Engaging Diasporas

How governments and development agencies can support diaspora involvement in the development of origin countries

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Executive summary

There is increasing recognition of the potential of migration in stimulating development in countries of origin. This acknowledgment accompanies a call to engage migrants and diaspora organisations in development cooperation. The present study analyses how multilateral organisations as well as European governments and development agencies have implemented such ‘migrants and development’ policies over the past three decades. It focuses specifically on the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and France, but also considers Belgium, Germany, Italy and Spain.

The extent to which the stated priority for this issue has been turned into concrete action has been limited up to now, with the exception of remittance policies. However, valuable lessons can be drawn from past and current experiences with the implementation of policies to support and to strengthen the engagement of diasporas and their members in the development of countries of origin. The study identifies a number of points of departure for implementing successful policies in this field:

- Recognising that migrants are already mobilised for development on their own initiative. Rather than ‘mobilising diasporas’, development actors themselves should be ‘mobilised’ to engage with and to learn from diasporas in development cooperation so as to establish a genuine two-way working relationship;

- Setting realistic expectations through increasing awareness of past experiences and studies that show migration is no panacea for development. Expectations must be set more realistically so as to avoid disappointment and the subsequent abandonment of the migration and development agenda;

- Successful alliance building also implies that established development actors should recognise the added value of diaspora organisations and show a serious and long-term commitment through giving them a real say in policy formulation and access to substantial funding;

- Increasing coherence between development cooperation and migration policies cannot be achieved by subordinating the first policy area to the second. Paradoxically, restrictive immigration policies force migrants into permanent settlement and impede circular movement, with negative consequences for the transnational engagement of diaspora groups;

- Avoiding double agendas. Diaspora organisations are unlikely to cooperate with development policies whose hidden agenda is to curb migration through development. This is not only an unrealistic aim but it will also almost certainly lead diaspora organisations to shun cooperation with development actors.

This study identifies four broad areas in which development agencies and governments can support and strengthen the engagement of diasporas and their members in the development of countries of origin:
1. **Facilitating and reducing costs of remittances.** This is the most tangible and therefore least problematic area of policy intervention. However, the only feasible way to serve the interests of migrants is to improve the banking system rather than to clamp down on the informal system without creating viable alternatives. Policies that try to channel remittances into productive investments are not only patronising and neglectful of the potentially positive impacts of consumption and ‘non-productive’ investments but they are also bound to fail as long as general investment conditions do not improve;

2. **Supporting migrants to set up small enterprises in countries of origin and facilitating ‘brain circulation’.** Repeated experiences have shown that such programmes are unlikely to succeed if they focus on or are conditional upon return. More promising results have been achieved by the Dutch IntEnt projects for migrant entrepreneurs and by UNDP’s long-standing TOKTEN programme to facilitate ‘brain circulation’. Both programmes avoid imposing a return conditionality.

3. **Supporting collective development projects initiated or implemented by diaspora organisations and their members.** It has proven difficult to put this idea into practice, due to differences in size, organisational culture and objectives of official development actors and diaspora organisations. For projects to succeed, it seems important that development actors do not stipulate the kind of projects to be funded but rather link up with existing initiatives of diaspora organisations. Co-funded projects that have been selected through an open tendering system – such as have been implemented in the Netherlands – have generally been more successful than ‘co-opted’ projects based on 100 percent funding. The French-Moroccan example of Migrations et Développement demonstrates that a successful implementation of projects should evolve from a long learning process and from a thorough knowledge of local contexts and cultural sensitivities;

4. **Supporting diaspora networks and capacity building of diaspora organisations along with creating durable alliances with established development actors.** Government or agency-led efforts to ‘engineer’ consultative bodies or migrant platforms do not seem to be the way forward to create such alliances. A more fruitful strategy seems to support existing, spontaneously created diaspora organisations or networks, such as Afford in the UK, which have already gained legitimacy through their role in development and advocacy of migrant rights and interests. However, there is a delicate balance between strengthening and patronising diaspora organisations.

In general, it would be a mistake to assume that diaspora groups and their members should be taught how to ‘do’ development or how best to spend their remittances. Diaspora organisations have survived independently for many years; any attempt to patronise or to state ‘what is best for them’ would appear to be a recipe for failure. The challenge for development actors is not to make diaspora organisations more like them, but to build on their unique strengths.
Introduction

1.1. Background

Over the past five years, the issue of ‘migration and development’ has regained substantial attention among multilateral agencies such as the World Bank and the IMF, national governments and development agencies. Presumably urged by the spectacular surge in remittances – which now amount to well over two times the amount of official development assistance and to tenfold the amount of net private capital transfers to developing countries – an increasing need is felt to integrate migration into development policies. However, this coincides with a one-sided focus on the macro-economic impact of migration, such as the importance of remittances for national accounts and their potential role in enabling business investments. Consequently, policy measures discussed at conferences and implemented in practice tend to focus on measures to facilitate and channel remittances into formal channels as well as to enhance their macro-economic impact.

This goes along with a comparative neglect of the important micro-level contribution of remittances to development in migrant sending societies. Firstly, the at least US$ 126 billion in remittances that are now sent yearly from North to South are primarily sent between individuals and families. These transfers have significant direct poverty-reducing and welfare-increasing effects. Secondly, even consumption and ‘non-productive investments’ – which tend to receive a bad press – can have significant positive multiplier impacts on economic growth and employment.

Furthermore, migrants might contribute to development in countries of origin in many ways other than by sending remittances alone. These contributions are less tangible than remittances but not necessarily less relevant. For instance, they might contribute to economic growth through setting up enterprises themselves or helping relatives to do so. This is not only a function of remittances, but it also potentially implies a beneficial transfer of know-how and competencies: what is called ‘brain gain’. Besides contributing to economic development, migrants can also play an important role in the stimulation of political debate, the strengthening of civil society, the enabling and encouraging of education for non-migrants, and the emancipation of women and minority groups in countries of origin.

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1 Kapur and McHale 2003.
3 See de Haas 2005; Taylor 1999.
4 See Massey et al. 1998.
Yet it is important to emphasise that, depending on specific circumstances, migration and remittances can also have negative effects on origin-country development: for instance, through increasing inequality, dependency or even support for warring parties\(^5\). As both negative and positive effects on development are found to varying degrees, the relevant question is under what conditions are migration and social and economic development more positively correlated than under others. It is difficult to generalise, since migration does not have some kind of predetermined impact. What seems essential is that, depending on the specific context at the sending end, migration enables people to disengage from, just as much as to engage in the social, economic and political development of countries of origin\(^6\).

Traditionally, it has been assumed by both sending and receiving countries that the positive contributions of migration to origin-country development normally coincide with the return of migrants. However, it has become increasingly clear that migrants have become progressively more transnational in their orientations and can thus be simultaneously involved in two or more societies at the same time\(^7\).

The radically improved technical possibilities allow migrants to foster links with their societies of origin through the (mobile) telephone, fax, (satellite) television, the internet and by remitting money through globalised banking systems or informal channels. This increasingly enables migrants to foster double loyalties, to travel back and forth, to foster relationships, to work and to do business simultaneously in distant places. The implication is that clear-cut dichotomies of ‘origin’ or ‘destination’ and categories such as ‘permanent’, ‘temporary’ and ‘return’ migration seem more and more difficult to sustain in a world in which the lives of migrants seem increasingly characterised by circulation and simultaneous commitment to two or more societies\(^8\).

In contrast to classical conceptions of migrant integration, the integration of migrants in receiving countries can not only coincide with but also even tends to amplify their involvement in the development of countries of origin. After all, successful and ‘integrated’ migrants generally also possess the attitudes, know-how, rights and financial capacity for setting up enterprises, participating in public debates and establishing development projects in their regions and countries of origin. Hence, transnationally operating migrant communities are emerging as independent and potentially powerful factors of development. The potential strength of migrants is their simultaneous knowledge of and involvement in two or more societies, which make them a potentially effective link between wealthy and poor countries.

Such forms of transnational economic, social and civic engagement can take place at the individual or family level, but seem to acquire an increasingly collective dimension. Migrants and their descendants exhibit a continued interest in their countries of origin, which is exemplified by the establishment of associations that explicitly aim to foster links with the countries of origin, to provide small-scale aid and to set up development projects. Numerous ‘home town associations’ have committed themselves to contribute to issues such as schooling, health care,

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\(^6\) de Haas 2005.
\(^7\) Vertovec 1999.
\(^8\) de Haas 2005.
infrastructure and women’s empowerment and to provide micro-credits to facilitate small-scale enterprises in regions and communities of origin.

Without denying the significant contribution of individually sent remittances and other forms of private transfers to poverty reduction and economic development (both directly and through income multipliers) in regions and countries of origin, the much-celebrated micro-level at which remittances are transferred is not only their strength, but also their main weakness, since this also implies that individual migrants are generally not able to remove general development constraints. Such constraints might exist in the form of a lack of road and public infrastructure and badly functioning markets such as lack of access to credit facilities, as well as failing government institutions, excessive bureaucracy and corruption. On the one hand, this points to the fact that migration is by no means a substitute for good governance by governments of migrant-sending countries. On the other hand, it also points to the potential strength of migrants’ collective contributions through organisations: Collective action is more likely to resolve some of such structural constraints than are scattered individual efforts. This might be in the form of small-scale contributions to local development through drinking water projects or the construction of schools, wells and roads, but also through more large-scale projects aimed at, for instance, promoting agricultural development through irrigation schemes and improving women’s economic independence through vocational training and micro-credits. Alternatively, migrant organisations might also strive to promote democratisation and strengthening civil society in sending countries through sustaining local organisations.

The transfers of social, financial and cognitive resources by migrants for the benefit of origin-country development have recently gained substantial attention in the ‘migration and development’ debate. This has coincided as well with a growing aspiration among government and development agencies to go ‘beyond remittances’ and to support migrants’ individual and collective transnational engagement in origin-country development, or to ‘mobilise’ migrants for development cooperation.

Substantial heed has been paid to the ways in which governments of sending states can contribute to enhancing the development impact of migration. In particular the Mexican experience has garnered considerable interest. As part of its Program for the Attention of Mexican Communities Abroad, the Mexican government has successfully implemented two-for-one and three-for-one programmes that match funds for every dollar raised by Home Town Associations for approved public infrastructure projects in Mexico. These Home Town Associations similarly receive financial and technical support from the Mexican government through its consular offices.

In comparison, the interest in the potential contribution of governments and NGOs of migrant-receiving countries to migrants’ transnational engagement in the development of sending countries received scant attention until the early 21st century. Although several development agencies have been involved in work with migrants in the North as an expression of social concern about their abuse and exploitation, few have taken migrants seriously as development actors. However, ‘if migration is an important

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9 See de Haas 2005; Taylor 1999.
10 ‘Beyond remittances’ is adopted from the title of Newland and Patrick 2004.
strategy for development and can contribute to the reduction of poverty in the south, there may be considerable potential for NGOs to work with migrants and diaspora groups in order to meet their goals\textsuperscript{12}.

A new consensus seems to have arisen that because of their simultaneous engagement in two or more societies, migrants and their organisations can be effective partners for implementing development policies. However, the potentially positive role of migrants and migrant organisations in development beyond remittances has thus far seldom been incorporated into day-to-day practices of development cooperation and migration policies.

### 1.2. Aims and research questions

Both governmental and non-governmental development actors have gradually recognised the high potential of migration and migrants for the development of countries of origin. Yet the extent to which the stated priority for this issue has been turned into concrete action by national ministries for development cooperation and development NGOs seems to be very limited up to now. Although development agencies show a vivid interest in sustaining migrant organisation, it has proven to be difficult to implement such ‘migration and development’ policies in practice. The focus of this study will be on whether and how governments and development agencies can practically support and enhance the transnational engagement of migrants in the development of countries of origin.

Migrants can be potentially involved in development policies in many different ways, such as through (1) actively involving migrants and migrant organisations in policy formulation; (2) supporting capacity building and network formation among migrant organisations so as to enhance their abilities to undertake development initiatives; (3) directly sustaining development initiatives of migrants by providing financial and/or organisational support; (4) involving migrants and migrant and diaspora organisations as ‘experts’ or ‘consultants’ in development projects designed by development agencies; and, more controversially, (5) involving migrant and diaspora organisations in programmes of permanent or temporary return\textsuperscript{13}.

Insofar as the ideas to involve migrants and their organisations in development policies have been formulated over the past years, there is no comparative knowledge of the characteristics and aims of such policies, how they have been put into practice, and to what extent they have been successful. More knowledge is required as to which specific fields and under what conditions successful partnerships between migrant organisations and development agencies can and should be built.

This study aims to fill part of this gap through a systematic analysis of whether, why and how European governments and development agencies have formulated and implemented ‘migration and development’ policies, and more specifically to what


\textsuperscript{13} In particular return migration has been seen.
extent and how they actively involve migrant and diaspora organisations and their members in development cooperation. This study will address the following specific questions:

- Which development actors are active in the field of migration and development?
- What concrete actions and policies have they implemented to address the migration and development nexus?
- In what practical ways do they establish, maintain and build links with migrants and their organisations as part of these policies?
- What are their experiences with past and present activities? What are the main factors determining failure and success and what are their future plans?
- What are the ‘enabling’ and ‘disabling’ environments for the involvement of migrant organisations in development cooperation and what role can development actors play to enhance this involvement?
- What practical policy recommendations can be formulated so as to help and motivate development actors and migrant organisations in building mutual partnerships?

Through synthesising scattered information and comparing policies and – successful and less successful – practices in a number of western European countries, this study aims to shed light on the available policies options. This overview and increased insight into the enabling factors that contribute to successful policies might help and motivate governments, development agencies and migrants to learn from previous experiences and to implement effective policies.

This study is primarily of an exploratory nature. Taking into account its limited scope, it can also serve as a basis for future research. In particular the following issues seem to deserve further investigation:

- A detailed evaluation of the effectiveness of projects supported by development agencies to build networks and increase capacities among migrant and diaspora organisations or that sustain development projects initiated by migrants. Because this is a new policy field, detailed evaluations, which would serve to identify best practices, are not yet available;
- In this effort, it would be particularly useful to study and to learn from the long experience of those joint development actions that have been accumulated at the local and regional level: for instance through city twinning programmes;
- A study similar to this one, but from the perspective of policies that development actors in sending countries can adopt to involve migration in their policies;
- A study focusing on the gender dimensions of ‘migration and development’ policies. In most policy documents and studies, this dimension is largely ignored. Are diaspora organisations dominated by men, and what is the gendered impact of projects? Is there a gendered difference in remittance behaviour and project design and implementation? How can development actors ensure women’s participation in such projects?
A study of how the efforts by governments and development agencies to ‘mobilise diasporas for development cooperation’ are perceived by migrant and diaspora organisations themselves. Why is there such a perceived gap between them and the ‘established development sector’? When and why do they experience the ‘courting’ by development agencies as patronising? What do they see as the added value of and the major obstacles to building effective partnerships?

1.3. Scope, limitations and concepts

This study will focus on initiatives undertaken by governments and nationally organised development agencies to involve migrants and migrant and diaspora organisations in their development policies. Because such agencies often collaborate closely with national governments and diverse multilateral development agencies, the relevant policies of the latter have also been taken into consideration.

The report first analyses how relevant policies have evolved in the Netherlands. In subsequent chapters this is compared with practices in the United Kingdom and in France. This choice is motivated by the fact that these three countries have relatively evolved migration and development policies, but show significant differences in the concrete orientation of these policies and, more specifically, the role they attribute to migrants and diaspora organisations. Another chapter will briefly review – without the pretense of being comprehensive – the situation in Belgium, Germany, Spain and Italy as cases of both well-established and recent immigration countries, where migration and development policies are less evolved for various reasons. This choice does not presume to be exhaustive or representative of Europe as a whole. For instance, it is only for brevity’s sake that the interesting cases of Sweden and Denmark have not been discussed.

It was equally for brevity’s sake that this study largely ignores the numerous and often much more established forms of joint-development cooperation between migrant organisations and local and regional NGOs and governments, such as through project support of city twinnings. Nor does the study pay specific attention to the extremely numerous spontaneous and independent efforts by individual migrants and their organisation to contribute to development. This was a deliberate choice, due to this study’s focus on the potential link between migrants and the established world of development cooperation.

However, this focus should not give the impression that migrant and diaspora organisations are passively awaiting or are in desperate need of help from governments and development agencies. In fact, in most cases, migrants have entered the development arena voluntarily and at their own expense in terms of time, effort and money. Or, as Newland and Patrick state: ‘The dense web of ties between diaspora and country of origin is, in the overwhelming majority of cases, the creation of individuals and groups acting on their own initiative, rather than a product of government intervention’.

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15 Newland and Patrick 2004, p. 17.
Finally, it would seem useful to discuss briefly the key terms used in this study: ‘migrant organisations’, ‘diaspora organisations’ and ‘development actors’\textsuperscript{16}.

A migrant organisation is any kind of organisation consisting mainly of migrants and their descendants, irrespective of the specific activities of such organisations. The commonly used term ‘diaspora’ is a highly contested concept, many definitions of which exist\textsuperscript{17}. As there is no room for extensive discussion here, we employ the definition put forward by Van Hear, Pieke and Vertovec:

‘Diaspora are defined as populations of migrant origin who are scattered among two or more destinations, between which there develop multifarious links involving flows and exchanges of people and resources: between the homeland and destination countries, and among destination countries\textsuperscript{18}.’

Although there is an analytical distinction between diaspora and migrant organisations, in practice the terms are often used interchangeably in different national contexts, and in this report as well we cannot always avoid doing so.

Migrant organisations, which are incredibly varied in scope, organisation and size, tend to focus on the lives, rights and integration of migrants in receiving countries. This study focuses on the minority of migrant organisations that aim at promoting development in countries of origin. AFFORD\textsuperscript{19} made the following categorisation regarding multiple organisational forms in which transnational engagement can take shape: Individuals (and families); Hometown associations; Ethnic associations; Alumni associations; Religious associations; Professional associations; Development NGOs; Investment groups/businesses; Political groups; National development groups; Welfare/refugee groups; Supplementary schools; and Virtual organisations

As far as activities are concerned, AFFORD\textsuperscript{20} distinguished:

- Person-to-person transfers of money, consumer goods, and even larger items such as cars, mainly to family, immediate and extended;
- Community-to-community transfers for constructive but sometimes for destructive purposes;
- Identity building/awareness raising in current home about ancestral home either with other members of same community or with wider groups;
- Lobbying in current home on issues relating to ancestral home, either of current home politicians or visiting ancestral home leaders;
- Trade with and investment in ancestral home (including electronic commerce);
- Transfers of intangible resources such as knowledge, values and ideas;
- Support for development on a more ‘professional’ basis;
- Payment of taxes in ancestral home.

\textsuperscript{16} For an extensive discussion of the concept ‘development’ itself see Sen 1999, and for a specific discussion of the concept of development in relation to migration, see de Haas 2003, cf. de Haas 2006.
\textsuperscript{17} Cohen 1997.
\textsuperscript{18} Van Hear \textit{et al.} 2004, p.3.
\textsuperscript{19} AFFORD 2000, pp. 5-6.
\textsuperscript{20} AFFORD 2000, p.6.
By ‘development actors’ we mean all individuals and institutions that act with the intention to contribute to development in poor countries. This includes governmental departments for international development, multilateral agencies and professional development agencies (NGOs) as well as migrants and their organisations aiming to contribute to the development of countries of origin.

1.4. Methodology

This study took place between November 2005 and March 2006. The first stage consisted of studying the relevant literature and in particular an analysis of policy and other available documents. This served to identify the existence, evolution and practical implementation of ‘migration and development policies’ among development actors. Subsequently, relevant specialists working for the various development actors were approached by email and telephone for additional consultations to supplement the written sources. Respondents also helped to identify other persons and organisations working on migrant involvement in development cooperation. This allowed the identifying of most relevant organisations in the field in order to obtain an adequate overview of the ‘migrants and development field’ in each of the countries under study.

1.5. Structure of report

In order to put the analysis into a framework of the general trends of the globally increasing attention for migration and development issues, Chapter 2 will provide an overview of whether and how relevant international organisations and multilateral agencies have formulated and concretely developed ideas and implemented policies towards migration and development and involving migrant organisations in their policies for international development cooperation.

The subsequent chapters contain the country-specific analyses. Each chapter will start with an analysis of national policies as formulated by governments and ministerial departments for international cooperation. Secondly, the migration and development policies of development agencies within each country will be evaluated. The conclusion will summarise the results and put forward a number of policy recommendations.
The international framework

2.1. The need for more awareness

The current interest in ‘migration and development’ in European migrant-receiving states is part of a global trend. In the first years of the 21st century, the issue of migration and development has gained the increasing attention of organisations such as the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU), financial institutions such as the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as well as other international organisations such as the International Labour Office (ILO) and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM). This chapter will analyse the recent evaluation of policies and practices with regard to the place of migration and migrants in development cooperation.

In the past few years there has been a remarkable renaissance in the interest in the issue of migration, development and remittances by policy makers, multilateral organisations and scholars. In particular, remittances seem to be a subject of unprecedented optimism and euphoria. This ‘fashion’ tends to coincide with a certain perception that it concerns a ‘new’ issue, which usually accompanies a call for more research. However, any suggestion that the subject of migration and development is ‘new’ testifies to a lack of awareness of the large existing body of research on this issue. Also in the policy field there have been earlier periods in which migration was seen as a vital development resource and in which policies have been designed and implemented to increase the development potential of migration. Lest we ‘reinvent the wheel’, we should not lose sight of the findings of previous work and policies.

It therefore seems useful to provide a certain historical context. In general, we can distinguish four periods in the post-WWII thinking on migration and development (see table 1). In the 1950s and 1960s it was widely assumed that through a policy of large-scale capital transfer and industrialization poor countries would be able to jump on the bandwagon of rapid economic development and modernization. In the same period, large-scale labour migration from developing to developed countries began to gain momentum. Many developing countries became involved in the migration process amidst expectations of the ‘dawning of a new era’.

