high commodity prices, especially oil, minerals and soy beans gave the country a strong comparative advantage; the resulting GDP growth has caused Bolivia to shift upward into the medium income group.

Social policy in Bolivia has changed substantially in tandem with the increase in world oil prices. According to the Supreme Decree 29565, enacted in May 2008, the increased revenues coming from the direct hydrocarbon taxes (IDH) should be used for social protection programs, among other purposes. However, there is not a clear relationship between the logic of the social program interventions and the allocation of these new resources.

With the Evo Morales administration there are important changes in the structure of the social protection programs. Most of them are “universal” but there is a tendency to focus them “geographically” through the Index of Food Safety Vulnerability (VAM) and the Index of Basic Needs (NBI). Most interventions take place only in those municipalities that have the highest VAM index and/or a NBI rating of greater than 70 per cent.

The rise in IDH revenues has multiplied by nine times municipal government revenues. Therefore, municipalities have become more dependent on the IDH revenues, making social investment vulnerable to the international context. Moreover, the allocation of IDH is inconsistent with the design and targeting of the social programs.

According to the Federación de Asociaciones Municipales, municipalities have declared their concern about the “lack of clarity in the information on the part of the Central Government with respect to the distribution of the IDH resources that are handled with a lot of uncertainty at the moment to carry out projections of adequate incomes for the planning of the municipal management.” This situation may generate a future lack of liquidity for municipal governments classified with high basic needs and food safety vulnerability.

However, social policy in Bolivia hasn’t ever been so dynamic. An important issue is the cash transfer programs. This type of program is very common in several Latin American countries, yet for Bolivia, this is somewhat new and politically profitable.

One of the most important programs is the “Bono Juancito Pinto” that aims to increase the access and the school attendance. It is a cash transfer program that gives US$28 per year to each child in public schools between 6 and 14 years old. The condition for receiving that amount is school attendance. Although there is not an impact evaluation of the program yet, according to the Ministry of Education, school attendance has substantially increased. Between the year 2006 and 2007, school attendance increased by 0.9 per cent for students from the first to fifth grades. The total growth rate in first grade school attendance was 2.8 per cent, one of the highest in the last ten years.

One of the most surprising aspects of the program is that the Bolivian army is responsible for the delivery of the money. The low costs of administration by the army and the social control exercised by social organizations support this current delivery system.

Another important program is the “Bono Juana Azurduy de Padilla”, which aims to reduce child and maternal mortality rates in Bolivia. It is oriented to the country’s 327 municipalities with a special focus on rural and suburban women and is meant to close a gap created 10 years ago when working mothers in urban areas received a breastfeeding subsidy of US$80 per year. With this new transfer, the state will grant US$6.50 to each woman that attends prenatal appointments, with a maximum of four, and US$17 to each woman that attends postnatal appointments. In addition, the government gives US$18 to each woman who brings her under-two child to bimonthly medical visits.

The program “Bono Juana Azurduy de Padilla” is a way to achieve equity among the “rural area” and the “urban area” and among the “formal” and the “informal” women workers.
In my opinion, this is one of the most accurate social programs of the new administration, since Bolivia has one of the highest child and maternal mortality rates in the regions, and most of the poverty in Bolivia could be explained by the situation of women living in rural areas and urban peripheries, mostly informal workers. The program will also have positive collateral effects; rural women will need to have an identity card and this will push forward their citizenship rights.

The new administration has also planned to implement social programs characterized not only by individual interventions but also interventions that address “social and indigenous communities” such as “Comunidades en Acción”, “Comunidades Recíprocas” and “Comunidades Solidarias”. After two years of discussions, these programs were unsuccessful as they have not started. The main issue is how to define “indigenous communities” and how the communities could achieve legal status in order to receive cash transfers. This is one of the most important issues that the government needs to resolve, since the approval of the new constitution in January 2009.

The reality is that among 15 so-called star social programs, only six are implemented: Juancito Pinto, Desnutrición Cero, Yo Sí Puedo, Operación Milagro, Mi Primer Empleo Digno and Juana Azurduy de Padilla. Many of these programs are implemented at the municipal level while some municipal governments have their own social programs. For example, school breakfast and school transport programs or “Aguayo para un parto sin riesgos” implemented in Curahuara de Carangas (give birth without risks program).

On the other hand, in Bolivia high social and political instability in the country, the potential negative impacts of the current international financial crisis, and the current crisis of the state-owned Bolivian Petroleum Enterprise (YPFB), combine to make Bolivia’s future uncertain. If we add social movements’ high level of empowerment and their strong demand with respect to the social programs as a factor in the long term, the lack of coherence between the “planning” and the “financing” of these programs could result in low levels of implementation, which also could stress the social tensions caused by unfulfilled promises.