21 Kapur 2003; Ratha 2003.
### Table 1. Main phases in migration and development research and policies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Research community</th>
<th>Policy field</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>until 1973</td>
<td>Development and migration optimism</td>
<td>Developmentalist optimism; capital and knowledge transfers by migrants would help developing countries in development take-off.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-1990</td>
<td>Development and migration pessimism</td>
<td>Growing scepticism; concerns on brain drain; after experiments with return migration policies focused on integration in receiving countries. Migration largely out of sight in development field.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(dependency, brain drain)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-2001</td>
<td>Readjustment to more subtle views under influence of increasing empirical work</td>
<td>Persistent scepticism and neglect; tightening of immigration policies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 2001</td>
<td>Boom in studies: mixed, but generally positive views.</td>
<td>Resurgence of migration and development optimism and a sudden turnaround of views: brain gain, remittances and diaspora involvement; further tightening of immigration policies but greater tolerance for high-skilled immigration.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Governments of developing countries started to actively encourage emigration, since they considered it one of the principal instruments to promote national development. The general expectation was that remittances — as well as the experience, skills and knowledge that migrants would acquire abroad before returning — would greatly help developing countries in their economic take-off.\(^\text{24}\) Return migrants were expected to invest large sums of money in industrial enterprises in the country of origin. Expectations ran high. In the same vein, it was thought that large-scale emigration could ‘contribute to the best of both worlds: rapid growth in the country of immigration... and rapid growth in the country of origin’\(^\text{25}\). In recent years, this optimistic view of migration and development seems to be experiencing a certain renaissance\(^\text{26}\).

After the Oil Crisis of 1973 Europe experienced a massive economic downturn, industrial restructuring and increasing unemployment. This more or less coincided with a turning point in thinking on migration and development issues. As of the late 1960s, prevalent optimistic views on migration and development were increasingly challenged by views of migration as a mechanism provoking not only a ‘brain drain’\(^\text{27}\) but also passive dependency of emigration regions and countries on migrant remittances. The departure of young, talented men and women would maintain and aggravate problems of underdevelopment. It was increasingly believed that migrants would tend to fritter remittances away on ‘conspicuous consumption’ and that they would mainly invest their money in ‘non-productive’ enterprises such as housing\(^\text{28}\).

The socio-cultural effects of migration were also increasingly placed in a negative light. Exposure to the relative wealth and success of migrants, combined with

\(^{24}\) Adler 1981; Penninx 1982.
\(^{25}\) Kindleberger 1965, p. 253; quoted in De Mas and Vermeulen 1993, pp. 2-6.
\(^{26}\) See de Haas 2005 and de Haas 2006.
\(^{27}\) cf. Adams 1969.
changing tastes and expanding material aspirations, were thought to make the way of
life in migrant sending regions and countries less appealing. A ‘culture of migration’
would subsequently perpetuate the vicious circle of ongoing out-migration.29

In the early 1970s, on the assumption that the great age of migration had ended
and that most labour migrants or ‘guest workers’ would or should return, western
European governments such as the Netherlands, Germany and France began to
experiment with specific measures to discourage family reunification and to
encourage migrants to return to their origin countries. These measures included
departure bonuses, training programs before return and investment programs for
return migrants.30 Such return policies typically failed, largely because of the lack of
opportunities for investments and employment in most countries of origin, which
continued to suffer from high unemployment, political instability and repression.
Moreover, after a certain ‘period of grace’ return migrants were generally not allowed
to go back to the receiving countries if their investment project failed or if they failed
to re-adapt. This made migrants decide to stay, ‘to be on the safe side’.31

However, and as will be described in following chapters, return migration policies
including financial bonuses and re-integration assistance have often continued
whether or not in a modified form– and have in some cases been reinvented. In the
same period, the UNDP started the TOKTEN programme to counter the effects of the
brain drain through a reverse transfer of technology and knowledge. In fact, the
programme still exists.

A growing body of research on migration and development conducted over the 1980s
and 1990s, and under the influence of the new economics of labour migration
(NELM), challenged the dominant pessimistic views on migration impacts. Based on
substantial evidence pointing to the diverse nature of migration impacts, NELM
offered a more subtle view, in which both positive and negative development
responses were possible, depending on the degree to which sending countries and
regions provided attractive environments in which to invest and to which to return.32

Nevertheless, in the development policy field a high degree of scepticism on the issue
of migration and development persisted from the mid 1970s until the late 1990s. This
also coincided with an increasing awareness of the permanent, non-temporary
character of immigration to Europe. Consequently, the focus shifted to the receiving-
country dimension of international migration, which went along with a trend among
European policy makers to focus more on the integration of immigrants and less on
the developmental consequences of migration for sending countries.33

Against the background of a long period of pessimism and near-neglect, the sudden
‘rediscovery’ of the migration and development issue and the rapid shift from

30 de Haas 2003; Entzinger 1985; Penninx 1982.
32 Stark 1978; 1991; Taylor 1999; for an extensive review, see de Haas 2003,
33 Nevertheless, many politicians and other policy makers in sending countries, in particular in the
Asian and Pacific context, continued to see international migration as a major instrument of national
economic development, in which a combination of migration, remittances, aid, and (government)
bureaucracy (MIRAB) is expected to contribute to the economic take-off of developing countries. See
pessimistic to optimistic views of ‘migration and development’ among multilateral organisations, governments and development agencies in the first half of the 2000s is a remarkable phenomenon.\(^3\)

This near-euphoria seems to have been instigated by a strong and unexpected increase in remittances. Remittances suddenly seem to have been re-discovered and have become a subject of unprecedented optimism and euphoria. The money remitted by migrants to developing countries rose from $31.1 billion in 1990 to $76.8 billion in 2000 to no less than $116.0 billion in 2003. Remittances to developing countries more than doubled during the 1990s, whereas official aid flows showed a declining trend. Remittances have proved to be less volatile, less pro-cyclical, and therefore a more reliable source of income than other capital flows to developing countries, such as foreign direct investment and development aid.\(^5\) It is claimed that remittances are close to tripling the value of the Official Development Assistance (ODA) provided to low-income countries, and they comprise the second-largest source of external funding for developing countries after Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).\(^6\)

This phenomenon ran parallel with a striking reversal – from pessimist to optimist – of dominant views regarding how migration affects development. It has recently been argued that remittances are a safety net for relatively poor areas and countries, and remittances are freer from political barriers and controls than either product or other capital flows. Remittances appear to be a more effective instrument for income redistribution than large, bureaucratic development programmes or development aid. This ‘private’ foreign aid seems to flow directly to the people who really need it, does not require a costly bureaucracy on the sending side, and far less of it is likely to be siphoned off into the pockets of corrupt government officials.\(^7\) As part of the same optimistic mood and paradigm shift, there is also growing optimism about the potential role of migrant diasporas. The ‘brain drain’ argument has been increasingly countered by the argument that migration can lead to a significant ‘brain gain’ through a counter flow of remittances, investments, trade relations, new knowledge, innovations, attitudes and information.\(^8\)

In brief, migration remittances seem to be a well-nigh ideal form of ‘bottom-up’ development finance and innovation. Although there is an element of truth in this, such euphoria may be overly optimistic. Migration and remittances are apparently now being proclaimed as the newest ‘development mantra’ among institutions such as the World Bank, governments and development NGOs. As a result, there is a real danger that amnesia regarding previous work leads to a naïve optimism reminiscent of earlier developmentalist beliefs; this will inevitably lead to the same exaggerated expectations and deep disappointments. Now that the pendulum has swung from sheer optimism to sheer pessimism and back again, it is time to nudge it steadily toward the middle.

\(^3\) Kapur 2003; Ratha 2003.
\(^5\) de Haas 2005; Ratha 2003; World Bank 2005.
\(^6\) GCIM 2005.
\(^7\) Kapur 2003.
\(^8\) Lowell and Findlay 2002; Stark et al. 1997.
\(^9\) Kapur 2003; see also Jones 1998.
Kapur argues that the current remittance euphoria is in part a reaction to previously failed development mantras, and therefore warns against uncritical optimism characterising this latest fashion in development thinking\(^{40}\). Any suggestion that the subject of migration and development is ‘new’ testifies to a lack of awareness of the existing body of research and policy experience, which indicate that the impacts of migration on development in migrant-sending communities and countries are fundamentally heterogeneous, and that migration is not a panacea to solve more structural development problems.

Migration and migrants can constitute a valuable resource for development in countries of origin, but this positive impact is a potential rather than an automatic mechanism. The fundamental question is not whether migration leads to certain types of development, but how different policy environments explain why migration has more positive development outcomes in some cases and less positive or negative outcomes in others\(^{41}\).

The remainder of this chapter will demonstrate how multilateral agencies and inter-governmental bodies have recently attempted to formulate policies and to develop concrete actions so as to maximise the development contribution of migration through the active involvement of migrant communities.

2.2. Multilateral financial agencies

2.2.1. Inter-American Development Bank

The Multilateral Investment Fund (MIF) of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) has pioneered remittance research through extensive fieldwork in Latin America and the Caribbean, through numerous publications – in particular by Manuel Orozco\(^{42}\) – and by its efforts to forge more efficient public-private partnerships to support the efficient delivery of remittance services\(^{43}\). Urged by surging remittances, the Multilateral Investment Fund began exploring remittance issues in 2000, and in May 2001 convened the first ever LAC (Latin America and the Caribbean) Regional Conference on Remittances. As background for the second LAC Regional Conference on Remittances, the MIF commissioned two studies on remittances to Latin America. In 2002, the MIF summarised the results in its report Remittances to Latin America and the Caribbean\(^{44}\), which drew international attention to the dramatic acceleration in remittances. Several studies and surveys were to follow, which concluded that the majority of foreign-born Latino people living in the US send remittances regularly. These studies equally conclude that providing access to financial institutions for

\(^{40}\) Kapur 2003.

\(^{41}\) Taylor 1999, de Haas 2005, de Haas 2006.

\(^{42}\) For Manuel Orozco’s publications on migration and development, see http://www.thedialogue.org/programs/policy/trade/remittances/

\(^{43}\) cf. IMF 2005.

\(^{44}\) MIF and ADB 2002.
remittance-receiving families in order to reduce transaction costs is an important priority\textsuperscript{45}.

\section*{2.2.2. World Bank}

Before 2003, ‘migration and development’ was a relatively minor issue for the World Bank\textsuperscript{46}. For instance, the \textit{Policies towards migration} section of the \textit{Globalization, Growth, and Poverty} report, published in 2002, mostly focuses on the implications of migration for receiving countries, and does not mention remittances at all\textsuperscript{47}. The scant attention to remittances in the \textit{Global Economic Prospects 2002} report mainly concerned a couple of warnings that remittances are a vulnerable and stagnant external source of income\textsuperscript{48}.

This all changed with the publication of the highly influential Global Development Finance report by the World Bank in 2003, and more specifically the chapter by Dilip Ratha, entitled \textit{Workers’ remittances: an important and stable source of external development finance}\textsuperscript{49}. This report raised global awareness of the developmental relevance of migration and sent a shockwave through the development community. The chapter stressed the relative importance of workers’ remittances as a source of development finance in developing countries and discusses measures that industrial and developing countries could take to increase remittances. It concluded that remittance flows are the second-largest source, behind FDI, of external funding for developing countries and that remittances are often invested by the recipients, particularly in countries with sound economic policies. It also observed that the transaction costs of fund transfers often exceed 20 percent, and that reducing them by even 5 percent could generate an annual saving of $3.5 billion for the workers sending money home.

In October of the same year the World Bank collaborated with DfID (Department for International Development of the United Kingdom) to organise a major conference on migrant remittances in London. It was apparently the first ‘global’ meeting of its type on this topic and was attended by 100 participants from 42 countries\textsuperscript{50}. The report and the conference signified the definite breakthrough of the migration issue on the global development cooperation agenda. It drew attention to soaring remittances and their developmental role, and reflected the priority given to the issue by global development actors.

This was the kick-off of a major series of World Bank empirical studies and publications analysing remittances, poverty and development issues as part of its ongoing Research Program on International Migration. The 2004 Global


\textsuperscript{46} Notwithstanding occasional publications, such as Russell 1995.

\textsuperscript{47} World Bank 2002.

\textsuperscript{48} World Bank 2001.

\textsuperscript{49} Ratha 2003.

\textsuperscript{50} International Conference on Migrant Remittances: Development Impact, Opportunities for the Financial Sector and Future Prospects, 9-10 October 2003, London. See http://www.livelihoods.org/hot_topics/migration/remittances.html
Development Finance Report\textsuperscript{51} contained an appendix entitled \textit{Enhancing the Developmental Effect of Workers’ Remittances to Developing Countries}. It first cited a World Bank study showing that at the individual level, remittances augment the income and reduce the poverty of the recipients\textsuperscript{52}; it also argued that, at the macro level, remittances are believed to have a favourable effect on growth to the extent that they are used to finance education and health expenses. Its main policy recommendation focused on reducing remittance transaction costs through stimulating greater competition among money-transfer agents; better access to banking services for migrant workers in remittance-source countries and households in recipient countries; harmonization of the financial infrastructure supporting remittances; and a better investment climate in the remittance-receiving country, for example, through removal of foreign-exchange restrictions\textsuperscript{53}.

The 2005 Global Development Finance Report also stressed that workers’ remittances provide valuable financial resources to developing countries, particularly the poorest\textsuperscript{54}. Another major World Bank study completed in 2005, entitled \textit{International migration, remittances, and the brain drain}\textsuperscript{55}, suggested, amongst other things, that both internal and international remittances reduce the level, depth and severity of poverty. However, one chapter in the study suggested that the size of the brain gain and its impact on welfare and growth is significantly smaller than is often assumed and may even be negative. It also showed that migration could lower the education attainment of children and increase inequality at least in the shorter term, although empirical evidence does not support the view that migration leads unequivocally to higher inequality in sending countries.

The World Bank’s \textit{Global Economic Prospects 2006: Economic Implications of Remittances and Migration}\textsuperscript{56} analysed the gains and losses associated with international migration and policies to improve the developmental impact of migration, with particular attention to remittances. It showed that international migration generates significant economic gains for the migrants, the countries of origin, and the countries of destination and that the benefits to the countries of origin are especially large in the case of low-skilled migration. The most feasible means of increasing such emigration would be to promote managed migration programmes between origin and destination countries that combine temporary migration of low-skilled workers with incentives for return. It also recommended measures to reduce remittance costs.

In March 2006, the World Bank collaborated with the Belgian government and the International Organization for Migration and the European Commission to organise another major international conference on Migration and Development in Brussels. The conference was attended by more than 400 decision-makers from migrant-receiving and migrant-sending countries and by representatives of migrant associations.

\textsuperscript{51} World Bank 2004.
\textsuperscript{52} Adams and Page 2003.
\textsuperscript{53} Similar recommendations can be found in another World Bank publication by Munzele Maimbo and Ratha 2005.
\textsuperscript{54} World Bank 2005.
\textsuperscript{55} Özden and Schiff 2005.
\textsuperscript{56} World Bank 2006.
In the same vein as the World Bank, the IMF has recently been multiplying remittance studies over the past few years. Although rich in content and scope, the IMF and World Bank studies and policy documents tend to focus strongly on the remittance dimensions, and pay relatively little attention to non-monetary dimensions of the migration and development nexus. Although these institutions do engage in the ‘brain drain vs. brain gain’ debate, this does not comprise the often collective contribution that migrants can make to development in sending countries by less tangible contributions to democratisation, civil society and knowledge transfer.

2.2.3. European Investment Bank

In 2005, the European Investment Bank (EIB) – responsible outside the EU for implementing the financial components of agreements concluded under European development aid and cooperation policies – took an interest in the migration and development issue. This materialized in the commissioning of a study by the EIB’s Facility of Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership (FEMIP) on improving the efficiency of workers’ remittances from the EU to eight Mediterranean partner countries (MPCs; Turkey, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria). The study, published in 2006, concluded that methods of transfer used are extremely expensive for those sending the money and prevent the funds from being put to sufficiently good use to finance productive investment.

Its recommendations include the improvement of payment systems and links with EU countries in order to reduce transaction costs and to provide better services; encouraging the use of banking systems through offering banking services specifically targeted at migrants — including mortgage products, remittance-tailored bank accounts, and investments funds — in order to channel remittances into productive investments; increasing competition in the banking sector and access to financial services by migrants and implementing new technologies for remitting funds. Interestingly, the report also recommends the pooling of remittance resources through local associations. The purpose would be to pool resources to finance infrastructure projects as well as entrepreneurial activities and productive investments in countries of origin, which could also be stimulated by matching government or donor funds.

As well as these local pooling schemes, the report also envisages the development of larger cooperative pooling schemes, whereby the migrant organisation and NGOs in host and recipient countries could help pool resources and work with banks and multilateral organizations to finance projects. The report also recommends promoting the transfer of knowledge and know-how of migrants and support for diaspora organisations wishing to stimulate business development in countries of origin.

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57 FEMIP / EIB 2006.
2.2.4. Other agencies

In 2003, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) funded a case study on the Philippines remittance industry, and has extended the study to review overseas remittance flows among Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong, China and Philippines. The aim is to identify factors in the policy and institutional framework that impact these flows. The 2003 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Report on Alternative Remittance Systems examined the factors that result in the use of informal financial systems over formal financial systems, and specifically analysed the U.S.-Mexico and Canada-Vietnam remittance corridors.

2.3. UNDP and TOKTEN

Although the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) does not specifically address the migration-development nexus in its policies, it is worth mentioning that back in 1977 it introduced the Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN) Programme, which is still in force58. It is probably the longest standing and most successful programme aimed at a transfer of competencies without being linked to permanent return, and in many ways was a ‘brain circulation’ programme avant-la-lettre.

The TOKTEN programme, which was created against the background of the serious concerns that came up in the 1970s about the brain drain, seeks to bring the knowledge, expertise and experience of qualified expatriates back to their country of origin through a reverse transfer of technology and knowledge through short-term consultancy missions. Between 1977 and 1997 TOKTEN placed about 5000 volunteers on assignments in 49 developing countries. TOKTEN participants work with public or private institutions, including universities or NGOs, in fields ranging from agriculture and manufacturing to health, law, management and technology59. TOKTEN is currently running in 35 developing countries60.

For instance, more than 400 Palestinian expatriate professionals have temporarily served in senior advisory and planning positions in various Palestinian Authority ministries, NGOs and private sector institutions. Of these experts 18 percent have decided to remain in the occupied Palestinian territories61. In Mali, a joint TOKTEN - UNESCO program brought in Malian visiting professors from Europe, North America and Africa to fill urgent teaching and research needs at the University of Mali. A TOKTEN program in Bosnia-Herzegovina, implemented jointly with IOM, has received applications from Bosnian nationals living across the world and attempts to match them with requests from Bosnian NGOs that need the services of a TOKTEN consultant. The selected candidates can return for a period of up to 2 months to work in the public and private sectors. After completing their consultancies, participants...

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59 Newland and Patrick 2004, p.32.
60 Van Hear et al. 2004, p.28.
can continue to provide their expertise on-line\textsuperscript{62}.

Applicant information is entered into the TOKTEN database and a steering committee consisting of host government and UN officials decides whether the applicant’s knowledge and expertise is appropriate. TOKTEN consultants receive no payment, only a per diem allowance, insurance policy and reimbursement for travel expenses. The fee for an average TOKTEN consultant is about one-quarter that of a traditional international expert consultant. This feature of the programme makes it popular and financially efficient, but limits participation to those diaspora members who are in a position to forgo their professional earnings for periods of volunteer consultancy\textsuperscript{63}.

\textbf{2.4. IOM and MIDA}\textsuperscript{64}

In the field of migration and development, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) states: ‘Properly managed international migration holds enormous potential for the development of countries’\textsuperscript{65}. In particular through surging remittances, migration is perceived to contribute to the reduction of poverty and to a reduction in the economic vulnerability of developing countries. In order to mitigate as much as possible the negative effects of ‘brain drain’ and to encourage the return of qualified nationals resulting in ‘brain gain’, the IOM focuses especially on stimulating circular and temporary migration, which would imply persistent involvement of migrants with countries of origin. As well as reducing remittance costs, promoting skill transfers and ‘brain circulation’, IOM promotes policies that facilitate voluntary return and reintegration, either temporary or permanent, particularly of the highly skilled. Partly migration-propelled development is also considered to ‘contribute to the management of migration’\textsuperscript{66}.

With the UK Department for International Development (DfID) and the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, IOM organised an Intersessional Workshop \textit{Mainstreaming Migration into Development Policy Agendas} in February 2005\textsuperscript{67}. Close to one hundred countries and forty intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations attended the workshop. In addition to general measures to facilitate remittance flows through formal channels, particular attention was paid to recognise the desirability to engage diasporas as agents for development. Some of the more concrete measures that were suggested included increasing the transparency of government development strategies and goals; supporting the establishment of migrant networks while respecting their autonomy; and engaging migrants in the process of policy making and in development programmes in a variety of ways, including project identification, implementation and monitoring. Furthermore, measures were proposed to identify diasporas through developing databases (similar

\textsuperscript{62} Newland and Patrick 2004, p.32.
\textsuperscript{63} Newland and Patrick 2004, p. 32.
\textsuperscript{64} This section has been co-authored with Simona Vezzoli (Monterey Institute of International Studies). She is the main contributor to the paragraphs reviewing the evaluations of the various MIDA programmes. Sources used: MIDA 2002; MIDA 2005a; MIDA 2005b; MIDA 2006a; MIDA 2006b.
\textsuperscript{65} http://www.iom.int/en/what/migration\%5Fand\%5Fdevelopment.shtml#nexus (accessed 15 April 2006).
\textsuperscript{66} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{67} For the report on this conference, see IOM 2005.
to proposals put forward by the European Commission later in 2005\textsuperscript{68}. It was also recommended to foster a sense of double belonging among members of diasporas, for instance through introducing dual citizenship and stimulating political participation. Also similar to the 2005 proposals by the EC, stimulating return, temporary and circular migration as well as temporary returns of qualified immigrants were seen as means to stimulate positive migration-development linkages. IOM also participated in organising the aforementioned migration and development conference in March 2006 in Brussels\textsuperscript{69}.

In terms of concrete policies, IOM has been particularly active in ‘migration management services’, mainly in the form of ‘assisted voluntary return’ (AVR) programmes. Such programmes are operated in collaboration with governments of destination countries, with IOM being the implementing body. AVR aims at ‘orderly, humane and cost effective return and reintegration of asylum seekers, denied asylum seekers and other migrants residing or stranded in host countries, who are willing to return voluntarily to their countries of origin’\textsuperscript{70}. Return assistance includes information and counselling to potential returnees, travel arrangements and medical assistance, post-arrival reception, information, referral, onward travel to the home location and reintegration assistance. AVR programmes have been implemented around the world, such as recently in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan\textsuperscript{71}. For IOM, AVR is an area of expertise, developed over more than 20 years of practice. Between 1993 and 2002, IOM claims to have assisted more than 3.5 million migrants return to over 160 countries\textsuperscript{72}.

The focus of the AVR programmes, however, has been very much on return rather than on development, and in fact no explicit link with development policies exists. Accordingly, IOM’s return policy and programmes are first and foremost seen as ‘a contribution to combating irregular migration’\textsuperscript{73}. Nevertheless, one area of engagement with the role of diasporas in development has been the attention to ‘bridging identified human resource gaps’ through the Return of Qualified Afghans (RQA) programme and the Return and Reintegration of Qualified African Nationals (RQAN) programme. However, such programs have had only limited and costly success for countries that were not able otherwise to attract returnees\textsuperscript{74}. The RQAN programme, for example, reintegrated slightly more than 100 African nationals per year between 1983 and 1999\textsuperscript{75}.

An example of a programme with a stronger ‘development’ component, and which is focused on ‘brain circulation’ and temporary returns, is the Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA) programme, which was launched in cooperation with OAU in 2001\textsuperscript{76}. MIDA is a capacity-building programme that aims to develop ‘the

\textsuperscript{68} See section 2.8. For a concrete example, see the African Experts database at http://www.uneca.org/itca/ariportal/db.htm

\textsuperscript{69} See section 2.2.2.

\textsuperscript{70} IOM 2002.

\textsuperscript{71} For an overview of current AVR programmes, see website http://www.iom.int/en/who/main_service_areas_assisted.shtml#

\textsuperscript{72} IOM 2002.

\textsuperscript{73} IOM 1997.

\textsuperscript{74} Newland and Patrick 2004: 31.


\textsuperscript{76} See http://www.iom.int/mida/
potential synergy between the profiles of African migrants and the demand from countries, by facilitating the transfer of vital skills and resources of the African diaspora to their countries of origin. The programme is based on the ‘notion of mobility of people and resources and, as such, offers options for reinvestment of human capital, including temporary, long-term or virtual return’. Approaches are tailored to meet the needs of the origin country without jeopardizing migrants’ legal status in their host countries or newly adopted home countries. Most importantly, they avoid the return conditionality, which is the most significant difference from human resource programmes such as RQA and RQAN, which were more narrowly focused on return and reintegration.

Since its inception, nine MIDA projects have been funded, three of which have been financed entirely by European governments: Belgium for MIDA Great Lakes, Italy for MIDA Ethiopia and Ghana, and the Netherlands for research on the potential role of the Ghanaian diaspora in the health sector in Ghana. To date, only MIDA Great Lakes and MIDA Italy have received full evaluations, given their sizeable budgets of 3.4 Mn€ and 520,000 € respectively. The MIDA Great Lakes project has been evaluated as overall successful, having effectively made 163 physical transfers during phase I (March 2001-December 2003) and 80 transfers during the 12 months of phase II, which ended in January 2006. While virtual and financial transfers have proved to be insufficient, evaluators have observed that over time the IOM representatives, the national governments and the diaspora members have demonstrated greater collaboration. A sense of accountability has developed, which has resulted in positive feedback from the beneficiary institutions. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, several students were able to complete their studies thanks to a national expert who taught a required course. A third phase of this project to last 24 months has been approved, although reduced funding might compromise the end results.

The MIDA Italy pilot project has aimed to promote the transfer of knowledge and expertise as well as the engagement of the diaspora communities in the form of investments and deployment of remittances and to promote capacity building of the Ethiopian and Ghanaian governments in dealing with diasporas. A pilot project funded by the Government of Italy – to which a wide range of institutions and NGOs and over 140 African associations contributed – included research, an information campaign and workshops organised across Italy to identify and to encourage African migrants to contribute to the development of their countries of origin. This generated about 90 funding requests for small entrepreneurial projects from migrants from 12 sub-Saharan African countries living in Italy, but mainly from Ghanaian and Senegalese nationals. Other proposals included projects submitted by Italian local authorities interested in co-funding projects with sub-Saharan African communities.

The research findings and the evaluation of the proposed projects conducted in the initial phase of the project supported the selection of Ethiopia and Ghana as pilot countries. In particular, the project encouraged the engagement of the Ghanaian diaspora in the development of micro-enterprises in the agricultural sector. For the Ethiopian community, the goal was the creation of a comprehensive website that would allow an exchange of information for the Ethiopian diaspora.

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77 Newland and Patrick 2004, pp. 31-32.
This project was beset by a number of problems, the most significant of which was the lack of commitment of the African governments, which resulted in the absence of support for the project’s activities and ultimately led to unsatisfactory outcomes. The government of Ethiopia was particularly unsupportive of the project. Despite all difficulties a website was created, but it was quickly put aside once the project ended. The evaluation indicated that the Ethiopian community had not demonstrated great interest in the program, although the program administrators had initially assumed that the Ethiopian community would be motivated for it, based on the mere fact that they are the oldest immigrant community in Italy.

Five investment projects were implemented in Ghana, among which were the establishment of small farms and a partnership between the Ghanaian migrant association and local authorities and private companies of the Emilia-Romagna Region to create an import-export tropical fruit enterprise. However, even in this instance they were isolated from national economic efforts and other development initiatives, and in the end it became clear that the ministry in charge was not interested in small-scale investments such as those promoted by MIDA.

Despite these initial obstacles, the MIDA Italy project was extended as the MIDA-Ghana/Senegal project with a start date of January 2006. It was decided to exclude Ethiopia and to target Senegal instead, given the large number of Senegalese in Italy and their interest in participating in the programme. Ghana was retained in the project, because during the initial phase a few investment projects were started in which several Italian businesses and local government agencies had invested. The project’s main focus remains on investment and remittances. Several steps have been taken to avoid the previous mistakes and to ensure greater collaboration between the IOM, the participating government and the diaspora members.

The Netherlands Ghana project started in January 2005 and will run until June 2007. It targets African health workers in Europe who are interested in working in the health sector in Ghana. To date, the project appears to be relatively successful, possibly because of its flexibility. In fact this project allows all Africans, not just Ghanaians, to volunteer in Ghana. This MIDA project also contains an innovative ‘reverse component’ giving interested Ghanaian health workers the possibility to receive additional training in the Netherlands. It targets specifically the brain ‘strain’ problem that Ghana is experiencing and it tries to address the problem from different angles.

In fact, this seems to come very close to the principles of the TOKTEN programme.

2.5. ILO and UNHCR

The International Labour Office (ILO) has one of the longest established records of studies and policies on migration issues, in which ILO tends to stress migrant workers’ rights in contrast to IOM’s traditional focus on ‘migration management’ and

78 Stocchiero 2005.
80 Corresponding to some of the suggestions made by Sriskandarajah (2005) in his paper written for the Global Commission on International Migration.
81 Cf. IOM’s International Migration Papers series (since 1995).
return migration. ILO conducted a series of studies under the DfID-sponsored project on *Skilled labour migration (the ‘brain drain’) from developing countries: Analysis of impact and policy issues*.\(^{82}\) Within the framework of its Project on Sustainable Migration Solutions, ILO published a series of discussion papers\(^{83}\) and organised an expert meeting entitled *Migration and Development - Working with the diaspora* in May 2004 with the German Agency for Technical Cooperation GTZ\(^{84}\). Both IOM and ILO participate heavily in a series of activities preceding the UN High Level Dialogue Meeting on Migration and Development in September 2006\(^{85}\).

Although it is not a development agency, nor does it have a mandate regarding international migration, UNHCR recognised that most countries hosting large refugee and IDP (internally displaced persons) populations rank at the lowest levels of the Human Development Index. Moreover, UNHCR has been charged by the UN General Assembly and the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme with playing a catalytic role in seeking to encourage development-related investments in refugee and returnee-hosting areas, as a means to encourage self-reliance and to prepare for the durable solutions of voluntary repatriation, local integration and resettlement. This makes development issues increasingly relevant for UNHCR’s work\(^{86}\).

### 2.6. Global Commission on International Migration

In December 2003, acting on the encouragement of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM) was established. The mandate of the Commission was to ‘provide the framework for the formulation of a coherent, comprehensive and global response to the issue of international migration’\(^{87}\). This independent body was an initiative by the governments of Sweden and Switzerland, joined by those of Brazil, Morocco and the Philippines, and supported by a core group of 32 states. Its objective was to provide recommendations on how to strengthen the governance of international migration.

The GCIM report, which was presented in October 2005, offers, amongst a wider range of other migration-related issues, a comparatively comprehensive approach towards the migration and development issue, which also goes beyond the usual focus on remittances. A separate chapter entitled *Migration and development: Realizing the potential of human mobility* recognised the role that migrants play in promoting development and poverty reduction in countries of origin\(^{88}\). Four of the report’s 33 recommendations directly relate to migration and development issues:

1. Remittances are private money and should not be appropriated by states. Governments and financial institutions should make it easier and cheaper to

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\(^{82}\) Cf. Lowell and Lindlay 2002.


\(^{84}\) See section 6.2.

\(^{85}\) See section 2.7.

\(^{86}\) UNHCR 2005.


\(^{88}\) GCIM 2005.
transfer remittances and thus encourage migrants to remit through formal transfer systems (recommendation 8). Costs of remittances should be reduced, for instance through fostering greater competition within the formal transfer system;

2. In countries of origin, measures to encourage the transfer and investment of remittances must be combined with macro-economic policies that are conducive to economic growth and competitiveness (recommendation 9);

3. Diasporas should be encouraged to promote development by saving and investing in their countries of origin and participating in transnational knowledge networks (recommendation 10);

4. States and international organizations should formulate policies and programmes that maximize the developmental impact of return and circular migration (recommendation 11).

Interestingly, GCIM sees a role for migrant associations and civil society institutions in collecting, analysing and disseminating relevant information on the different transfer services that are available to people who wish to remit. Such increased transparency in the financial services sector would allow migrants to make an easy comparison between the costs of transferring remittances with different service providers.

GCIM also sees an important role for home-town associations and diaspora organisations in collecting and transferring ‘collective remittances’ to their place of origin, which can be used for infrastructural and other projects that bring benefits to whole communities rather than to individual households. It also recommended combining such collective remittances with matching funds provided from public sources or by development agencies, as has been done in the Mexican two-for-one and three-for-one programmes.

The GCIM report distinguishes itself by the attention given to ‘diasporas and development’: ‘Diasporas should be encouraged to promote development by saving and investing in their countries of origin and participating in transnational knowledge networks.’ This can be done through fund matching by countries of origin such as in the Mexican example, but also by ‘mobilizing diaspora networks’, in which destination countries can play a role. By supporting the establishment of professional diaspora organisations and other civil society entities that incorporate migrants, programmes can be developed that

‘facilitate the transfer of skills and knowledge from the diaspora to their countries of origin. This might entail physical return, by means of short-term secondments or sabbatical visits, but can also involve ‘virtual return’, using the video-conferencing and internet facilities that are increasingly available in even the poorest of countries’.

A good practice example given by GCIM was the African Human Resources programme of NEPAD (New Partnership for Africa’s Development) and

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90 See http://www.africanressource.org/
UNESCO\textsuperscript{92}. The goal of this programme is to create a database of Africans teaching in universities and high schools in Europe, United States of America, Canada and in the world. This database will be available for African states and any other organisation in the field of education and teaching in Africa. The Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) is co-ordinating activities related to the development of database on African experts and the diaspora, and making them available for access and utilisation by member States, development actors and others. Such databases are believed to constitute an essential information base into which users could tap to identify the trained workforce they require to establish and maintain research networks, virtual learning networks, policy reforms, and so on.\textsuperscript{93} Nevertheless, it remains unclear to what extent these programmes have met their objectives in practice.

Although GCIM stressed that if the developmental impact of international migration is to be maximized, countries of origin must first and foremost strive to create a healthy business environment, it acknowledged that individual migrants and diaspora organisations can play an important role in promoting trade and investment in their countries of origin. Specific measures that were proposed are training programmes and business counselling, which help migrants to develop the entrepreneurial skills and business acumen needed to engage in successful trade and investment activities.

2.7. UN high level dialogue meeting on migration and development

The launching of GCIM coincided with the decision of the General Assembly of the United Nations in December 2003 to devote a high-level dialogue to international migration and development on 14-15 September 2006. This is allegedly the first major event in United Nations history that focuses exclusively on international migration issues. The stated purpose of the high-level dialogue is ‘to discuss the multidimensional aspects of international migration and development in order to identify appropriate ways and means to maximize its development benefits and minimize its negative impacts’\textsuperscript{94}. Core topics to be addressed are the effects of international migration on economic and social development; the migration of highly skilled persons; actions to improve the impact of remittances on development; international cooperation to prevent and combat the trafficking in persons; and institutional mechanisms to enhance international cooperation for the benefit of countries and migrants alike. Although the High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development has no formal link with GCIM, it recommended taking into account the recommendations in its final report\textsuperscript{95}.

\textsuperscript{91} This is an initiative of African states supported by the European Union (EU) and the G8 countries, and is committed to building and retaining within the continent critical human capacities for Africa’s development. See also section 4.2.

\textsuperscript{92} Some examples of existing internet-based, transnational diaspora networks are: The Digital Diaspora Network – Africa (http://www.ddn-africa.org/) supported by the United Nations ICT Task Force, UNFIP and UNIFEM; the Indian Diaspora Website (http://indiandiaspora.nic.in/); and the Somaliland Forum (http://www.somalilandforum.com).

\textsuperscript{93} See http://www.uneca.org/itca/ariportal/docs/afrexpertsform.PDF


\textsuperscript{95} For further information on the High Level Dialogue, see http://www.un.org/esa/population/hldmigration/
In preparation for the High Level Dialogue meeting, the Population Division of the UN extracted from outcome documents of earlier major United Nations conferences and summits those parts that relate to international migration as well as to compare these to the recommendations made by the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM). The ensuing *Compendium of Recommendations on International Migration and Development* \(^{96}\) shows that past UN events focused mostly on issues like migration management and the protection of the rights of migrants and refugees. They paid scarce attention to the development dimension of migration, with the exception of the usual declarations to reduce costs and facilitate remittances\(^ {97}\) as well as to implement macro-economic and fiscal measures to channel migrations through formal channels and into productive investment\(^ {98}\). This is also reflected in the ‘core topics’ of the High Level Dialogue. These largely correspond to the two first aforementioned GCIM recommendations, but largely ignore its other recommendations pertaining to how to stimulate the role of diasporas in development beyond facilitating remittances.

### 2.8. European Union

As an officially proclaimed ‘major strategic policy priority’, migration has been at the heart of EU policies towards ‘third states’ over the past decade. However, the emphasis of these policies has been very much on cooperation in migration control (control of external borders, readmission) rather than *migration and development per se*. EU policies seem to increasingly embrace the concept of ‘co-development’, which tends to be associated with assisted return, thereby employing a focus on the ‘return potential’ as a development factor\(^ {99}\). In light of the growing European focus on migration and border control, the French co-development policies – which were heavily criticized for being too focused on migration prevention – have now become ‘acceptable’ and have recently been a source of inspiration for recent migration and development policies at the European level\(^ {100}\). More in general, the EU policies of trade liberalisation and development aid towards ‘third countries’, such as the Barcelona process and MEDA programme have been based partly on the idea that increased aid and capital flows would alleviate the causes of migration and therefore substitute labour (migration) flows in the longer term.

In 1998, the European Commission set up the High Level Working Group (HLCW) on Asylum and Migration as a second path to developing an explicit *migration prevention policy* in addition to its development aid and ‘root causes’ policies. The HLCW was charged with preparing Action Plans on countries from which large numbers of refugees and migrants come to Europe. Initially, the plans were meant to develop measures for cooperation with sending countries regarding foreign policy, and for development and trade. However, in practice the action plans emphasize

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\(^{96}\) UN 2006.


\(^{100}\) It should be noted that the European Commission’s attitude towards immigration policies tends to be more liberal than that of the member states (see Lacroix 2003, p.312).
repressive measures such as the promotion of readmission of rejected asylum-seekers and securing protection in the conflict region, without addressing the question of how this coincides with human rights abuses in a given country\textsuperscript{101}.

Since the Tampere European Council in 1999, the European Union has laid the foundations for a common asylum and immigration policy. These policies strongly focus on the harmonisation of border controls to tackle illegal migration, trafficking in and smuggling of human beings, terrorism and organised crime. It is frequently mentioned that the EU should work together with countries of origin in achieving a comprehensive approach, involving all stages of migration, with respect to the root causes of migration, entry and admission policies and integration and return policies. The European Council meeting in Seville in June 2002 concluded that ‘closer economic cooperation, trade expansion, development assistance and conflict prevention are all means of promoting economic prosperity in the countries concerned and thereby reducing the underlying causes of migration flows’\textsuperscript{102}.

Accordingly, in December 2002 the European Commission issued a policy document containing a large section on migration and development. The emphasis in this document is on ‘migration management’ and a reduction of unwanted migration flows. As far as the development dimension is addressed, its prime aim is to reduce migration: ‘the long-term priority of the Community should be to address the root causes of migration flows. One should duly recognise the effect of long-term development programmes on migratory flows, in particular in poverty eradication, institution and capacity building and in conflict prevention. Development resources should concentrate on this objective’\textsuperscript{103}.

The only area in which the positive developmental role of diasporas – apart from remittances – is mentioned is in the form of voluntary return of migrants. This would bring back

‘accumulated amounts of financial, human and social capital into developing countries. Traditionally, return has therefore been seen as an essential aspect in ensuring a positive relationship between migration and development. This positive correlation assumes that a migrant has spent sufficient time abroad to acquire skills and resources, and that he or she is capable and willing to dedicate (part of) this capital to new activities in the country of origin. These countries of origin can facilitate a successful reintegration, which is also beneficial to the local society at large, by creating the right social, economic and institutional environment for the returning migrant\textsuperscript{104}.’

Although it is mentioned that governments of migrant-sending countries can set up active policies to intensify contacts with their diasporas and involve them in the national development process, and that destination countries can also implement ‘co-development’ schemes to facilitate ‘brain circulation’ and assist legal migrants to contribute to the development process of their country of origin, no concrete policy measures were proposed. A practical problem here is that since the disappearance of

\textsuperscript{101} Lindstrøm 2005 and Van Selm 2002.
\textsuperscript{102} Conclusions of the European Council, Seville, 21 and 22 June 2002.
\textsuperscript{103} CEC 2002.
\textsuperscript{104} CEC 2002, p. 16.
the European Union of Migrants Forum in 1999\textsuperscript{105} the EU has no interlocutor who could represent diaspora organisations at the European level.

As a follow-up, the European Commission presented its draft conclusions on ‘migration and development’ in May 2003, claiming that they ‘reflect a fair balance between migration and development interests and contain a series of short and mid-term policy measures for the Commission to follow, with a view to paving the way for increasing synergy between migration and development cooperation’ \textsuperscript{106}. It reiterated the focus on border control, return migration and readmission of earlier documents. Partnerships with third countries are primarily seen through the lens of an ‘improved joint management of migration flows, including border control, readmission, institutional capacity building and strengthening the safeguards with respect to the international obligations to provide protection for refugees’. Voluntary return is the only concrete measure suggested ‘to support local development through the repatriation of skills and resources’. However, one new element is the proposal to facilitate the ‘efforts of migrants residing in the EU who intend to contribute to the economic and social development of their country of origin’, for instance through ‘strengthening of communication facilities between trans-national communities and their country or region of origin’ \textsuperscript{107}.

A second new element is the referral to remittances:

‘The flows of remittances should be addressed, with the aim to improve their efficient utilisation in the macro-economic development of countries of origin. In this respect the Commission is invited to investigate how the transfer of funds from the EU to source countries can be made cheaper and more reliable, and to propose, where appropriate, pilot programmes to channel remittances into productive investment in countries of origin and assess their impact on migratory flows in the long-term \textsuperscript{108}.’

A final new element is the Commission’s intent to elaborate ‘a review of development cooperation related job policy and the feasibility and impact of generalising the hiring of staff originating from target countries for development cooperation under financial conditions sufficiently attractive to provide an alternative for emigration’ \textsuperscript{109}.

In November 2004, The European Council stated: ‘Policies which link migration, development cooperation and humanitarian assistance should be coherent and be developed in partnership and dialogue with countries and regions of origin’. In addition the Council recommended ‘to develop these policies, with particular emphasis on root causes, push factors and poverty alleviation, and urges the Commission to present concrete and carefully worked out proposals by the spring of 2005’ \textsuperscript{110}.

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{105} Lacroix 2003, pp. 309-310.
\textsuperscript{106} CEC 2003, p.2.
\textsuperscript{107} CEC 2003, p.8.
\textsuperscript{108} CEC 2003, p.8.
\textsuperscript{109} CEC 2003, p.9.
\textsuperscript{110} EC 2004, p.22.
\end{flushleft}
In synergy with the presentation of GCIM’s final report and as a precursor to the UN High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development, and building on its December 2002 communication, in September 2005 the European Commission proposed a series of more concrete measures in its Communication Migration and Development: Some concrete orientations. The communication focused on specific topics that are associated with South-North migration, and ‘in particular on possible actions that could be carried out at EU level, in partnership with developing countries of origin’. The EU proposals merit some attention, because it is the first time that an intergovernmental body has proposed such a concrete and more comprehensive set of measures to address the migration and development nexus. These comprise (1) facilitating remittances, (2) the role of diasporas, (3) encouraging circular migration and brain circulation and (4) mitigating the adverse effects of the brain drain.

1. Facilitating Remittances

The EC identifies two main areas for policy action on remittances:

(a) fostering cheaper, faster and more secure ways to send remittances through:

- *Improving data* through improving data collection and household surveys on selected bilateral ‘remittance corridors’. Such studies should identify possible indicators of a lack of competition and technical inefficiencies in the remittance industry;
- *Enhance transparency* through a Directive on payment services that will increase competition and enhance transparency. The EC also suggested setting up a Europe-wide website providing information on the various remittance channels;
- *Creating a harmonised legal framework* for money transfer operators throughout the European Union, as well as EU and EIB assistance in improving the financial and economic infrastructure in developing countries to facilitate remittances;
- *Fostering the use of new remittances technologies* (such as the use of debit cards and ATMs) and *improving access to financial services* in developing countries including micro-finance institutions.

(b) *enhancing* the development impact of remittances in recipient countries to improve the incentive and informational infrastructure so as to stimulate productive investments:

- To *enhance financial intermediation* in developing countries through facilitating partnerships between micro-finance institutions and mainstream financial institutions – in partnership with the countries concerned and, where relevant, in cooperation with the EIB.
- To *provide funding for collective remittances and co-funding schemes*: that is, joint projects by diaspora organisations and local organisations so as to support local development.