After two boom years, the risk of high social and political instability in the country, the potential negative impacts of the current international financial crisis, and the current crisis of the state-owned petroleum company, combine to make Bolivia’s future uncertain.

Natasha Morales Escoffier is a Bolivian mother of two children and has a MSc in the Economics of Development from the Institute for Development Studies in The Hague, Netherlands. She has worked the last five years as an independent international consultant for several international organizations (UNESCO, UNIFEM, IADB) doing research on several countries in Latin America. This article draws from a previous article published in the Monthly Monday Morning Development Newsletter of the Institute for Advanced Development Studies-INESAD.
**Who is FOCAL?**

**Board of Directors**
- **Chair**
  - John Graham, Consultant
- **Bob Anderson**, former Vice President Americas, CIDA
- **Alain Berranger**, Executive-in-Resident, Schulich School of Business
- **Secretary**
  - Michael Bell, Consultant, Justice Solutions Inc.
- **Treasurer**
  - Anthony M.P. Tattersfield, Partner, Raymond Chabot Grant Thornton
- **Executive Director**
  - Carlo Dade, FOCAL (ex-officio)

**Directors of the Board**
- Charles P. Bassett, Former Canadian Executive Director to the Inter-American Development Bank
- Pablo F.G. Bréard, Vice President, Head of International Research, Scotiabank group
- Rt. Hon. Joe Clark, Former Canadian Prime Minister
- Graeme Clark, Ambassador & Permanent Representative of Canada to the OAS (ex-officio)
- Winston Cox, Alternate Director for the Caribbean at the Inter-American Development Bank
- Jean Daudelin, Assistant Professor, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University
- Paul Durand, OAS Resident Representative to the Dominican Republic
- James M. Lambert, Director General, Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Latin America and Caribbean Bureau (ex-officio)
- Jennifer L. McCoy, Associate Professor of Political Science (Georgia State) and Director of the Americas Program at The Carter Center
- Elizabeth Spehar, Consultant, Washington, D.C.
- Vinita Watson, Executive Director for Canada, Inter-American Development Bank (ex-officio)

**FOCAL Staff**
- Carlo Dade, Executive Director
- Olga Abizaid, Program Director, Democracies that Deliver
- Barbara MacLaren, Project Manager, Labour Mobility and Development
- Peter Moore, Director of Communications / Editor
- Naume Mutambo, Manager of Finance and Administration
- Arch Ritter, Interim Program Director, Research Forum on Cuba
- Ronald Rojas, Project Manager, Education and Health
- Tandy Shephard, Project Manager, Mapping Knowledge for Development

**Research Associates and Interns:** Kaylee Cameron, Stephanie Cabrera, Juan Camilo Sanchez, Ryan Dubé, Irina Ortiz, Alison Steeves, Maria Trimble, Emily Wilson.

---

**Emerging Leaders in the Americas Scholarships**

Canadian colleges and universities can sponsor Latin American and Caribbean students for one to two semesters to study at their institution. The goal of the scholarship program is to “support the development of human capital and a next generation of Leaders in the Americas while strengthening the linkages between Canadian post-secondary institutions and the ones in Latin America and the Caribbean.” For more information, visit www.scholarships.gc.ca/elap-eng.asp.

---

**Letters to the Editor**

We welcome letters to the editor. Please send by email to pmoore@focal.ca or by fax to 613-562-2525.

The views expressed in FOCALPoint are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of FOCAL, its Board or staff.

---

**FOCALPoint** is undertaken with the financial support of the Government of Canada provided through the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA).

---

**Canada and the Americas: Priorities and Progress**

Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade released a new report chronicling progress made since Canada declared the Americas its number two foreign policy priority after Afghanistan.

The report is available for download in English and French at geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/geo/americas-report_ameriques-rapport-en.asp

---

**Chronicle on Cuba 2009 Available in Spanish**

Cubasource.org now has available the January to April editions of the 2009 Chronicle on Cuba (in Spanish only), with a day-by-day summary of occurrences on Domestic Affairs, Economy, Exile Community, Foreign Affairs, Security, and US-Cuba Relations.

---

**FOCAL**

1, rue Nicholas Street
Suite/Bureau 720
Ottawa, Ontario
K1N 7B7 Canada
Tel/Tél: 613.562.0005
Fax/Téléc: 613.562.2525
Email/Courriel: focal@focal.ca
www.focal.ca

Copyright © FOCAL 2008