111 CEC 2005.
2. Diasporas as actors in home country development

The EC recognises diasporas as ‘an important potential actor in the development of countries of origin’, and puts forward the following initiatives and recommendations to contribute to a stronger involvement of diaspora members through helping developing countries to map their diasporas and build links with them by

- Supporting developing countries by helping them to set up databases where ‘members of diasporas interested in contributing to home countries’ development can register on a voluntary basis, and more generally to maintain links between these countries and their diasporas, in coordination with other donors;\(^{112}\);
- Stimulating Member States to identify and engage diaspora organisations that could be suitable and representative interlocutors in development policy and/or possible initiators of development projects in countries of origin\(^{113}\);
- Encouraging diaspora organisations involved in the development of countries of origin to set up a mechanism that could ensure appropriate representation of their interests at EU level;
- Besides existing initiatives, notably by local authorities in the framework of twinning schemes, the EC considers the feasibility of introducing youth exchange schemes focused in particular on migrant communities, based on the experience gathered with existing intra-EU schemes.


This largely reiterates issues raised in the EC December 2002 Communication. It is proposed to increase the role of migrants’ return – permanent, temporary or even ‘virtual’ – in ‘fostering the transfer of skills to the developing world, together with other forms of brain circulation’. This objective should be seen in the general context of EC policies towards economic migration, which seem to be heading in the direction of

- Stimulating the potential of temporary migration through encouraging circular migration, by
  - giving a priority for further temporary employment to workers who have already worked under such schemes and have returned at the end of their contract
  - stimulating short-term and seasonal migration;

\(^{112}\) Examples that were mentioned are a database where skilled members of the Senegalese diaspora abroad can register their interest in contributing to the country’s development and provide details of their skills; the support provided by Italy to Egypt, Ghana and Ethiopia to improve their links with their respective diasporas, mainly in the context of the MIDA programme (see sections 2.4 and 6.3).

\(^{113}\) The document stated that governments in receiving countries wishing to involve foreign diasporas in their work with developing countries are faced with the additional difficulty of identifying ‘the right interlocutors’ among the various organisations representing diasporas. France, for example, has tied to address this problem by encouraging diaspora organisations involved in the development of countries of origin to pool their efforts within the framework of an umbrella organisation, such as FORIM in France, the LOM (National Ethnic Minorities Consultative Committee) in the Netherlands, or Connections for Development in the UK.
Facilitating return migration through
- the elaboration and management of assisted return programmes
- supporting countries of origin with the successful reintegration of return migrants;
- measures in areas such as the transferability of pension rights, the recognition of qualifications or mechanisms to ensure that researchers or other professionals who have worked in the EU can keep in touch with their former colleagues to facilitate voluntary returns and help them reintegrate successfully;

Simulating temporary or virtual return through
- building upon existing experience in temporary or virtual return programmes (such as TOKTEN and MIDA)
- considering support to e-learning schemes
- facilitating networking between foreign researchers working in the EU and research organisations in their countries of origin
- protecting residence rights in the EU of diaspora members who decide to engage in such activities
- continuing support, under the Aeneas programme\(^{114}\), to projects by which diaspora members set up sustainable economic activities in countries of origin.
- involving interested entrepreneurs from migrant communities to contribute to the development of their country of origin
- identifying best practices in areas such as secondments or sabbatical leaves that can facilitate temporary return.

4. Mitigating the adverse effect of brain drain, through

Improving the evidence base of interested developing countries in order to improve their knowledge of their labour markets, including shortages or excesses of skills at the sectoral level;

Disciplining recruitment through encouraging Member States to develop mechanisms such as codes of conduct to limit active recruitment (‘cherry picking’) in cases where it would have significantly negative repercussions for targeted developing countries, especially in the health care sector;

Fostering institutional partnerships between institutions (research institutions, universities, hospitals or other bodies) in the EU and in interested developing countries or regions could play a role in addressing the causes of brain drain, for instance through the elaboration of ‘shared work schemes’;

Encouraging development cooperation as a source of employment opportunities for skilled professionals in developing countries.

\(^{114}\) AENEAS Programme - Financial and technical assistance to third countries in the field of migration and asylum. The Aeneas programme for technical and financial assistance to third countries in the areas of asylum and migration was established in March 2004 (for the period 2004-2008 with a total budget of 250 M€) (CEC 2005, p. 13; see Stocchiero 2005). This programme supports third country efforts to better manage migratory flows but also gives a certain leeway for migration and development actions. Because most of these projects are still underway, it is too early for an evaluation. The VALEPRO programme of the French pS-Eau is also financed under this budget line.
This communication by the EC appears to be a step forward in developing a more comprehensive approach towards migration and development than had been in place until recently. It goes beyond a narrow focus on remittances, which includes the broader developmental role of diasporas. Nevertheless, the underlying objective in particular of the third objective (‘circular migration and brain circulation’) still seems discouraging permanent settlement rather than the development of countries of origin per se. Furthermore, with a few exceptions, most policies are still in their formulation phase.\footnote{One exception is EC support that has been given within the framework of the now discontinued budget line B7-667 to various preparatory actions for cooperation with third countries in the area of migration (including the ‘fight against illegal migration’ and also the idea of prevention) and asylum to “maximise the impact of migration on the development of countries of origin of migrants” (CEC 2005, p. 13). For instance, this has been done through helping migrants to set up small-scale entrepreneurial activities and to assist Afghan nationals to return to their country.}

2.9. Conclusion

Over the past five years there has been increasing international recognition of the development potential of international migration, resulting in a wealth of studies, workshops and conferences. These have made it possible to identify most of the obstacles to reaping the full benefits of migration for development as well as the various policy areas in which interventions are possible. However, in terms of formulation and implementation of concrete policies, surprisingly little has been achieved at the international level. Only in the field of facilitating remittances through reductions of costs and increased transparency of remittance markets has a set of relatively concrete and more or less ready-to-implement proposals been developed.

While the initial focus was on remittances, in the past couple of years there seems more renewed awareness of other developmental roles for migrant communities. Consequently, proposals to ‘mobilise diasporas for development’ tend towards declarations of good intent and remain vague in terms of concrete policy implementation. Moreover, in particular in EU policies, and to a certain extent also with institutions organisations such as IOM, proposals to promote the involvement of migrants in development appear to be entangled with and subordinate to policy objectives to reduce permanent migration and to promote temporary migration.

Therefore, it seems useful to look at the practical experience some European countries have in implementing policies that attempt to engage migrants in development cooperation or to strengthen development activities of their organisations. Through studying how governments and development agencies have attempted to enhance the development contribution of migration and to involve migrants in development cooperation, we might learn what types of actions are likely to be successful or not.
The Netherlands

3.1. National policies

3.1.1. Introduction

The Directoraat-Generaal voor Internationale Samenwerking (DGIS; Directorate General for International Cooperation) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for Dutch development collaboration. In 2003, about 3.8 billion € (0.8% of the Dutch Gross National Product) was reserved for development policy. Besides financial contributions to international organisations (such as the World Bank and the United Nations), governments of developing countries, international NGOs and other donor countries, one of the unique features of Dutch development cooperation is its co-financing structure. This entails that DGIS, in addition to a regular project support for a wider variety of NGOs, channels substantial structural funds to a small number of Dutch development NGOs known as co-financing agencies. Traditionally, the most prominent of these co-financing agencies (CFAs) have been Oxfam Novib, Cordaid (Catholic), ICCO (Protestant) and Hivos (Humanist).

Before the introduction of the programme financing agreement between CFAs and DGIS in 1980, each development project had to be approved individually for funding by the Ministry. Since then the co-financing institutions have considerable leeway for pursuing independent programme management, as long as the development practices adhere to the broad strategy set out by DGIS. CFAs only need to report on their use of funds on an annual basis. The co-financing agreement is evaluated every four years. In their turn, CFAs have funding links with almost 3,000 partner organisations in developing countries. They cooperate with and support these organisations, and do not have their own operational programmes.\footnote{Kruse 1997.}

3.1.2. Migration and development *avant la lettre*: the REMPLOD experience

Although several western European countries began to experiment with programmes of return migration and reintegration support (mainly for the supposed ‘guest workers’) in the 1970s, the Netherlands boasts what is probably the first ‘migration and development’ programme. The Dutch REMPLOD project (Reintegration of Emigrant Manpower and Promotion of Local Opportunities for Development) is...
perhaps the oldest example of research preparing and evaluating migration policies that were combined with explicit components of a development policy.

The REMPLOD project was initiated and funded in 1974 by the Dutch Ministry of Development Cooperation in order to explore ways in which international labour migration could contribute to development and combat the causes of emigration in sending countries such as Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey\textsuperscript{117}. This was in a time when it was generally expected that labour migration from Mediterranean countries would be temporary, and, consequently, that most migrants would return. Large-scale emigration to Europe, which gained full momentum in the late 1960s, was still relatively new. The idea was that returning migrants could use their skills and savings for local development by contributing to existing projects or founding new businesses.

However, the conclusions of the associated REMPLOD research project were not optimistic about the potential of influencing regional and local development by returning migrant entrepreneurs. Extensive field research in the REMPLOD project on the social and economic effects of emigration and return indicated that the investment opportunities for migrants in their regions of origin were very limited, and that, in fact, development in migrant-sending regions was a prerequisite for return and/or investment rather than a consequence of migration\textsuperscript{118}. They showed that to stimulate development processes in regions of origin, more structural changes are necessary than migrants can effectuate\textsuperscript{119}.

In the case of Morocco, the political situation and the endemic corruption strengthened the historical mistrust of the northern part of Morocco towards the central government and its regional and local representatives. This lack of confidence also hampered potential initiatives and concomitant investment of migrant workers in northern Morocco\textsuperscript{120}.

The Turkish research team looked in particular at existing initiatives of Turkish migrants to invest productively in the regional of origin: the Joint Stock Corporation, established by migrants themselves, and Village Development Cooperatives, a form of local economic initiatives whose members were given priority to be sent to Europe as guest workers on the condition that they would invest part of their saving in these cooperatives at home. The research showed the dismal conditions in which the great majority of these initiatives struggled in the mid-1970s: poor management, lack of government interest in supporting these initiatives, financial problems, problems of trust and other abuses. Only a few of these initiatives survived, and the successful ones were taken over by larger institutional investors in Turkey, thereby marginalizing the original migrant initiators\textsuperscript{121}.

This REMPLOD-research led to two policy measures. The first was that, notwithstanding these pessimistic research conclusions, the Dutch government decided, even before the research was finished, to develop a policy programme to endorse individual returning migrants from the Netherlands to establish small

\textsuperscript{117} Van Dijk \textit{et al.} 1978.
\textsuperscript{118} Heinemeijer \textit{et al.} 1976.
\textsuperscript{120} De Mas 1978.
\textsuperscript{121} Penninx and Van Renselaar 1978.
enterprises in their home countries: this TPP-programme (Return Projects Programme) was implemented by IMOS (International Migration and Development Cooperation) a welfare organisation in the Netherlands, NCB (Netherlands Centre for Foreigners). The prerequisites for participation in the programme were high and included an appropriate good professional background, an elaborate and promising business plan and a considerable amount of capital\textsuperscript{122}. This programme ran until the early 1980s when it was abolished after an evaluation.

The second policy strand was that the Dutch government concluded bilateral agreements with sending countries (Morocco, Tunisia, Yugoslavia and Turkey) to implement projects in which returning migrants would have an important place. In the case of Turkey some seven of the existing Turkish Joint Stock Corporations and Village Development Cooperatives were offered professional assistance and monitoring through FMO, a funding agency for development. These bilateral agreements turned out to be a temporary and limited policy endeavour that did not survive the 1970s. From the mid-1980s onwards all policy efforts were stopped. The results were seen as too limited to justify the high costs. The support for returnees was now also seen as running counter to the spirit of the new Dutch integration polities\textsuperscript{123}

### 3.1.3. The new Dutch ‘development and migration’ policies

In 1996, DGIS wrote a policy memorandum called ‘migration and development’. The document contained a very general analysis of the topic, and proposed few concrete measures, but stated its willingness to support a ‘general remigration program, aiming at the voluntary return of migrants to developing countries’\textsuperscript{124}. It also asserted that well-coordinated foreign and aid policies could lead to a reduction in ‘undesired migration’. Referring to the negative experiences with earlier return programmes such as REMPLOD, improved cooperation with authorities and NGOs in countries of origin, more tailor-made employment programmes responding to local demand and more flexibility to adopt the programme to specific needs countries were recommended. There was, however, no real follow-up to the report.

In 2003, the government of the Netherlands, DGIS and the Ministry of Justice took up the issue again and started orienting on the issue of migration and development, and in particular what has been phrased as improving the coherence between migration and development policies. Within this framework, the migration and development agenda has been dominated by the emphasis on controlling (i.e. curbing) migration ‘in accordance with the absorptive capacity of Dutch society, with a view to preventing the abuse of the system and illegal migration, while offering protection to all those who genuinely need it’\textsuperscript{125}. Consequently, the search for policy coherence between migration and development policies has been conceived primarily from the ‘need to improve migration management’ and to regulate migration, which ‘created increasing pressure to include migration issues within the context of foreign and development policy’\textsuperscript{126}.

\textsuperscript{122} Aumüller 2004.
\textsuperscript{124} DGIS 1996, p.44.
\textsuperscript{125} IOM 2005, p.8.
\textsuperscript{126} IOM 2005, p.8.
The 2004 policy memorandum on development and migration

After internal discussion and a series of consultations with academics and development and migrant NGOs, the ministries for Development Cooperation (DGIS) and Immigration and Integration issued a joint policy memorandum entitled Development and Migration in July 2004\textsuperscript{127}. In the memorandum, the Dutch government expressed its expectation that well-coordinated development policies would contribute to reducing immigration. Furthermore, the government proposes to intensify existing voluntary and forced return migration programs as a means to promote development in migrant-sending countries. The document concluded that there was considerable room to improve the coherence between migration and development policies, in particular through (1) improving capacity building in the field of ‘migration management’ and (2) ‘protection in the region’, encouraging (3) ‘effective return of illegal migrants’ deemed necessary ‘for the integrity of and public support for the asylum system and migration policy in general’; (4) ‘assisted voluntary return’ and (5) circular migration.

On the practical level, capacity building for migration management is, for instance, envisaged through its integration into existing bilateral programmes and policies for ‘good governance’. Enhancing refugees’ ‘protection in the region’ is primarily envisaged through partnerships with countries neighbouring refugee source countries and through channelling additional funds to UNHCR for investing in regional refugee protection schemes, as has been done in Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania and Yemen. The Dutch ministries of Development Cooperation and Immigration and Justice present the policies promoting ‘protection in the region’ and sustainable return as one of the ways that coherence between migration, development and humanitarian policies is achieved\textsuperscript{128}.

The 2004 Development and Migration policy memorandum proclaims circular migration as an optimum strategy to reconcile the interests of the migrant and of the sending and destination countries. With the exception of what are called knowledge migrants, the Dutch government considers any other type of labour migration to be primarily temporary. Circular migration is here mainly interpreted as ‘temporary’ migration, which is seen as an intermediate solution to fill shortages on the domestic labour market while avoiding permanent settlement. Circular migration is seen as one of the areas where the interests of individual migrants, host and home societies coincide: it allows developed countries to fill temporary job openings, migrants to earn an income and to acquire skills, and origin countries to benefit from skills and knowledge transfers, while the brain drain is counteracted\textsuperscript{129}.

\textsuperscript{127} DGIS 2004.

\textsuperscript{128} In this context, in January 2006 the Dutch ministers of Development Cooperation and Immigration and Integration visited the Kakuma refugee camp in north Kenya, which receives 40 percent of its funding from the Netherlands. Fifteen hundred refugees will be invited to settle in the Netherlands as part of an agreement with UNHCR. Minister Verdonk of Immigration and Integration questioned this arrangement, not only because of doubts about the refugees’ integration into Dutch society, but during the visit both ministers told refugees that it would also be best for their home countries if they were to return as soon as the situation allowed. Source: Paul Hazebroek, Vluchtelingen vanuit Kenia naar Nederland: Verdonk zet vraagtekens bij opvang in Nederland, Radio Nederland Wereldomroep www.rnw.nl, 27-01-2006; Volkskrant, 25-01-2006.

\textsuperscript{129} See also IOM 2005.
This view coincides with an emphasis on the temporary nature of migration and on return:

‘Effective return policies are a condition for policies to promote temporary labour migration and circular migration. It is important to encourage voluntary return using a combination of policies, such as forced return where necessary, agreements with countries of origin, support of or pressure on countries of origin, support for migrants and migrant organisations, support to activities of the Dutch civil society in the field of education and re-integration, support for temporary labour migration including effective return, and support for (temporary) return for the benefit of the (re)building of the country of origin’.

Voluntary and forced ‘effective return of illegal migrants’ and rejected asylum seekers is for instance envisaged through concluding readmission agreements with countries of origin and transit. Assisted return is envisaged through appropriate training, preparation and financial support, in particular in cooperation with the IOM, which is extremely active in facilitating the return of (former) asylum seekers.

IOM facilitates the return of (former) asylum seekers living in the Netherlands. The standard instrument for these policies is the Return and Emigration of Aliens from the Netherlands (REAN) regulation, in addition to which a ‘reintegration contribution’ can be handed out (for instance, assistance to facilitate transport of goods needed to start an own enterprise) through a number of programmes, such as the Re-Integration Project Return (HRPT) and the REAN+ regulations for Iraq, Afghanistan, Angola en de Democratic Republic of Congo. From January to November 2005, 3304 persons returned from the Netherlands through these programmes, of whom 1338 and 374 used the HRPT and REAN+ regulations, respectively.

Within the Return, Migration and Development (TMO) programme, which was launched in 2005 and has a yearly budget of approximately 5 M€, the Dutch government finances a project of CARE International, which aims at the reintegration of Somalis who returned to Somaliland from within the ‘region’ and the Netherlands, through the education and professional training of 100 returnees each year. The TMO programme has also provided funding to the foundation Maatwerk bij Terugkeer (Individual Return Assistance Agency), which was established by the CFA Cordaid, and which aims at facilitating the return and reintegration of rejected asylum seekers, corresponding to the prime aim of the TMO programme.

In the field of voluntary and temporary return, the Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA) pilot project (in which the IOM, the Sub-Saharan Africa Department of DGIS and various West African countries, Netherlands-based migrant groups and

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130 DGIS 2004, p.8; translated from Dutch by author. See also de Haas 2006.
131 Tweede Kamer 2006.
132 Tweede Kamer 2006.
133 See also section 3.3. In order of priority, the aims of the TMO programme are: Return and reintegration of rejected asylum seekers; the (temporary) return of refugee status holder for the reconstruction of the country of origin; and policy development in the field of development and migration (Tweede Kamer 2005).
the Netherlands embassy in Ghana are closely cooperating) is mentioned as a good practice. The programme aims to promote ‘brain gain’ in Africa by encouraging the temporary return to Ghana of Ghanaian professionals working in the Netherlands, especially of medical personnel. It also offers the opportunity to Ghanaian doctors and students to follow internships in the Netherlands.\textsuperscript{134}

Another example that has been mentioned is IOM’s programme Return of Qualified Afghans (RQA), to which the Netherlands has given financial support, and which is aimed at the temporary return (6 to 12 months) of highly skilled Afghans. One-third of the participants came from the Netherlands. The RQA programme, which is co-funded by the European Commission, reached its capacity by the end of June 2005, and facilitated the return of 150 qualified and skilled Afghans (14 female and 136 male).\textsuperscript{135} At the time of the writing of this report, no evaluation of the programme was available, although its overall success is said to be limited.\textsuperscript{136}

In 1985, the Dutch government adopted a remigration regulation. An amended version came into effect as the Remigration Act in 2001. The act mainly targets former guest workers from Mediterranean countries, but also includes migrants from Surinam, the Indonesian Moluccas and the Cape Verde Islands as well as acknowledged refugees. The Remigration Act offers those who wish to re-migrate to their country of origin the facilities with which to realise that desire. Under certain conditions, the Remigration Act offers two facilities: a basic provision (to cover costs of travel, moving and resettlement) and a remigration provision for those at least 45 years of age (a monthly benefit dependent upon the composition of the family and the standard of living in the country of destination, health insurance and additional benefits). During the first year after return, participants have the right to return to the Netherlands. The Netherlands Migration Institute (NMI) offers practical assistance and guidance for prospective return migrants who intend to use the Dutch remigration facility.\textsuperscript{137} In 2002, 509 migrants returned with a remigration provision, and 219 with only a basic provision. Of the total of 728 migrants, 289 returned with their partners.\textsuperscript{138}

Together with three other organisations (AGEF, Caritas Wien, The Göteborg Initiative), the NMI carried out a research project called Migration and Development Project (Migdev) in 2004 aimed at evaluating projects and practical lessons learned in the field of return migration and development. The project was funded by the European Refugee Fund, Oxfam Novib and the partner organisations. The report, which was published in March 2005, identified a number of success factors based on return migration experience in various post-conflict situations, in particular relating to the establishment of small businesses, the supply of labour and construction projects.\textsuperscript{140}

\textsuperscript{134} See section 2.4 for more information on the MIDA programme.
\textsuperscript{135} See \url{http://www.iom-rqa.org/}
\textsuperscript{136} See section 2.4.
\textsuperscript{137} See website NMI \url{http://www.nmigratie.nl/}
\textsuperscript{138} Berkhourt 2003.
\textsuperscript{139} See section 6.2.
\textsuperscript{140} AGEF, Caritas Wien, The Göteborg Initiative and Netherlands Migration Institute 2005.
The report stressed that migrants should be seen as a potential resource rather than as a problem. Their decision to return should not be prompted by the prospect of financial support, but by a genuine willingness to return and the capacity to be reintegrated. Voluntary return creates the best opportunities for success. Adequate supervision of return projects should be flexible and tailor-made in order to succeed, and substantial and continuous monitoring and cooperation of host and origin countries is necessary. This labour-intensive character will keep down the numbers of migrants. The report observed that it is difficult to determine the impact of return and business start-ups on development, as it cannot be verified by indicators. A more comprehensive and extended evaluation of the projects would be required. One commentary on the report stated: ‘creating the right conditions to promote sustainable development will have a greater effect than supporting individuals.’

**Government views on diaspora involvement and remittances**

The 2004 policy memorandum recognises the contributions to development by migrants and their organisations in the Netherlands. However, no concrete measures to involve them in development cooperation are proposed apart from the intent to consult them on migration and development policies through the National Ethnic Minorities Consultative Committee (LOM), originally set up by the Dutch Government in 1997 to discuss its integration policies with interlocutors from the main immigrant and minority groups.

The memorandum also mentions a number of obstacles in building relationships between migrant organisations and development organisations:

- Migrant organisations are often essentially interest groups that mainly support the members’ own families or districts, which is not always compatible with a development organisation’s broader approach;
- Political analyses made by migrant organisations do not always match those made by development organisations;
- A high degree of rivalry exists between the various migrant organisations.
- There is a certain ambivalence regarding public authorities and the Dutch authorities in particular;
- They do not always have expertise in development cooperation, and as a result their proposals often fail to qualify for support under existing programmes;
- Development organisations are sometimes confronted with rivalry between migrant and partner organisations in countries of origin and migrant organisations.

On the increased use of remittances for development purposes, the Dutch government holds the position that the money remitted by migrants is their own private wealth, and that ‘all governments can therefore do is create conditions in which remittances can be optimised and put to the best possible use in countries of origin’. In reducing transaction fees charged on remittances, the Dutch government primarily sees a role for the free market and strategic behaviour by consumers, and no role for the government. On the issue of the use of remittances for development purposes, the

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141 AIV 2005, p. 55.
government states that ‘migrants and migrant organisations are very reluctant to channel their own money through governmental or non-governmental development organisations.’

The AIV advisory report

In June 2005, and at the request of the Minister for Development Cooperation in November 2003, the Migration and Development Cooperation Committee of the Dutch Advisory Council on International Affairs (AIV) issued an advisory report entitled Migration and Development Cooperation: Coherence Between Two Policy Areas. The report stated: ‘Measures to promote coherence between development cooperation and migration policy cannot be achieved by subordinating one policy area to the other’ and ‘it is not always possible to reconcile all the various interests at stake’.

Because of the complex, long-term and often contradictory linkages between migration and development, AIV suggested not to use instruments for development policy for migration policy or to make aid conditional on cooperation in restrictive immigration policies. Instead, it stated that development cooperation should focus on its primary goals of poverty reduction. This implies that immigrants in Netherlands from most important origin countries will be excluded, because they generally do not belong to the (low income) partner countries enjoying Dutch development cooperation.

There exists a difference of opinion about the Dutch government’s policy memorandum and AIV advice with regard to the relationship between (return) migration and development policies. Firstly, AIV advice voiced a strong hesitation to link forced return migration to development policies – which in addition to voluntary and temporary return is one of the main ways the government’s policy memorandum envisages putting migration and development policies into operation:

‘One complicating factor is that returning asylum-seekers whose applications were rejected are not in the same starting position as migrants who have made a positive decision to build an economic future in their country of origin. One of the AIV’s conclusions is that return can be encouraged if returning migrants are given a safety net in the form of possible readmission to the Netherlands. Recent studies have failed to show whether return projects have any clear effect on development, apart from activities in the construction industry.’

Secondly, AIV also suggested promoting immigration from partner countries of Dutch development cooperation partly to encourage an efficient diaspora connection

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143 DGIS 2004, pp. 57-58.
144 AIV 2005.
145 AIV 2005, p. 56.
146 However, in a recent letter to the Dutch parliament, the Ministers of Development Cooperation and Immigration and Integration surprisingly stated: “The conclusions of the AIV and the policy memorandum Development and Migration correspond”. The Ministers also said that the AIV recommendation stated that in general, no incoherence exists between migration and development cooperation policies (Tweede kamer 2006, p. 2).
147 AIV 2005, p. 58.
so as to promote development in these countries. This is not in line with the Dutch government’s restrictive migration policies. AIV identified a number of policy measures that can increase the contribution of migrants to development. First of all, ‘migrant organisations should be given more help in establishing consultative structures, and migrants themselves could be given specific support to set up and realise small development projects in their region of origin’. On remittances, the AIV report says: ‘Although migrants are free to decide what happens to the money they send home, this does not rule out measures to enhance the development effects of these remittances. Various financial services can be offered to migrants to persuade them to invest in the interests of development\textsuperscript{148}.’

\textit{Practical initiatives to enhance migrant involvement}

The Dutch government has a positive stance regarding support to migrants and migrant organisations involved in development cooperation. Together with DfID (UK Department for International Development) it is among the most generous sponsors of conferences and workshops on this topic\textsuperscript{149}. However, its point of departure is that the initiative should rest mainly with the migrants and migrant organisations themselves, as well as the decision as to how individual and collective remittances are to be used. Nevertheless, the Dutch government does indirectly (mainly through co-financing channels) support capacity building and encourages migrant and development organisations to continue seeking closer cooperation, so that migrant organisations can enhance their contribution to development\textsuperscript{150}.

IntEnt is the only larger programme funded by DGIS that is specifically directed at migrants\textsuperscript{151}. It is a programme intended to help migrants set up small private businesses in countries of origin. For a further description, see section 3.6. However, there are various government-supported channels through which migrant and other organisations in the Netherlands can obtain advice and financial support for development-related activities in their countries of origin. As part of a major change of course of its policies implying an increased priority given to lowering the threshold between the civil society and official development world, as of 1998 DGIS started to actively target its policies at involving Dutch civil society in development cooperation.

This stood in marked contrast to established, classical views among development professionals, who often tend to disdain particular development initiatives, and, in the same vein, frequently claim that migrants are not necessarily the best development actors. These views are based on the view that development cooperation is a profession and that ‘civilians’ – who are sometimes indicated as ‘hobbyists’ and

\textsuperscript{148} AIV 2005, p. 58.
\textsuperscript{149} For instance, the intersessional workshop on migration and development cooperation in February 2005, which was organised in collaboration with the IOM and DfID.
\textsuperscript{150} The Ministers of Development Collaboration and Immigration and Integration stress that involvement with integration should not hinder their integration in the Netherlands: “From migrants that aim at permanent residence here, we firstly expect a clear orientation towards the Netherlands” (Tweede Kamer 2006, p. 4).
\textsuperscript{151} See \url{http://www.ondermemenoverdegrens.nl/}
‘amateurs’ – are not professionals and who, despite their good intentions, ‘sometimes have no clue about what they bring about through offering aid’. Despite significant resistance among development actors to recognise ‘civilians’ (migrant or not) as development actors, several initiatives have been set up by the Dutch government to try to increase involvement of all civilians, migrant or non-migrant.

**Front Offices and Linkis**

The Small-Scale Local Activities (KPA) programme, which was introduced in 1991 and is currently implemented by NCDO (National Commission for international cooperation and Sustainable Development), awards grants of up to 100,000 € to top up (i.e., doubling) the proceeds of relatively small-scale fund-raising activities in the Netherlands for projects in developing countries. The programme’s budget has increased from the equivalent of 1.13 M€ in 1994 to 6.75 M€ in 2004. However, the DGIS estimates that at the moment too few migrant organisations make use of this programme.

Following the example of the KPA programme, and at the strong instigation of DGIS, NCDO and five CFAs (Oxfam Novib, Cordaid, ICCO, Hivos and Plan Nederland) established **Front Offices** in 2003, where Netherlands-based individuals and organisations (migrant or non-migrant) can apply for funding for small-scale development projects. The idea of establishing such Front Offices is to increase public support for development cooperation in the Netherlands and to facilitate the access of civilians to development finance. Each Front Office has the freedom to develop its own policy in terms of implementation and projects to be funded.

The Front Offices of the co-financing agencies, NCDO (National Commission for international cooperation and Sustainable Development) and the Netherlands Local Development Cooperation Centre (COS Nederland, a nationwide association of fifteen centres for international cooperation) participate in **Linkis** (Low-Threshold Initiatives & Contact and Information Centre for International Cooperation) initiative. It is basically an online facility (www.linkis.nl), which was launched in 2004 and aims at improving involvement of citizens and small organisations in the field of development cooperation.

Reflecting the policy priorities of DGIS, the aim of Linkis is to further lower the threshold between the Dutch civil society and the professional and often large-scale, complex and opaque ‘development world’. Its most crucial function is to inform and advise groups of citizens (including migrants and migrant organisations) on concrete opportunities to submit proposals for small-scale development projects (co-funding up to 50,000 €) with the Front Offices of the participating development agencies. Through filling in a brief on-line questionnaire on the main characteristics of the

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153 Bouzoubaa and Brok 2005, p. 36, translation from Dutch by author.
154 See section 3.5.
156 This also explains why each participating organisation has given a different name to its Front Office initiative.
157 See http://www.linkis.nl
intended project, the website guides proposers to the Front Offices of the development agencies that are likely to fund such projects. COS Nederland provides practical support to diaspora and other organisations in developing project proposals.

Thus, Linkis is primarily a ‘digital counter’, showing citizens the ropes with regard to official development cooperation. Over a three-year period, more than 1,500 small-scale projects have been funded by Dutch development agencies through the Front Offices. In following sections, we will see that these Front Offices have also enabled several Netherlands-based migrant organisations to realise development projects in countries of origin.

Netherlands Financial Sector Development Exchange (NFX)

Although DGIS officially sees few opportunities for government intervention regarding remittances, together with the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Economic Affairs DGIS has supported the creation of the Netherlands Financial Sector Development Exchange (NFX) in 2005\(^{158}\). This is a public-private partnership (with leading Dutch banks participating) for the development of the financial sector in developing countries, to improve transparency and competition and access to financial services through building local financial sector know-how. This is based on the idea that ‘a solid and well-functioning financial sector is a powerful engine behind economic growth in developing countries and emerging markets’. Remittances form one of the core areas of NFX’s activities, and the underlying assumption is that ‘effective banks can channel international streams of private remittances for the benefit of higher production and investment. The financial sector therefore provides the rudiments for income-growth and job creation, and contributes to raising the standard of living\(^{159}\).’

Co-financing agencies

Most Dutch CFAs and other development NGOs have developed policies that specifically target the involvement of migrants and migrant organisations in development cooperation, both within and outside the Front Offices and the Linkis framework, although this is not one of the priorities of DGIS. This can be explained by the relative freedom CFAs have within the co-financing framework, despite the fact that the lion’s share of their funding is provided by DGIS. This also explains the significant differences in the approach of the different CFAs towards migration and development in general and the involvement of migrants’ organisations in particular. The following sections will analyse the relevant policies of the main (though not all) Dutch development agencies.

\(^{158}\) AIV 2005, p. 49.
\(^{159}\) Source: [http://www.nfx.nl/home/about/index.html](http://www.nfx.nl/home/about/index.html).
3.2. Oxfam Novib

Among the Dutch CFAs, Oxfam Novib traditionally represents the non-denominational sector of the Dutch ‘pillarised’ society. It was founded as Novib (Netherlands Organisation for International Assistance) in 1956. Novib joined Oxfam International in 1994. In 2006, it changed its name from Novib to Oxfam Novib to express the importance the organisation attaches to international cooperation in achieving its core missions of reducing global injustice and poverty. Oxfam Novib has its own constituency but also raises its own funds. It works together with the ten other members of Oxfam International, who collaborate with more than 3,000 local organisations.

Oxfam Novib has a staff of 330 persons, and of its total budget of 148.2 M€ in 2004, 73.3 percent originated from government subsidies (mostly co-financing money) and 26.6 percent from own fundraising, such as the contributions of more than 333,000 individuals among whom 159,000 donors. In 2004, Oxfam Novib transferred 122 M€ to its partner organisations in developing countries, who implement most of its programmes. Oxfam Novib works according to a rights-based approach, in which ‘poverty’ is regarded as a lack of rights: ‘Due to a lack of basic rights, people that live in poverty do not have (sufficient) access to power, material resources and basic services. This leads to hunger, exclusion, exploitation, a lack of opportunities and inequality.’

In the 1990s, Oxfam Novib set up the Novib Nederland Fonds (NNF), a ‘window’ where migrant organisations could apply for small funding to finance their activities such as conferences and seminars. These activities were mostly conducted to generate awareness among the Dutch public about the situation in migrants’ countries of origin. Since 1998, Oxfam Novib has become increasingly active in the migration and development field and began working actively with diaspora organisations. In 1998 Oxfam Novib established the awareness-raising Arc Mundi project (Awareness Rising for Change – Multicultural Networks and Developments Initiatives) with a number of other organisations. Arc Mundi aims at establishing an equal and durable cooperation and dialogue between organisations for development cooperation and self-organisations of migrants and refugees through information evenings, seminars and special training activities for refugees, migrants and journalists. The objective is to increase the number of diaspora organisations supporting small development projects in their countries of origin. In 1999, Oxfam Novib started to support ERCOF (Economic Resource Centre for Overseas Filipinos), a Filipino organisation that aims to enable Filipino migrants to utilise their remittances and human resources for more productive use and rural development in communities of origin.

Serious internal debate on migration issues in relation to development started in 2001. Responding to the growing needs of diaspora organisations, such as those expressed in the Arc-Mundi framework, Oxfam Novib formulated a migrant policy in 2002 that would guide its work among diaspora organisations. This was a significant policy

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160 [http://www.novib.nl/](http://www.novib.nl/)


162 The other organisations were Forum, VON and STOA.
shift, considering that Oxfam Novib as a development agency is supposed to channel its resources to developing countries. However, aided by the 2003 Global Development Finance report of the World Bank and the major International Conference on Migrant Remittances taking place in the same year\textsuperscript{163}, there was growing recognition of positive migrant contributions to the development of their countries of origin.

Oxfam Novib has been involved in the Inter-Agency Remittances Task Force, a policy platform on remittances that was designed by the World Bank, and in which DFID, CGAP (Consultative Group to Assist the Poor), IOM Geneva, IDB (Inter-American Development Bank) and the IABD were also involved. The Task Force emerged from the major 2003 remittance conference in London, and aimed at improving remittance data and to coordinate the efforts of donors and international financial institutions toward improving remittance data and to develop remittance principles for regulators and the private sector. Based on its work with diaspora organisations, Oxfam Novib has participated in the consultative meetings in connection with the drafting of the EU Communication on Migration and Development\textsuperscript{164}. Oxfam Novib also collaborates with other international organisations such as the IOM, the Inter-American Dialogue, the Asian Development Bank, and DFID.

However, the emphasis of Oxfam Novib’s migration and development activities has not been on facilitating remittances, but on strengthening the involvement of diaspora organisations and their members in development cooperation. Oxfam Novib’s support to diaspora organisations concentrates on:

\begin{itemize}
  \item Strategic financing of small and large development projects of diaspora organisations;
  \item Capacity building (project management, project cycle management, fund raising, lobbying, and so on);
  \item Supporting alliance building with other NGOs;
  \item Linking and learning/exchange visits’
  \item Organising expert meetings and conferences.
\end{itemize}

Since 2003, Oxfam Novib has organised and sponsored expert meetings and workshops and has provided financial support for a range of conferences in and outside the Netherlands on this topic, including:

\begin{itemize}
  \item Expert meeting on \textit{Migration, globalisation and development}, March 2003, the Netherlands\textsuperscript{165};
  \item Conference \textit{Programs to Harness the Resources of Overseas Filipinos for the Development of Local Economies}, July 2003, the Philippines\textsuperscript{166};
  \item Expert meeting \textit{Bridging the gap: International migration and the role of migrants and their remittances in development}, November 2004, the Netherlands\textsuperscript{167}.
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{163} See section 2.2.2.
\textsuperscript{164} See section 2.8.
\textsuperscript{165} For the project report, see NOVIB 2003.
\textsuperscript{166} For the project report, see ERCMOVE 2003.
\textsuperscript{167} For the project report, see NOVIB 2004.
• Conference Remittances and Poverty Reduction in Africa, March 2006, the Netherlands. This conference was organized by African migrant organisations in the Netherlands168;

• International conference The Impact of Remittances in Latin America: Microfinance as alternative channel for remittances, September 2005, Zacatecas, Mexico – the cradle of the innovative two-for-one and three-for-one programmes that match funds for every dollar raised by Home Town Associations for approved public infrastructure projects in Mexico169. This conference included a field trip to the various projects of the Federación de Clubes Zacatecanos del Sur de California;

• To stimulate exchange of ideas and experiences, Oxfam Novib co-organised four debates per year on topics related to migration and development attended by migrants and refugees.

A diverse audience consisting of policy makers, migrants, diaspora organisations and academics generally attend these conferences and workshops gatherings. Oxfam Novib supports migrant and refugee associations in a variety of ways, mainly through the provision of capacity building and financial assistance to migrant organisations. Although this support may be linked to development projects that such organisations conduct in the country of origin, this is not necessarily the case. Oxfam Novib does not engage in activities targeted at facilitating the return of (rejected) asylum seekers.

In concrete terms, support to diaspora organisations is mainly realised through Oxfam Novib’s Front Office, which is part of the broader Linkis initiative170. Linkis/Oxfam Novib was established in 2004 and is part of the Popular Campaigning bureau. The Linkis/Oxfam Novib fund supports development activities of smaller and bigger civil society organisations in the Netherlands of in developing countries. Such activities may relate to capacity building, public campaigns, fundraising and project finance. In 2004, of a total number of 451 applications, Oxfam Novib agreed on 158 smaller projects representing 5.4 M€ of funding initiated by mostly relatively small organisations within the Linkis framework. Some 40 percent of all these cooperation projects concern diaspora organisations171.

To ensure that migrants have access to funding, Oxfam Novib allocates at least 30 percent of the total number of projects it receives annually to activities and projects of diaspora organisations in the Netherlands in their countries of origin. Linkis Oxfam Novib has an annual budget of 7 M€ for North-South Cooperation. Until 2006, 25 small projects in the North, mainly in the Netherlands, have been funded; 36 small projects in the South (support ranging from 5,000 to 50,000 €); and five larger, 3-year projects (average 100,000 - 150,000 €), which will possibly be extended. Simultaneously, Oxfam Novib provides funding for small projects of diaspora organisations to support Netherlands-based lobbying and awareness campaigns to draw attention to development issues in their countries of origin. On average, 20 such projects are supported annually. Capacity building has a separate budget.

168 For the conference announcement, see HIRDA 2006.
170 See section 3.1.
For instance, in 2004 Oxfam Novib provided 40,000 € funding for a project by the Ethiopian migrant organisation Stichting Dir\(^{172}\) to establish an Ethiopian coffee house in Amsterdam. This will provide jobs for Ethiopian migrants in the Netherlands and for small Ethiopian farmers who produce ecologically grown coffee and for local workers who will process and pack the coffee. Oxfam Novib also collaborates with the Dutch head office of the transnational Somali migrant organisation Hirda (Himilo Relief and Development Association). They received over 100,000 € and the collaboration with Hirda is regarded as a best practice example within Oxfam Novib. Hirda is an NGO established in 1998 by Somali refugees living in the Netherlands. With Oxfam Novib’s help Hirda runs projects to improve education in the Somali village of Bardhere in the Gedo region\(^{173}\).

Oxfam Novib has increased its involvement in microfinance, including programmes that aim to channel migrant remittances for microfinance. A notable example is its support for Ercmove (Economic Resource Center for Migrants and Overseas Employees), an NGO aiming at, amongst other things, ‘harnessing the development potential of migration, by providing the means to foster the economic empowerment of migrants and overseas workers in the Netherlands that will enable them to contribute to the sustainable development of local communities in their countries of origin through innovative micro-finance and alternative investment schemes’\(^ {174}\). In collaboration with Oxfam Novib and other funding bodies, Ercmove has conducted several projects in this field, such as Linking Organised Migrants in NL and NGO Partners in their Developing Countries of Origin through Microsavings and Investments towards Local Economic Development and Improved Standard of Living and a project aimed at promoting microsavings in The Netherlands and microinvestment in the Philippines\(^ {175}\).

Oxfam Novib also strives to establish long-term collaborations with diaspora organisations, and to contribute to capacity building through facilitating meetings, training, conferences and expert meetings, with a focus on enhancing migrant contribution to development in countries of origin while improving their position in the Netherlands. For instance, Oxfam Novib also supports Tiye International, a platform uniting ‘black, minority and refugee’ organisations, which aims at improving equal opportunities and societal participation of women with a migrant or refugee background as well as ‘improving interaction between women from the South living in the North with women in the South’\(^ {176}\).

Oxfam Novib also supported the formation migrant networks such as Multicultural Women Peacemakers, Migrant Women Initiatives in the Netherlands for Development (MIND), the Sudan Civil Society Forum and a network of Ethiopian diaspora organisations involved in development cooperation. Other organisations that have recently been supported by Oxfam Novib include: Management Development Foundation (an international management training and consultancy bureau, supported for capacity building among migrant organisations); Mama Cash (an NGO working

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\(^{172}\) [http://www.dirnet.nl/](http://www.dirnet.nl/)

\(^{173}\) See [http://www.hirda.org/bardere.php](http://www.hirda.org/bardere.php)

\(^{174}\) [http://www.ercmove.nl/about.htm](http://www.ercmove.nl/about.htm)


for women’s rights worldwide through supporting women’s groups\textsuperscript{177}); and The Hague Process (an initiative to ‘develop concrete proposals for sustainable refugee
and migration policies’\textsuperscript{178}).

In its strategic management plan 2007-2010, Oxfam Novib focuses on stimulating the social and political participation of migrant organisations. The main goal of such support is to strengthen migrant organisations and to advocate national and international recognition of their role. The objective is that by 2010 such support will have contributed to the establishment of international diaspora networks that are able to influence decision making on migration and development issues by development agencies, states and international organisations, and that are able to initiate development projects independently to exploit the development potential of migration and remittances.

### 3.3. Cordaid

Cordaid is a Dutch development NGO established in 1999 through a merger of three Catholic development organisations\textsuperscript{179}. Except in the case of emergencies, Cordaid does not carry out its own project in developing countries, but works with over 1000 local development organisations to implement its policies. Its total yearly income is 175 M€, two-thirds of which originate from the development budget of the Dutch ministry of development cooperation, and one quarter from own (donor) funding. With approximately 280 people working for Cordaid, its total budget for local organisations and projects in development countries amounts to approximately 150 M€.

Cordaid’s involvement with diaspora organisations is relatively old, which can be attributed to the specific historical background of Memisa Medicus Mundi and Mensen in Nood, two of the three merger partners of Cordaid. These organisations were not part of the Dutch co-financing structure; historically they had more room to obtain funding for projects in the Netherlands or initiated by migrant organisations based in the Netherlands. The third merger partner, Bilance (the earlier Cebemo) depended almost entirely on co-financing, within which there was very limited room for such support. Nevertheless, since the 1980s Bilance has established some links with migrant organisations. This started off with Moluccan organisations, which gave small contributions to development programmes on the Moluccan island of Ambon in Indonesia\textsuperscript{180}.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, debate was renewed in the Netherlands on the role of the ‘new Dutch’ (immigrants and their descendants), and in particular whether they should have access to co-financing. At the time, Cebemo was approached by HIMOS (Hindoe- en Moslimorganisatie voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking) a mixed Hindu

\textsuperscript{177} \url{http://www.mamacash.nl}

\textsuperscript{178} \url{http://www.thehagueprocess.org/about/samenvatting.htm} (accessed March 2006).

\textsuperscript{179} These organisations were Memisa Medicus Mundi, Mensen in Nood and Bilance, mainly with a background in the Catholic mission.

\textsuperscript{180} The Moluccans had an established tradition of remittances dating back to the colonial era – a tradition that they ‘exported’ to the Netherlands. Support for this organisation can be seen as an example of Linkis avant-la-lettre.
(dominant) Muslim development organisation created by Surinamese migrants. To facilitate its activities, HIMOS was given office space inside the Cordaid building, while retaining their separate organisational structure. Over the 1990s, HIMOS gradually broadened its scope of development activities beyond Surinam towards India and other countries; and it also appointed a Turkish collaborator.

In the early 1990s, the ‘new Dutch’ became increasingly active, and complained about not having access to governmental development funding. This discontent was also voiced in the Arc Mundi project established by Oxfam Novib. The 1999 merger into Cordaid enabled a broadening of opportunities for building links with migrant organisations, because the two other merger partners had an established tradition of collaborating with Dutch-based organisations and also had substantial (approximately one-third) own funding. Upon the merger, all the HIMOS personnel were integrated into the Cordaid organisation. When DGIS started to support ‘civil society construction’ as part of a general change of policy course after 1998, more room was also created for Cordaid to support migrant network organisations. Since then, Cordaid has initiated a specific programme, Projecten Nederland Internationaal (Projects Netherlands International) supporting migrant networks in the Netherlands that are involved in stimulating development in countries of origin.

Such network organisations generally emerged from previous cooperation between migrant organisations with a similar ethnic or religious background working together in giving humanitarian and development aid. Cordaid does not directly support development projects, but rather aims to strengthen migrant network organisations, which in turn support local organisations in developing countries. Through providing financial support and capacity building, the Projecten Nederland Internationaal programme aims to contribute to the growth of these migrant network organisations into professional development organisations. The stated objective is that, in this way, ‘the migrant networks can themselves concretely contribute to durable poverty reduction’. In 2004, 21 projects were approved, representing a total budget of €1,294,000.

Network organisations that have been supported by Cordaid include:

- The Seva network, which presents itself as an international organisation, inspired by Hindu values, for development cooperation. Its development projects aim at fighting poverty and promoting the socio-economic emancipation of populations in India, Nepal and countries of the Indian diaspora such as Surinam, Guyana and Mauritius. It was initiated by people who were formerly active in HIMOS, and the first diaspora organisation supported by Cordaid. It is also the first Dutch migrant organisation that acquired the TMF (Thematic Co-Financing) status of DGIS, through which Seva now receives a TMF subsidy for civil society organisations involved in development cooperation, heralding its transformation from migrant to professional development NGO.

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181 Cordaid 2005.
182 http://www.sevanetwork.net/
• The Africa network, which also originated from Himos. It groups about 28 African organisations including some ‘White’ organisations working in Africa or with Africans\textsuperscript{183};
• The Selam network, which also originated from Himos, and is a development organisation based on moderate Muslim values. It was initially oriented on Turkey, but is now also broadening its development activities towards other (predominantly Muslim) countries\textsuperscript{184};
• SMHO (Cooperating Muslim Aid Organisations), which was a branch that split off from Selam\textsuperscript{185};
• SMS (Global Society Foundation), which was an initiative of three refugee organisations but now counts 150 refugee organisations. It is not a genuine network organisation, as its activities focus on provision of training of refugee, migrant and other organisations in development cooperation\textsuperscript{186}. It also receives European funds to train diaspora organisations so that they are more able to understand the workings of European institutions;
• The Morocco network; the 2004 earthquake in the Moroccan Rif incited the emergency aid department of Cordaid to urge Moroccans to donate money. The ensuing collaboration with Moroccan organisations led to the formation of a Morocco network. In November 2005 they followed their first training with SMS on development aid;
• A ‘meta-work’; in 2004 the MOS (Consultative Development Cooperation Body for Migrants was established, and is a meta-network of migrant and refugee organisations working on migration and development\textsuperscript{187}.

Cordaid supports these migrant networks, which are already working with local associations in the countries of origin, with funds and capacity building through its ‘projecten Nederland international’.

The \textit{Particulier Initiatief Fund} (Private Initiative Fund, PIF) is Cordaid’s Linkis Front Office, which was established in 2004, at which time it received 500 funding applications for small projects, of which 225 were approved, and 70 under review at the end of that year\textsuperscript{188}. Funding is based on doubling the own funding up to a maximum of 12,500 € per project. It is not known what proportion of the approved projects was initiated by migrant organisations, but the proportion is substantial.

Cordaid has also supported SSR (\textit{Stichting Steun Remigranten}), a foundation established in 1989 by the council of churches in the Netherlands, which aims to assist migrants who return to Morocco. SSR operates a support office in the town of Berkane in north Morocco, in the main areas of origin of ‘Moroccan Dutch’. This office is managed by two social-juridical counsellors who give practical support to the returnees with the manifold juridical and administrative problems they tend to encounter on issues like the payment of allowances from the Dutch government, tax policy, divorce and guardianship. As well as providing individual assistance, SSR supports local development NGOs and women’s organisations in this region and has

\textsuperscript{183} \url{http://www.afrikanetwerk.org/}
\textsuperscript{184} \url{http://www.selamnetwerk.nl/}
\textsuperscript{185} \url{http://www.smho.org}
\textsuperscript{186} \url{http://www.sms-vluchtelingen.nl}
\textsuperscript{187} \url{http://www.mos-overleg.nl}
\textsuperscript{188} Cordaid 2005.
attempted to establish a regional network of NGOs working in the field of
development. They also encourage returnees to organise themselves and to participate
in the social and educational activities of local NGOs. The local organisation of
returnees, El Fath, is equally supported by SSR\textsuperscript{189}. SSR is one of the few examples of
effective post-return support, which has proven its value against relatively low costs,
and which is highly appreciated by Moroccan return migrants, who, once returned,
often feel let down by Dutch institutions.

Cordaid also offers support to the assisted return of rejected asylum seekers through
the \textit{Bureau Maatwerk bij Terugkeer} (Individual Return Assistance Agency), which
was established in 2001 and is now supported financially by the DGIS programme
\textit{Return, Migration and Development} (TMO)\textsuperscript{190}. In 2004, mediation was provided to
109 people as they returned to their countries of origin, and assistance was given to 29
people outside the context of return proceedings. Within this framework, Cordaid
cooperates with the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the Dutch
Central Missions Commission (CMC).

3.4. Hivos

A CFA guided by humanist values, Hivos was established in 1968. Its most important
activity consists in providing financial and political support for local NGOs. Ninety
percent of its budget is provided by DGIS co-financing. In 2004, expenditures went
primarily to Civil Society Building (41\%) and Direct Poverty Alleviation (29\%).
Africa is the region to receive the largest portion of Hivos support; 32.3 M€ went to
the sector Sustainable Economic Development; nearly 12 M€ to Human Rights and
8.6 M€ to Gender, Women and Development. A total of approximately 137 people are
employed by Hivos\textsuperscript{191}.

Hivos does not have a specific programme for migration and development, although
migrant organisations can and do apply for funding through Linkis. Part of the annual
Linkis budget (approximately 100,000 €), called the diversity fund, is earmarked for
the support of development initiatives of migrant organisation. Most of the funding
requests received through Linkis focus on sub-Saharan Africa. Several funded
projects are said to suffer from a lack of focus and expertise, and better counselling
and training could improve the success rate. Nevertheless, there are also successful
examples, such as the project based on an Argentinean architect’s proposal to recycle
waste. There have been internal discussions on whether to recruit personnel with a
specifically migrant background. They have now been abandoned, partly because
most of the countries targeted by Hivos do not correspond to the most important
countries of origin of migrants living in the Netherlands. Since 2004, Hivos has also
contributed to IntEnt (approximately 100,000 € in 2006), an NGO assisting migrants
who wish to set up an enterprise in their country of origin\textsuperscript{192}.

\textsuperscript{189} Odé 2002.
\textsuperscript{190} See section 3.1.3.
\textsuperscript{191} \url{http://www.hivos.nl}
\textsuperscript{192} See section 3.6.
3.5. NCDO

The NCDO (National Committee for International Cooperation and Sustainable Development) is a foundation that focuses on raising public awareness about and support for international development cooperation in the Netherlands. NCDO develops its own activities and funds activities initiated by others. The NCDO also organises debates and events but it mainly provides funding. Although its yearly budget 30 M€ (2005) is almost entirely funded by DGIS, NCDO is independent of the government. It is also free to work in all developing (ODA/DAC) countries, and therefore does not have to restrict its activities to the target countries of official Dutch development cooperation. Thus the relative freedom it enjoys even in comparison to the CFAs enabled NCDO (similar to two of the three merger partners of Cordaid\textsuperscript{193}) to support several development-oriented diaspora organisations well before the Front Offices were established.

NCDO has played a key role in putting the issue of migration and development on the Dutch development policy agenda and in network building between diaspora organisations and development actors. It accomplished this by organising two major conferences in 2004 and 2005, which were attended by major stakeholders (migrants, development NGOs, policy makers, and academics)\textsuperscript{194}.

As was mentioned in section 3.1.3, the Small-Scale Local Activities (KPA) programme was introduced in 1991 and is currently carried out by NCDO, awards grants of up to 100,000 € to top up (i.e., doubling) the proceeds of privately initiated fund-raising activities in the Netherlands for projects in developing countries. The Matra/KPA programme supports in particular small-scale projects in Central and Eastern Europe, but also in Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Turkey, Morocco and Jordan, aimed at stimulating political change and supporting civil organisations.

The NCDO Front Office and also the KPA programme contribute to projects in developing countries that are not eligible for a subsidy from any of the other financing NCDO programmes. For migration and development policies, this has the advantage that it can also fund projects initiated by migrant from countries such as Turkey and Morocco, major source countries for Dutch immigration that are not on DGIS’s target countries list. A particular condition for funding is that projects have to stimulate the debate about international cooperation and provide information in the Netherlands about the project in order to increase public support for development cooperation.

Both KPA and the NCDO Front Office encourage migrants and refugee initiatives that focus on the development of their countries of origin. However, as has been said earlier, relatively few migrant organisations make use of these and other NCDO programmes, which recently led to increased efforts by NCDO to involve migrants in its activities. NCDO’s aim that at least 10 percent of the project proposals should be

\textsuperscript{193} See section 3.3.

submitted by diaspora organisations was achieved in 2005. In that year a group of ‘Moroccan Dutch’ established the Foundation Marokko Fonds (Morocco Fund) through NCDO’s support. The fund aims to support development projects in Morocco and to increase the involvement of migrants of Moroccan origin in such activities.

3.6. IntEnt

IntEnt\textsuperscript{195} is an NGO that was established\textsuperscript{196} in 1996 as a sequel to the Dutch SEON programme, which aims to assist migrant entrepreneurs to set up a business in the Netherlands. Both programmes were initiatives of FACET BV\textsuperscript{197}, an SME Consultancy and Implementation Company working primarily in developing countries. It was a response to the growing number of successful migrant entrepreneurs operating in the Netherlands wishing to start a business in their country of origin, but who faced difficult access to information, financial facilities and specialised services.

In the first years, the Dutch government was the sole financier. Since 2002, IntEnt has received additional funding, such as from the EU for its Morocco programme. In 2004 a partnership agreement was signed between IntEnt, HIVOS (one of the CFAs) and DGIS on funding until the end of 2007. Between 1997 and 2000 the programme focused on Ghana, Surinam, Morocco and Turkey, but through additional funding IntEnt has been able to extend its business development services to migrants who wish to start a business in the Netherlands Antilles (Curaçao), Afghanistan, Ethiopia and Burundi.

IntEnt implements a SME promotion programmes focused on ‘bridging two worlds’. It focuses mainly on the establishment phase, and there is a cut-off point in the programme at the moment the businesses are operational. IntEnt stresses that it does not focus on return migration, but on circular migration and reaping the advantages of simultaneously living in and having experience in two countries. The programme emphasises the personal responsibility of the entrepreneurs, who are expected to finance most of their enterprise with their own funds. However, the programme provides possibilities to obtain additional external financing from a bank in the country of origin, in most cases with a supplementary guarantee from IntEnt\textsuperscript{198}.

Prospective migrant entrepreneurs can receive support from IntEnt, which comprises assistance from the orientation until the actual start of the business and the first period of operations. If accepted, they enter the IntEnt programme, consisting of four phases: (1) Promotion and publicity phase; (2) preparatory phase; (3) starting (financing) phase; and (4) implementation phase. In the IntEnt Information and Entrepreneur Centre clients can make use of a wide range of facilities to collect market data, which can also be used to prepare and finalise the business plan. IntEnt applies the ‘tilted funnel’ concept: over a period of time people who have registered and requested assistance gradually drop out. Hence, only the entrepreneurs with sufficient

\textsuperscript{195} See \url{http://www.ondernemenoverdegrens.nl/}
\textsuperscript{196} Founded by FACET, SEON and Triodos Bank.
\textsuperscript{197} See \url{http://www.facetbv.nl}
\textsuperscript{198} Intent 2006.
motivation and promising projects complete the entire process. Many interrupt the preparations during the process. Since its programme became truly operational in 2000 until end 2005, about 4,666 persons contacted IntEnt for information. Of the 1071 persons that were admitted to the programme, 163 had their business plan approved and 154 actually started their business, of which 13 were abandoned after being set up. The total investment made possible by IntEnt clients amounts to 11.2 M€ for 179 businesses started since 2000. The average investment per client was 62,694 € in 2005. The total amount of guarantees approved (net value) amounted to 1.4 M€ by the end of December 2005 for 98 clients, with an average commitment of 14,398 € in 2005. The lion’s share (1.2 M€) of its 1.4 M€ budget (2004) is funded by DGIS.

In her study on the developmental impact of Ghanaian migrants’ business enterprises in Ghana, Casini acknowledges that the support provided by an organisation like IntEnt, such as access to credit and capacity building, is useful and often necessary for starting enterprises. However, she saw room for improvement, particularly to concentrate not only on the financial side of business but to take more readily into account the social constraints in developing and implementing business plans. For instance, she observed that the pressure by family and friends to share resources can undermine the success of business initiatives. IntEnt has also recently started to establish local IntEnt representations in Surinam, Morocco and, at a later stage, Ghana. Recently, the French AFD (French Development Agency) has expressed interest in the IntEnt approach.

In 2005, IntEnt developed www.geldnaarhuis.nl (Money [to] Home), a website where the public can perform online comparisons on costs of remitting money to Morocco, Turkey, Somalia, Ghana, Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles. This website was established after a study it commissioned together with NCDO revealed the low transparency and high transaction costs of the Dutch remittance market. The initiative is similar to and seems strongly inspired by DfID’s www.sendmoneyhome.org website in the UK.

Particularly relevant for the active involvement of migrants, IntEnt has recently supported the establishment of the Promio (Professionalisation of Migrant Organisations) programme so as to strengthen the institutional and organizational capacity of migrant organisations. The idea is that this will help them to become professional and independent ‘service providers’, able to implement (development) projects, to develop training programmes or to do consulting.

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199 Intent 2006.
200 Intent 2006.
201 Casini 2005.
202 ConsumentenBond, NCDO and IntEnt 2005.
203 See section 4.1.
3.7. Other development agencies

ICCO is an independent CFA that was founded more than forty years ago by Dutch Protestant churches. ICCO sees itself primarily as a financing organisation and does not post people abroad or implement their own projects. It has a few small field offices. Its turnover in 2005 was 138 M€ and it works with 885 partner organisations in 50 countries. Around 2003 ICCO started developing a policy on migration and development, not only in developing countries but also in the Netherlands. Like other CFAs, ICCO has established a Front Office (called Front Desk) for small projects. With an annual budget of 2 M€, in 2005 ICCO supported 97 organisations in the Netherlands with a total amount of almost 2 M€. There is no criterion stipulating that a certain proportion of approved projects should be initiated by migrant organisations. In the framework of the ‘inter-religious dialogue’ ICCO supports small migrant-churches (Co-operating Churches in the Netherlands). ICCO also explores possibilities to involve migrants and migrant organisations in supporting partner-organisations in countries of origin and in conducting development projects in countries of origin.

Oikos is the Ecumenical Institute for Church and Developmental Cooperation supported by various churches. It does not provide funds, but supports activities in the Netherlands that contribute to a ‘worldwide just and sustainable development’, including research, lobbying, education and campaigns\(^{204}\). Oikos has also developed some activities around the topic of migration and development, for which a total budget of 50,000 € is allocated. Since 2003, Oikos organises in collaboration with Cordaid and SMS an annual Ideas Competition for development projects proposed by migrants. The three winners receive cash prizes of 10,500 €, 7500 € and 5000 €, respectively, to be spent on a development project\(^{205}\). The ideas competition is generally evaluated as positive, but the organisation’s experience is that more training is required to improve the capacity of the proposers to convert their ideas into concrete propositions. In September 2004 Oikos organised an expert meeting on remittances\(^{206}\), and in 2005 it published a booklet, *To Make a Difference*, describing practical cases of migrants who had succeeded in contributing to development in their countries of origin. Oikos has also organised expert meetings and has dealt with remittances and other migration-related issues.

3.8. Conclusion

After a long period of scepticism and neglect since the failure of the REMPLOD projects in the 1970s, the internationally increased interest in the topic of migration and remittances has had a huge impact on development actors in the Netherlands. In its official policies, and notably according to its 2004 policy memorandum, the Dutch government is focusing on stimulating temporary and return migration in order to harmonise migration and development agendas, although the development agenda seems somehow subordinate to the migration agenda. However, there is considerable discrepancy between this official policy discourse and the practice in which diaspora

\(^{204}\) [http://www.stichtingoikos.nl](http://www.stichtingoikos.nl)
\(^{205}\) See [http://www.ideeenwedstrijd.nl/](http://www.ideeenwedstrijd.nl/)
\(^{206}\) Karsians and Nix 2004.
organisations and migrant-led development initiatives are indirectly supported by Dutch co-financing government funds for development cooperation. Although DGIS does not see a specific place for facilitating or influencing remittance flows, it does in practice support remittance policies through NFX. It also supports migrant entrepreneurship in countries of origin through funding IntEnt.

Perhaps the most innovative element of the Dutch policies is the establishment of the KPA, Front Offices and the Linkis programmes. These have significantly increased the access of private or civic development initiatives to government funding. This has been part of the new policies that DGIS has pursued since 1998 to lower the threshold between the professional development world and the Dutch civil society. Although this paradigm shift in Dutch development policies was not inspired by a specific concern about the issue of migration and development – which in 1998 was still entirely out of sight – a positive side-effect has been that also migrants and their organisations can now access development funding through such programmes. In addition, the specific, decentralised features of the Dutch co-financing structure through which the new policies have been implemented have also played a certain favourable role in promoting cooperation with migrant organisations.

Because the Dutch development agencies have considerable leeway in implementing their policies, significant differences exist between the different development NGOs with regard to their migration and development policies. Besides NCDO, Oxfam Novib and Cordaid have been most active in this field, and specifically encourage migrant organisations to apply for small-scale funding through their Front Offices, not only for project funding but also to support their professionalisation.

Both organisations claim to have somewhat different policies, with Cordaid emphasising support to (independent) migrant networks and Oxfam Novib stressing capacity building to stimulate migrants’ own advocacy. Although there is probably an element of truth in this, in practice the differences are sometimes less than in theory. Several organisations, in fact, organisations such as Hirda and Dir, are supported by Oxfam Novib and Cordaid as well as by NCDO. A significant difference is that Cordaid supports programmes linked to return migration, from which Oxfam Novib abstains. Due to the specific background of two of its three merger partners, Cordaid has the longest involvement with diaspora organisations. The case of the Seva network points to the importance of continuity of support: Only through consistent support over a longer period can we expect experience to mature and collaboration to flourish.

A recent external evaluation of the Linkis programme concluded that they have generally been successful. However, it also observed that several obstacles remain: Most people who successfully apply are already familiar with development cooperation to a certain extent, while many ‘outsiders’ are not even aware of Linkis. Hence there is room for improved transparency and internal coordination between Front Offices and training, and assistance to applicants can be improved. Interestingly, it was observed that the instant success of Linkis leads to rapid budget depletion, increased competition of limited resources and a professionalisation of applicants, which eventually risks limiting the accessibility of the programme. Therefore, the whole endeavour can be undermined by its own success. For that
reason, a recent evaluation recommended to increasing the Linkis budget. This evaluation also stressed the importance of continuity of support to organisations.

The total funding allocated to the Front Office is small compared to the total project funding available among Dutch development NGOs. There is general agreement that what applies for ‘outsider’ organisations in general applies even more for migrant organisations. Migrant organisations have had even more difficulties in gaining access to the Front Office, partly through a lack of information about and awareness of the existence of the Front Offices.

Unfortunately, there is little independent information on the success of the initiatives by CFAs (in particular Oxfam Novib and Cordaid) to support diaspora network organisations. Nor are external evaluations of development projects initiated by diaspora organisations available to the public yet. This makes it difficult to judge the success of such projects, the major problems encountered, and the lessons learned as well as to critically assess the extent to which diaspora involvement has an added value.

One study showed that migrant and refugee organisations still find it difficult to gain a clear overview of the complex regulations and conditions for submitting a proposal, but this was before the Linkis and Front Offices were launched. For Novib and Cordaid this has been a reason to specifically encourage the involvement of migrant organisations. Some oppose too much positive action and take the position that no distinction should be made between migrant and non-migrant applications and that such an attitude is in fact patronising towards migrants. As one respondent working for a Dutch development agency said:

‘My scenario of worst practice would be a too narrow focus on obtaining more [funding] requests by migrants: Then they will remain a target group that, in the worst case, will lead to drop out in the longer term. I favour initiatives by development NGOs to support migrant organisations. However, development NGOs tend to become patronising rather quickly and that is counterproductive. People have to be addressed on the basis of their own qualifications and that is why I oppose the argument that migrant are not necessarily the best development workers. This is often raised in debates by White organisations, but in the perspective of what migrants are already doing [in development] and in the perspective of their strengths this is somehow a non-debate.’

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207 Sikkema et al. 2006.
208 In a commentary, Seva expressed its disappointment on the fact that the evaluation of Linkis (Sikkema et al. 2006) did not address the particular difficulties diaspora organisations experience in accessing and contacting the front offices as well as its neglect of existing forms of cooperation between migrant organisation and ‘established development organisations’. To fill this gap, Seva expressed its intent to conduct its own evaluation. Source: http://www.oneworld.nl/index.php?page=4_2&articleId=7928&articleOrganisationId=402 (Accessed 17 April 2006).
A certain paradox arises between, on the one hand, the wish among development NGOs to financially support migrant organisations to strengthen their involvement in development cooperation, and on the other hand, their aim to strive for the ultimate independence of such organisations. This paradox was illustrated by another respondent, who stated:

‘In some sense, we create our own competitors in the development field, and the ultimate goal is that they make us superfluous.’

For migrant organisations, a similar dilemma exists between remaining independent but lacking funds or gaining access to funding at the ‘risk’ of being ‘incorporated’ and losing a significant degree of independence. By ‘becoming’ professional development organisations, they might also lose some of their unique features as independent migrant organisations. Significant suspicion remains among migrants about why, after decades of neglect, governments and development NGOs are suddenly so interested in ‘them’. In fact, several established, development-oriented – for instance, Turkish – migrant organisations have been remarkably underrepresented at Dutch ‘migration and development’ conferences and in other activities. It is unclear to what extent this reflects ignorance or intentional refusal to be ‘incorporated’. There seems to be disagreement on this point both within migrant organisations and development NGOs. In any case, it indicates that development actors should be aware of the risks of adopting a patronising stance in trying to involve or to sustain diaspora groups.
United Kingdom

4.1. National policies

From an early stage, even before migration and development was placed on the global development agenda, the UK Department for International Development (DFID) has been active in the field of migration and development. DFID has a migration team in their Policy Division, and has played a leading role in knowledge formation on the issue of migration and development policies through organising and funding conferences and through commissioning and funding research\textsuperscript{211}.

There is now a wealth of DFID-sponsored studies on migration and development issues. A particular characteristic of these studies is that they go ‘beyond remittances’ and cover a broad range of issues, including diaspora involvement in the development of sending countries\textsuperscript{212}. Moreover, DFID provides funding for the Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty at the University of Sussex, which focuses in particular on the interactions between livelihoods, inequality and poverty in sending societies\textsuperscript{213}. Together with the World Bank and International Migration Policy Programme (IMP) it organised the first major international conference on Migrant Remittances in October 2003\textsuperscript{214}. Along with the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs and IOM, the UK government organised the intersessional workshop on migration and development cooperation in Geneva in February 2005\textsuperscript{215}. DFID also instigated and funded the South Asia Migration Resource Network\textsuperscript{216}.

In contrast to several other European countries, British development NGOs such as Oxfam, Save the children, Action Aid, World Vision, Cafod, Christian Aid and Care\textsuperscript{217} have not developed specific policies towards migration and development or the involvement of diaspora organisations in their activities.

\textsuperscript{211} Unlike DGIS of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which has mostly relied on internal expertise or informal consultations and has not commissioned research for policy development on this issue.
\textsuperscript{213} For relevant policy and research papers, see http://www.migrationdrc.org/ and http://www.livelihoods.org/hot_topics/migration/policy.html
\textsuperscript{214} See section 2.2.2.
\textsuperscript{215} See section 2.4.
\textsuperscript{216} See www.samren.org
\textsuperscript{217} CARE nevertheless is involved in a project aimed at the reintegration of Somalis who returned to Somaliland, financed by the Dutch government (see section 3.1).
Remittances

The UK has played a leading role not only in designing but also in actually implementing policies to facilitate remittances. This priority is based on the conviction that particularly in this area there is a high degree of coherence between economic (financial markets) and development policies. According to DfID, stimulating remittances fits in with its main objective of poverty reduction, and a ‘win-win’ situation can thus be easily created: ‘Remittances are a fast and effective way of shifting resources to the developing world, thus giving the means for poverty reduction and sustainable development’, while ‘From a private sector point of view, increasing the value of remittances will increase the size of the market’.

Although the financial sector team at DfID has aimed at improving the developmental impact of remittances, this has in practice been mainly implemented through remittance facilitating policies, which concentrate on increasing volumes and speed and reducing costs, but are not related to impacts per se. With regard to remittances, DfID’s priorities are

‘to improve access, transparency and choice for remittance senders and recipients, with lower costs and greater security. Remittances can therefore have an even greater impact on people on low incomes, and can better assist them to improve their livelihoods and take advantage of opportunities. DfID also sees remittances as a key means of reducing financial exclusion.’

Practically, DfID thinks to facilitate remittances through sharing international best practice, technological innovation such as the use of mobile phones for banking purposes, helping governments develop financial regulatory frameworks and policies that improve the operation of financial markets, and helping to build a domestic financial infrastructure in developing countries while providing access to financial services to the unbanked poor.

The flagship initiative of DfID’s recent remittance activities is the Sending Money Home? programme, comprising the website www.sendmoneyhome.org, country-specific leaflets for diaspora communities in the UK and a market survey report. The objective is to increase transparency of the UK remittance market through providing a central information platform, where the terms of money transfer services are clearly presented. A consumer section on the website was established which allows customers to compare money transfer providers on the basis of cost and speed. The initiative is widely regarded as a success, as is demonstrated by the high website usage statistics and high national and international press coverage and the fact that the example has already been copied abroad through the recent creation of a similar website in the Netherlands. Not only individuals but also organisation such as the UN, EU, World Bank, US Government Accountability Office, central banks, NGOs and providers of money transfer services regularly use the site. Moreover, DfID’s country offices in Rwanda, Jamaica, Ethiopia, Kenya, Ukraine, India and South Africa have all signed contracts to add their countries to the initiative, and negotiations with other countries are underway.

220 See also Carling 2005.
Furthermore, *Remittance Country Partnerships* have been concluded with the governments of Ghana, Nigeria and Bangladesh and designed with Nigeria and Pakistan. Such partnerships include a range of measures to remove impediments to remittance flows, to improve access to remittances and ‘other financial services and to strengthen the capacity of the financial sector to provide efficient and widespread transfer payment services’.\(^{221}\) The financial sector team at DfID has also recently started working with DfID Pakistan on a financial sector access programme with a remittances (post earthquake) component. DfID has also participated in the *Inter-Agency Remittances Task Force*, which emerged from the major remittances conference in London in October 2003\(^{222}\), and in which Oxfam Novib has also been involved and has contributed to data collection.

DfID is also involved in the *Remittances Principles Task Force*, led by the Bank for International Settlements and the World Bank. This task force was set up to develop principles for countries who want to improve the market for remittance transfers and bring down the price of these transfers. The principles cover the following areas: the market environment, transparency and consumer protection, payment system infrastructure, the role of remittances services providers, and the role of public authorities.

Based on the notion that ‘the private sector holds the key to improved access and lower costs’, DfID initiated a high level dialogue in June 2004 with banks, money transfer companies and other ‘stakeholders’ on ways to reduce costs and improve access to low-income senders and recipients. This has led to the formation of the *UK Remittances Working Group*, in which leading banks and money transfer companies have worked with the government (notably DfID and the Treasury) to improve remittance services to developing countries from the UK. The group released a report into the £2.7 billion UK remittance market in November 2005. The report provided orientations to increase the flow of (regulated) remittances to developing countries from the UK through making remittance cheaper, quicker and easier. The report particularly recommended the creation of a private sector task force to draw together research, information and discussion from the industry and to deliver increased competition and choice for consumers\(^{223}\). The working group also supports a new association for small money transfer providers in the UK.

### 4.2. Beyond remittances: Connections for Development

The 1997 White Paper on *International Development, Eliminating World Poverty* committed DfID to ‘build on the skills and talents of migrants and other members of ethnic minorities within the UK to promote the development of their countries of origin’\(^ {224}\). However, in contrast to remittances, it has proved much more difficult to put this policy objective into practice. Subsequently, DfID created the Development Awareness Working Group (DWAG) to advise the government on its development awareness, education, and information work in relation to international development

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\(^{221}\) Source: [http://www.sendmoneyhome.org/Contents/about%20dfid.html](http://www.sendmoneyhome.org/Contents/about%20dfid.html) (Accessed 5 April 2006).

\(^{222}\) See section 2.2.2.


\(^{224}\) DfID 1997.
issues. Between 1999 and 2000, a number of participants from the DWAG formed a black and ethnic minority (BME) sub-group, ensuing from the concern that, despite the 1997 White Paper commitment, little had in fact issued from DfID in terms of practical steps towards engaging BME groups interested in and supportive of international development\textsuperscript{225}. Prior to publication of the second White Paper on international development in 2000, the African Foundation for Development (AFFORD) submitted a position paper stressing the relevance of diasporas for development in countries of origin\textsuperscript{226}.

DfID subsequently commissioned a study to increase understanding of the UK’s black and ethnic minority (BME) civil society. In 2001, the report \textit{Getting it Right Together: Black and Minority Ethnic Groups} and DfID’s Development Agenda were published, which identified the need to increase the capacity of the BME community organisations to engage with DfID in policy development, implementation and promoting institutional diversity internally. One of the report’s observations was that only a very small percentage of the 6,000 to 15,000 BME organisations define themselves as oriented towards international development. However, it also concluded that many such organisations are unaware of DfID and its goals, while at the same time ‘DfID does not have a feel for the sector and its works’\textsuperscript{227}.

DfID’s perceived lack of success in engaging non-traditional development partners such as BME groups was the basis of a decision to explore the potential for a Strategic Grant Agreement (SGA) with the BME civil society. This led to the DfID-supported formation of Connections for Development (CfD), a network of BME voluntary and community organisations that aim to mobilise UK BME civil society for action on development. In April 2003 DfID concluded a three-year Strategic Grant Agreement (SGA) with CfD worth £750,000 (£250,000 per year). DfID sees the SGA as a tool to raise awareness within BME organisations of international development issues and to build their ability to plan and deliver effective activities contributing to poverty reduction. Activities are based around raising awareness in the UK and building the capacity of BME groups to become more actively involved in international development. However, the SGA has a UK focus and does not provide funding for projects in the South.

The activities within the SGA include:

- bringing together diverse segments of UK diaspora groups, providing leadership and enabling debate, shared learning and collaboration for action around international development issues;
- facilitating engagement with DfID and other key international players to help proactive engagement on international development issues throughout UK diaspora groups via the networks;
- facilitating engagement of UK diaspora groups into different policy areas of international development across the UK.

\textsuperscript{225} See also Van Hear \textit{et al.} 2004, p.4.
\textsuperscript{226} AFFORD 2000; Interestingly, the involvement of diasporas was in effect not mentioned in the second white paper on \textit{Eliminating World Poverty} (DfID 2000).
\textsuperscript{227} Compass 2001.
CfD’s main information and networking vehicle is its website www.cfdnetwork.co.uk. CfD’s aim is not to undertake international development projects, but to help its BME members to become actively involved in development through establishing a network, undertaking research, informing about all aspects of development, lobbying for BME participation in policy making and through supporting its membership members and connecting them to training and funding agencies. Currently, CfD is undertaking research to map BME voluntary sector groups across the UK and their involvement in international development. Now, in 2006, the SGA with CfD has been extended to March 31, 2007. No formal evaluation of CfD has taken place. DfID has involved diaspora organisations in the development of a number of Country Action Plans (Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nigeria, India), and has actively consulted African diaspora organisations as part of the Commission for Africa process.

In June 2004, the House of Commons International Development Committee presented its report Migration and development: How to make development work for poverty reduction. The report reiterated earlier statements from the 1997 White Paper that ‘The diaspora and its members can be important agents of development. Governments have much to learn from a deeper engagement with the diaspora, its members and constituent organisations. The diaspora should be involved in discussions on development strategies, voluntary remittances and sustainable return’.

DfID’s migration team provided funding to support an annual meeting of AfricaRecruit www.africarecruit.com. This is an initiative launched in 2002 as a mobilisation programme of The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), The Commonwealth Secretariat and the Commonwealth Business Council. AfricaRecruit facilitates the African diaspora towards capacity building in Africa either through skills or investment in areas such as remittances. It provides links to www.findajobinafrica.com and the IOM’s MIDA programme.

However, despite the wealth of studies and policy papers stressing the desirability to support the transfer of skills, knowledge, experience and other resources from migrant communities to their countries of origin, this has, apart from the establishment of CfD, yielded limited practical results, thus scarcely meeting the expectations raised in the 1997 White Paper.

In principle, work through the SGA with CfD runs parallel to work that other sections of DfID might do with BME groups. This means that work through the SGA does not exclude BME organisations applying for other DfID funding schemes, notably the Civil Society Challenge Fund (CSCF). However, relatively few BME organisations have found their way to fundraising from such funds. The Civil Society Challenge Fund (CSCF), which was established in April 2000 and has a budget of £19.6 M, is open for applications from civil society organisations in the UK. As the Getting it right together report observed, the CSCF was set up ‘to encourage grass roots groups but applications demand a lot of systems and procedures of accountability’, this is quite similar to the reasons the Dutch DGIS set up Linkis. The same report noted from

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228 United Kingdom House of Commons International Development Committee 2004.
229 See also Carling 2005; Van Hear et al 2004.
230 Compass 2001, p.3.
the total of 742 applications for the CSCF that were submitted between April 2000 and the time of reporting only 19 were from BME groups, and of the 146 accepted applications only one was from a BME group. Equally, no BME groups were among the 11 recipients of the £49.6 M Partnership Programme Agreement (PPA) funding, and only 15 of 293 applications and 3 of 79 approved projects for the £6.5 M Development Awareness Fund (DAF) were from BME groups. Six years later, this situation does not seem to have drastically changed.

DFID commissioned a number of studies to look at what other steps could be taken to further engage the diaspora. One study on the role of the diaspora in poverty reduction in countries of origin recommended that donors ‘should invest heavily in a stronger knowledge base for policy making through research, analysis and rigorous evaluation of diaspora involvement in development and its impact on poverty’ as well as recognize ‘that successful diaspora projects for home-country development must be led, or ‘owned’ by the diaspora groups themselves is an important starting point for donors, who are advised to build upon successful endeavours rather than create them from above’. It also concluded that donors should consider providing support to build and strengthen diaspora networks that have a strong developmental potential.

The study also stated that ‘donor governments that are serious about transnationalism as an engine of development will strive for policy coherence across departments of government’. This coherence implied ‘an immigration policy that creates opportunities for legal residence and fosters integration, and visa policies that make it easier for diaspora members of to come and go between home and host countries’. This vision is opposed to the coherence that many European governments envisage, which seems to focus on temporary, return and ‘circular’ migration as development tools.

Another study explored more specifically the many ways in which UK-based diasporas contribute to development and poverty reduction in countries of origin. The report observed that ‘Migrants’ incentives to participate in origin country development or reconstruction depend on the extent to which they feel they have a stake in their home nation-states as well as in the countries that host them. It recommended securing the rights of migrants, cutting the cost of money transfers and encouraging migrants to invest in community development initiatives in their origin countries as well as ‘taking steps to give diasporas a more active voice in the development arena’. Moreover, the study endorsed the proposals made earlier by the African Foundation for Development (AFFORD, see also section below):

- Acknowledge that the diaspora merit as serious an engagement as the private sector with DFID and other relevant government departments with a development brief;
- Draw UK-based diaspora groups into the formulation of Country Strategy or Assistance Plans, Poverty Reduction Strategy Planning, and other instruments of UK development policy;
- Make greater efforts to bridge the UK’s two parallel development and relief

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231 Compass 2001.
efforts, one mainstream-led (DfID plus UK-based NGOs engaged in development and relief) and the other diaspora-led;

- Form a dedicated unit within DfID (along the lines of the Private Sector Unit) to engage with UK-based diaspora groups.\(^{235}\)

In August 2005, two BME (AFFORD and AFP) groups published another report commissioned by DfID providing orientations for DfID staff to engage with diaspora groups and communities to achieve the Millennium Development Goals. The report emphasised the importance of a sustained two-way dialogue to improve mutual understanding and to avoid a mismatch of expectations. It also identified obstacles to DfID-diaspora engagement, among which the heterogeneity of diaspora groups, DfID’s decentralised structure and the regressive attitudes of some diaspora groups towards DfID’s development agenda, as well as mindsets among development professionals resisting engagement with diaspora groups. Some DfID staff suggested that colleagues schooled in particular theories and approaches to development may simply find the idea of diasporas and migrants as major stakeholders in development counterintuitive and difficult to assimilate.\(^{236}\)

In March 2006, DfID issued its draft migration and development paper. Although the paper reiterated the 1997 commitment to build on the skills and talents of migrants to promote the development of their countries of origin, it is not clear from the report to what extent and how the initial steps such as CfD and engagement in Country Action Plans will be extended into more concrete steps towards a more intensive and continuous engagement in practical terms.\(^{237}\)

### 4.3. The AFFORD case

It is worth paying more specific attention to the African Foundation for Development (AFFORD, [www.afford-uk.org](http://www.afford-uk.org)) as an illustration of the potential strength and influence of spontaneously created diaspora organisations that are not necessarily government supported. AFFORD was founded as a UK-registered charity in 1994 by a group of Africans in the UK, in response to concerns that, despite the vast number of Africans in the UK who organize themselves and contribute to Africa's development, Africans were effectively marginalized from mainstream development activity directed towards Africa.

AFFORD intends to connect Africans and their organisations abroad working for the development of Africa and African people directly with organizations on the continent working toward the same goals. Its mission is to expand and enhance the contribution that Africans in the diaspora make to Africa’s development. Its three work programmes are (1) to support UK-based African organisations in their quest to support development in their regions of origin, (2) to support African input into mainstream development policy and practice and (3) to facilitate direct developmental linkages between Africans in the UK and counterparts in Africa.


\(^{236}\) AFFORD and AFP 2005, p. 27.

\(^{237}\) DfID 2006.
AFFORD has been or is engaged in a range of activities; for example:

- **Africa21**, a consortium of nine UK-based African-led development organisations that sponsors a yearly ‘African Development and diaspora Day’ (ad3) and that provides an opportunity for Africans in the UK to work together to promote development in Africa as well as to meet with various international development agencies, donors, NGOs and others;
- The **African Diaspora Voices for Africa’s Development** (ADVAD) coalition, consisting of UK-based African organizations formed to give Africans in the diaspora the opportunity to ‘speak with one voice’;
- In February 2004, AFFORD collaborated with a social justice organization called Fahamu, based in Oxford, Durban and Cape Town, to offer an Oxford University-accredited distance-learning course for UK-based Africans. The course is on fundraising and resource mobilization, focusing on how Africans in the diaspora can increase their own fundraising capacities\(^{238}\);
- AFFORD is negotiating with a number of Australian and American companies to provide a remittance transfer service that will enable migrant workers to send any amount of money from any part of the world for a fee of only one US dollar\(^{239}\);
- AFFORD has also set up the ‘Hello Africa’ programme, which aims to tackle poverty by facilitating and sustaining developmental linkages and partnerships between Ghanaian, Nigerian and Sierra Leonean communities in the UK and counterparts in Africa\(^{240}\);
- The Opportunity Africa (OA) project provides a gateway to Africa-related international development careers, training and education for young people of African descent in the UK diaspora. It also aims to enhance their skill base and job preparedness, making it easier for them to move into full-time employment in this sector.

In addition to its practical role, AFFORD has also played a leading role in the advocacy of migrant roles in development both nationally and internationally. Over the past decade, AFFORD has been able to exert considerable influence on DfID and in particular in raising awareness on the relevance of diaspora organisations for development and their right to become engaged while retaining their independence through their website, publications, press releases and participations in conferences. It has for instance played a leading role in establishing CfD. It has thereby always retained a remarkably independent and (self-) critical voice, regularly putting forward original ideas. For instance, in March 2006 AFFORD called for Remittance Tax Relief\(^{241}\).

\(^{239}\) IOM 2005, p. 31.
\(^{240}\) Van Hear et al. 2005, p. 11.
\(^{241}\) Faal 2006; Of interest is that in the Netherlands remittances were tax-deductable under certain conditions until a major tax reform abolished this measure a few years ago.
4.4. Conclusion

In terms of practical action, UK migration and development policies have been characterised by a strong focus on remittances. In coalition with multilateral organisations, in particular the World Bank, it really has pushed the agenda forward in facilitating remittances and channelling them into formal channels through increasing transparency and competition in the remittance market. It forged a public-private partnership in the form of the UK Remittances Working Group. The sendmoneyhome.com website symbolises the leading role of the UK in remittance policies. These policies are apparently based on the conviction that there is a strong coherence between the poverty reduction focus of its development agenda and the expansion of the remittances market both in sending and receiving countries.

On paper, the UK approach towards migration and development is much more comprehensive than that of the Netherlands and, as we will see, of France. DfID neither links migration and development to return or temporary migration nor does it suggest a link between development cooperation and migration reduction. In this manner, DfID has apparently kept a position relatively independent of the Home Office, which approaches migration from the perspective of control, safety and security. Instead, DfID is committed to address the (apparently positive) links between migration and poverty reduction and clearly sees a role for diaspora organisations.

However, DfID’s often repeated commitment in 1997 to ‘build on the skills and talents of migrants and other members of ethnic minorities within the UK to promote the development of their countries of origin’ has shown to be very difficult to implement, despite an abundance of DfID-funded studies on migration and development and diasporas. While the global policy and research community is reaping considerable benefits from these research efforts, DfID’s 2006 draft migration and development paper showed an apparent inability to translate the recommendations into practical ways to involve diasporas in development policies, such as expressed in commissioned studies and as expressed by the independent and critical voices of UK diaspora organisations such as AFFORD. This also exemplifies that governments should not overestimate their role; nowhere else in Europe do diaspora organisations seem as active and as vocal as in the UK.

France

5.1. The evolution of French policies: beyond return?

In the Anglo-Saxon field of migration and development policies, the French experience is frequently ignored. This is striking, because France has arguably the most long-standing and developed migration and development policy in Europe. In fact, France’s experience seems to be highly instructive for countries that have only recently developed initiatives in this field.

In the 1970s, France’s policy was strongly associated with the return of migrants to their countries of origin. This focus on return has also been one of the main reasons this policy was severely criticized both internally and by other European countries. In his landmark study on French migration and development policies, Thomas Lacroix has described how, partly as a consequence of this criticism and ‘feedback’ by diaspora organisations, this approach has gradually evolved into a policy called co-développement.

From 1977 to 1986 the objective of these policies was to diminish the migrant population through stimulating return migration mainly under the aide au retour (1977-1980) and aide à la réinsertion (since 1983) programmes. The main instruments of these policies consisted of return bonuses to help the migrants to establish a new livelihood, and, in the case of Algerian and Senegalese migrants, offering professional training before return. In general, only a few migrants participated in these schemes. The majority who did so were Portuguese and Spanish migrants, who returned mainly because of the democratisation and economic take-off in their countries prior to and after their accession to the EU.

The main reason for the failure of return migration policies seemed the lack of perspective in most countries of origin. The relatively low level of the return bonuses (approximately 5,300 € at current standards) also did not help to make the project succeed. Because these return policies only targeted non-EU citizens, they were also seen to violate republican principles, and the pretext of development was seen to disguise the economic rationale of these policies. In addition, the extreme right Front National party supported the idea of helping migrants from non-European countries to return by giving them support to set up their own enterprises similar to the Dutch Remplod project. This support did not contribute to the credibility of these policies.

Lacroix 2003; reworked and published as Lacroix 2005. This section draws heavily on Lacroix 2003.
among migrants and others, who suspected that the stated development intentions of such policies camouflaged a hidden agenda of stimulating return migration.  

Although the aide à la réinsertion programme has formally continued to persist, the bureau de la réinsertion has closed down and the number of migrants signing up has fallen to negligible levels. The explicit return policies have been gradually abandoned and after 1986 political discourses put an increasing emphasis on development aid as an instrument to reduce ‘migration pressure’ in sending countries. Although return was no longer the primary means, the underlying thought remained to reduce migration through ‘instrumentalising’ aid. Another distinct feature was the specific role these new policies attributed to development-oriented diaspora associations, in France known as OSIM (Organisations de Solidarité Internationale Issues des Migrations), whose cooperation in development policies was deemed necessary to effectively curb migration flows.

In 1991, a special inter-ministerial officer (chargé de mission) for réinsertion et coopération was appointed within with the office of the Prime Minister. After several years of internal reflections within the government, in 1995 the Programme Développement Local Migration (PDLM) was established as the first concrete measure in the direction of the current co-development policies. The PDLM is largely inspired by the significant contribution of Senegalese migrants to (agricultural) development along the Senegal River. An equivalent of 2.6 M€ was invested over a period of five years. The programme aims to assist migrants wishing to establish enterprises in their countries of origin. The programme concentrates on facilitating local development projects through conducting feasibility studies and on support in detecting and connecting project partners such as OSIM, twinned municipalities and development NGOs.

A second component of the programme, as it was implemented in Senegal and Mali, constitutes technical and financial (an equivalent of 3700 € on average) support for individual return migration projects. These programmes promoted the voluntary return of Senegalese and Malian migrants by providing assistance to migrant workers for reinsertion, in the forms of credit funds for the establishment of businesses, training-for-return programs, and so on. The program also aimed to ‘reverse the exodus of the Senegalese’, by ‘explain[ing] to people the problems and hazards of emigration. . . . [and] demonstrat[ing] to them that their territory is full of gainful opportunities’. The hope was that they could exploit these opportunities in association with Senegalese living abroad. In order to convince the Senegalese that it is for their own good not to go abroad, and to urge migrants to ‘return and invest’, they advocated, amongst other things, the ‘publication of a brochure on business opportunities’ in Senegal. In the Kayes region of Mali, the Malian government cooperated with assisted return programs for unauthorised Malians in France, and works with international organisations to attract educated Malians back to Mali. In total 200 projects, of which 180 in Mali and 20 in Senegal have been realised. However, a significant proportion of projects have failed in the longer term, and the

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244 See de Haas 2006.
245 Diatta and Mbow 1999, p.251.
247 Martin et al. 2002.
programme was also harmed by delays in payment and a lack of motivation among French and Malian officials.\textsuperscript{248}

According to Lacroix, the novelty of the PDLM programme is the dismissal of return migration as the prime objective of migration and development policies. Instead of directly reversing the migration flows through stimulating return, the goal was now to stop flows through development. This also reveals the conceptual weakness of the programme. Although its goals are ambitious and address the longer term, the limited financial means involved make it impossible to achieve them by definition.\textsuperscript{249} Moreover, the rationale of this and similar ‘development instead of migration’ programmes ignore substantial evidence that development and the concomitant socio-economic transformations almost invariably tend to be associated with increasing migration at least in the short to medium term.\textsuperscript{250}

As well as the low level of financial support given to migrants, Lacroix blames in particular ‘the ambivalence of the governmental attitude’ as the major factor harming the credibility of these migration and development programmes. For instance, in 1995 the Minister of the Interior – who reinforced the ‘fight against illegal immigration’ in France – convoked Malian migrant associations to support collective projects in the Senegal River area, but on the condition that the returnees were undocumented migrants who renounced a return to France. The Malian associations subsequently refused to cooperate and only ten candidates accepted the proposition.\textsuperscript{251} This type of experience in combination with anti-immigration discourses by politicians fuelled considerable suspicion that such projects focused more on return than on development.

\textbf{5.2. Co-development}

In the light of past failures, the current French migration and development policies have been formulated over the past nine years, and have been officially coined co-développement.\textsuperscript{252} The concept of co-développement (co-development, or ‘cooperation for development’) policy is based on the principle that migrants are central actors in the development process of receiving countries, and that their contributions should be recognised and encouraged. The underlying original intention of reintegration in countries of origin has not entirely disappeared. Moreover, another fundamental notion is still that development will ultimately lead to decreasing migration to France.\textsuperscript{253}

In 1998 the Mission interministérielle au codéveloppement et aux migrations internationales (MICOMI) was established, whose mission was to ‘propose orientations and measures to reinforce the collaboration of France with countries of emigration with the aim of agreeing with them, in the perspective of co-development,'
on an improved control of migration flows. However, the strong association made regarding the return of undocumented migrants harmed the implementation of these new policies. The *Contrat de Réinsertion dans le Pays d'Origine* (CRPO) targeted undocumented migrants from Mali, Senegal and Morocco who were not eligible for regularisation. This time the reward was not a certain amount of money, but an EU visa, to be granted the moment that the French *Office des Migrations Internationales* (OMI) judged that the return migrant had successfully re-integrated into his country of origin. Because of this link with illegal migration, migrant associations refuse to collaborate. According to Lacroix, the CPRO durably discredited French co-development policies because it again fuelled suspicion that the development objective disguised the real goal of return migration.

After the failure of CPRO, MICOMI was dismantled and replaced by the *Ambassadeur Délégué au Co-Développement* in 2002. This decision was motivated by the wish to establish a better connection between *co-développement* and the general strategy for development cooperation, as well as to further distance it from policies to combat undocumented migration and stimulate return migration, which have proven to be so harmful to the objective to involve OSIM. Officially, co-development is now seen as ‘any development activity, regardless of its nature or area of activity, that involves the contribution by migrants if they either wish to return to their origin country or would like to help their countries of origin while they remain in France.’

In a communication to the French cabinet in 2003, the Minister Delegate for Cooperation and Francophony announced that the government had decided to give new impetus to the idea of co-development, while admitting that, ‘since the beginning of the 1990, [co-development] had largely remained a concept’ and was primarily brought up in the framework of (return) migration and re-integration policies. In an explicit breach with this narrow concept, the minister stated: ‘The agenda of co-development is in fact broader and is not solely intended to encourage the re-employment of migrants in their countries of origin.’ The idea is that migrants can act as mediators between home and host countries. The two official priorities of the new French co-development policies are (1) to facilitate remittances and to channel savings of migrants towards productive investment as well as (2) to mobilise the diaspora elite for the development of their countries of origin.

**Channelling remittances and migrants’ savings**

The first programme, launched in 2004, targets better channelling of remittance flows by assisting migrants wishing to invest in their origin countries. In comparison to the remittance optimism voiced by DfID in the UK, French policy makers tend to take a more critical stance towards the benefits by stressing that most remittances are mainly

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254 Lacroix 2003, pp. 299-300, translation from French by author.
255 Adviser to the Ambassador in charge of co-development, France, cited in IOM 2005, p. 41.
used for family consumption, health and housing. One of the priorities of the co-development strategy is therefore "to channel the remaining funds into productive investments able to contribute to the economic growth of developing countries." In 2003, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the Fédération Bancaire Française (French Banking Federation), the French Treasury and the AFD (French Development Agency) launched a programme aimed at (1) collecting the savings of migrants in France; (2) transferring these savings with safe, regular, inexpensive and simple mechanisms; (3) supporting guarantee mechanisms for savings and discount mechanisms for credit rates; and (4) accompanying and advising investors.

**Mobilising the diaspora elite**

The second priority of the French co-development policy is to mobilize the skills and know-how of diasporas for the benefit of origin countries. This is based on the idea that "Development is not possible without guidance and the transfer of expertise." A study commissioned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has shown that many migrants are willing to provide their expertise and their experience to their countries of origin on a limited basis. In fact, many OSIM were already active in development activities in countries of origin. The new co-development policies aim at providing the organisational and financial means to meet this desire among many OSIM. In order to promote "brain circulation", one of the programmes involves short-term missions for scientific and technical diaspora members to lecture at the universities or participate in research in their home countries. Currently, the French government covers the travel expenses and there is a possibility that in the future and in exceptional cases a salary supplement will be paid. A proposal also exists to establish dual Chairs at universities in France and countries of origin.

**Pilot co-development projects**

As part of the new co-development policies, four countries were chosen for pilot projects: Morocco, Mali, Senegal and the Comoros. The Ambassador delegate of co-development describes the programme implementation as "highly decentralized": "credit fund administration is devolved to embassies and projects are selected by Joint Committees made up of representatives of the French embassy and of authorities, local authorities and associations in the country concerned; during the project implementing phase, liaison with migrant communities in France is ensured by the Ambassador delegate for co-development." These projects build on the longer experience France has accumulated with regard to return migration and co-development projects with Mali and Senegal in particular.

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257 However, this ignores significant empirical evidence that expenses involving consumption and "non-productive investments" also increase living standards and well-being and that such expenditure can have substantial positive multiplier and employment effects in migrant-sending societies (Taylor 1999; cf. de Haas 2005)

258 IOM 2005, p. 41.


260 Ambassador Delegate for Codevelopment, Co-Development: Overview, 3 June 2005, CODEV no. 82.
In 2003, a co-development project in Mali of 2.6 M€ (Priority Solidarity Fund) was launched. It was implemented by the French Embassy, with the support of the Ministry of Social Affairs, Labour and Solidarity. Its aim is threefold: (1) the co-funding of local development projects initiated by diaspora associations (from 7,500 € to 45,700 € and up to 70 percent of the total budget); (2) the re-employment of migrants wishing to return to their countries to set up a small enterprise in collaboration with the Office des Migrations Internationales (OMI) and aided by a grant of 4000 to 7000 € and technical support in Mali (700 persons have returned to Mali since 1995 via such programmes); and (3) the mobilization through ‘brain circulation’ of the Malian scientific diaspora for the benefit of the University of Bamako. The latter component of the Mali Co-Development programme is being implemented in collaboration with the TOKTEN programme of the UNDP. The Malian government provides accommodation and the TOKTEN programme covers their travel expenses and their daily allowance of 30 € and a wage of 3.50 € per hour. In exchange, the Mali Co-Development PSF contributes 65,000 € to the TOKTEN programme. Up to July, 40 missions were realised. The French Development Agency (AFD) is investigating a project for the creation of homebuyer savings products in Mali.

As a follow-up to the Mali co-development programme, a second bilateral 2.5 M€ programme has been implemented in Senegal. The programme has been designed by the French embassy and the Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DGICD), and was adopted by the joint French-Senegalese Committee for Co-development and Migration in 2005. The Senegal programme is similar to the Mali programme, and consists equally of three parts: (1) providing co-funding (up to 70 percent) for projects (such as schools, health centres, farming and water supply) conducted by Senegalese OSIM in their villages of origin; (2) supporting short-term missions by highly qualified members of the Senegalese diaspora in France mainly in agribusiness, new technologies and management; and (3) economic reintegration assistance for Senegalese nationals living in France who wish to return to start an income-generating activity through technical assistance, a 4,000 to 7,000 € grant, training and management assistance. Management of this project is decentralised, which means that a technical unit has been set up in Dakar and that projects are selected in Dakar. To overcome weakly developed banking sectors and unattractive credit markets in Senegal, the French government strives to establish a mechanism enabling migrants or other Senegalese citizens to obtain loans to set up small businesses.

In Morocco, a project of 3.8 M€ implemented by the AFD includes European funding of 1.5 M€ – the remainder of which was funded by investors – and will enable the creation of rural tourism infrastructures in the south Moroccan Taroudannt region as well as the creation of SMEs, financed by a start-up fund set up by the French Caisse des dépôts et consignations and its Moroccan counterpart. The two programmes are supported financially by the Priority Solidarity Fund (FSP) as part of the budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Migrants from outside the four states can already receive assistance within the framework of the Migration and Economic Investment Programme if they have

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261 See section 2.3.
investment proposals for their country of origin. Through specific credits from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the French government can support migrant initiatives to invest in the country of origin to finance economic and social activities, such as the construction of schools and health centres. The French government plans to expand the co-development programmes beyond the four pilot countries. New programmes are envisaged to come into force in 2006, enabling us to implement projects in other French-speaking African and Southeast Asian countries.

*Forum and PRA/OSIM*

With government support, the *Forum des Organisations de Solidarité Internationale Issues des Migrations* (FORIM) was established in 2002. It was the first genuine effort to establish a dialogue with OSIM, in France known as OSIM (*Organisations de Solidarité Internationale Issues des Migrations*). The establishment of FORIM is the result of a long struggle by the manifold French diaspora organisations to become recognised as equal partners in development cooperation. There has long been a particular reluctance among the governments to work with and fund associations in which non-French citizens were also represented. This forced many OSIM to obtain funding through non-migrant French NGOs.\(^{262}\)

FORIM is a consultative platform between the government and the approximately 700 OSIM it represents. FORIM officially aims at ‘associating at all components of French civil society in order to promote the integration of populations with a migration background, to reinforce the exchanges between France and the countries of origin and to contribute to the development of regions of origin’.\(^{263}\) FORIM has activities aimed at informing, training and coaching its members, network building, representing migrant organisations in policy discussions with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, facilitating the interaction between its members and other civil society organisations, and providing information on possibilities for project funding. FORIM is also member of the French *Haut Conseil à la Coopération Internationale* (HCCI) and the *Commission Coopération Développement* (CCD).

Besides setting up an observatory and resource centre and running a programme for exchange and training, FORIM runs the experimental PRA/OSIM (*Programme d’Appui aux Projets des OSIM*) programme in collaboration with the French Catholic Committee against Hunger and for Development (CCFD, a French development NGO).\(^{264}\) PRA/OSIM enables OSIM to finance small local development projects in the French priority countries for development aid, with the exception of Mali and Senegal (which are integrated in the *Fonds de Solidarité Prioritaire Codéveloppement* (FSP) programme of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs). OSIM organisations can submit project proposals through an open call for tenders. The budget of projects should not exceed 120,000 € and the maximum amount of co-financing is 15,000 €.

Both the PRA/OSIM programme and the FORIM receive 150,000 € in financial support, with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Employment, Labour and Social Affairs both contributing half of the total sum of 300,000 €. To put

\(^{262}\) Lacroix 2003, pp. 317-318.


\(^{264}\) See section 5.3.
this into perspective, the newly created French agency for the reception of foreigners
and migration (ANAEM) receives an annual budget of 65 M€.

The current co-development policies assign an important role to local authorities. In
the framework of ‘decentralised cooperation’, French local authorities can engage in
partnerships with counterparts in other countries with the objective of stimulating
cultural, technical and economic cooperation. Existing city twinning programmes are
couraged to participate in the PRA/OSIM programme.

In July 2005, the co-development team of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs launched a
Co-development Newsletter as a platform to disseminate information, stimulate
debate and increase awareness about French co-development policies and actions.
Although it was intended to appear four times per year, no second issue has been
forthcoming.

Over the past decades, numerous French development NGOs have established
contacts with OSIM organisations and vice versa. In recent years, several have
associated themselves with the governmental co-development policies both
financially and organisationally. To illustrate this we will give examples of some of
the most prominent development NGOs in this respect: the CCFD and the Panos
institute. Regarding its importance in the implementation of co-development policies,
we will also describe the activities of the pS-Eau (Programme Solidarité Eau)
association.

5.3. CCFD

The French Catholic Committee against Hunger and for Development (CCFD or
Comité Catholique contre la Faim et pour le Développement) was established in 1960
and claims to be the largest development NGO in France. The Paris-based CFFD
comprises a permanent staff of 170 persons and 15,000 local volunteers across
France. Its two main missions are to support development projects and to raise public
awareness of the situation in poor countries. Its total budget for support to partner
organisations in developing countries amounted to 19.5 M€ in 2004. Project funding
is directed to sub-Saharan Africa (26 percent), Latin America (15 percent), Asia and
Oceania (16 percent) and the Mediterranean (15 percent).

Since CCFD’s establishment, migration has been one of its priorities. It has lobbied
to extend Loi 1901, the law on the right to establish an association to migrants and it
supports various migrant groups. In 2004 the CCFD spent 930,000 € or 2.6 percent
of its development budget on its ‘migrant project’, which comprises (1) support to
organisations that defend migrants’ rights and that assist refugees; (2) support to
lobbies and public campaigns for the recognition of migrants’ rights and to raise
awareness on the human reality of migration; (3) support to organisations that combat
human trafficking and (4) active support to migrant associations involved in
development cooperation.

265 As with the second paragraph, this section draws heavily on Lacroix 2003, pp. 319-320
266 http://www.ccfd.asso.fr/
267 Until December 1981, non-French nationals did not have the right to establish independent
associations in France.
CCFD has supported migrant-led development projects since 1976, and between 1983 and 1986 it supported 70 individual re-integration projects. Throughout the 1990s, the return and re-integration declined in importance and the emphasis was placed increasingly on migrant-initiated development projects without return. In 2000, CCFD has supported 56 projects against a total budget of an equivalent of 570,000 €. Projects under this programme are implemented jointly with the involved migrant associations. The CCFD is one of the major organisations through which migrant organisations can access public funding for their development activities.

On the political level, CCFD strongly advocates recognition of OSIM as development actors. It also vigorously advocates the right to migrant mobility as a condition for genuine double citizenship, which can also be beneficial for development in countries of origin. It has also acquired a central role in FORIM and the PRA/OSIM programme as well as other programmes such as PMIE. In fact, CCFD has become the central node between migrant NGOs and the official world of development cooperation.

5.4. Institut Panos

The Panos Institute was established in 1986 as a non-governmental organisation focusing on giving support to Media pluralism. Its objectives are to strengthen the media in sub-Saharan Africa, the Maghreb and the Mediterranean region as well as their ability to produce and disseminate pluralist information. Panos has three main establishments, in London, Paris and Washington, which operate in distinct geographical areas: Eastern and Southern Africa and South Asia for Panos London; Western Africa and now Central and Northern Africa for Panos Paris; Caribbean Islands for Panos Washington. In 2000 Panos West Africa was created, with offices in Dakar and Bamako. The Panos institute has collaborated with and received funding from a large number of French and foreign organisations, including the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the CCFD (see above), DfID (United Kingdom), the European Commission, Cordaid (Netherlands, see) and the Ford Foundation (United States).

Although strictly speaking Panos is not a development NGO, it has developed various activities in the area of migration and development, in which it has taken a position against the idea that there is a correlation between development and migration reduction. It aims at education and raising awareness in order to achieve a greater inclusion of immigrants and members of ethnic minorities in Europe in the defining and implementing of policies and actions for development cooperation. Between 2000 and 2003, Panos led the IEMOs in Europe project to raise awareness and provide development education for the greater inclusion of diasporas in the formulation and implementation of development policies. Panos has organised meetings of European

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268 See section 5.5.
269 This section heavily draws on Lacroix 2003.
270 See website http://www.panosparis.org/
271 Immigrant and ethnic minority organisations.
diaspora organisations and has published a series of papers mapping their role in the development of countries of origin\textsuperscript{272}.

Between 1992 and 1997, Panos conducted the *Migrations et Coopération Internationale* programme to analyse the involvement of migrants in regional development in the Kayes region in Mali and in the Senegal river basin. In 1999 PANOS launched the MIDEIP (*Migration, Développement et Intégration Pluriculturels*) programme, with a budget equivalent to 1.2 M€ over a three-year period. MIDEIP aimed at ‘promoting the added value of people from immigrant origin to the development of societies in the South and the North’.

The programme – which has been renamed MIME (*Migrations internationales & médias*) – concentrates on supporting scientific production, training and support to migrant associations, promoting the migrant know-how and diffusing through the media a positive image of migrants and their significant contribution to development. Panos specifically aims at sustaining the professionalisation of NGOs of migrants and in the South, so that they can become more autonomous from the established development NGOs. Panos therefore considers professional training and network support more important than local development. Between 1996 and 2004, Panos also awarded 20 grants (ranging from 1200 to 1800 €) for missions of immigrants with a project for the transfer and/or exchange of skills with their country of origin during one- to three-month periods. This programme was first funded by the Greater Paris Regional Council of Ile-de-France and since 1998 has been funded by CCFD. Under the scheme, a wide range of assignments, dealing with new information and communication technologies (ICT), hydraulics, renewable energy, socio-cultural activities, sport, and so on, have been funded in a number of countries, including Morocco, Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, Vietnam, Congo and Cape Verde.

### 5.5. Ps-Eau

The *Programme Solidarité Eau* (pS-Eau, or Water Solidarity Programme) is an association established in 1984 to facilitate local initiatives of international cooperation and North-South exchange with the aim of improving the water access of people living in developing countries. The pS-Eau board consists of local authorities, enterprises and other professional organisation dealing with water issues, as well as research organisations and development and migrant NGOs and governmental representatives. This Paris-based association has a permanent staff of 10 people\textsuperscript{273}.

Over the past two decades pS-Eau has worked intensively in the Senegal river basin in Senegal and Mali, and because of this experience pS-Eau has now become the operator in France of the government-funded FSP co-development programmes in Mali and Senegal\textsuperscript{274}. A recent evaluation of 123 projects established between 2003 and 2005 in the framework of the *Fonds de Solidarité Codéveloppement Mali* showed that 60 percent of the projects were stable, 20 percent unstable and 20 were abandoned. On average each enterprise generated two jobs\textsuperscript{275}.

\textsuperscript{272} Cf. Bencini 2004.
\textsuperscript{273} See website \url{http://www.pseau.org/}
\textsuperscript{274} See \url{http://www.pseau.org/codev_mali/} and \url{http://www.codev.gouv.sn/}
\textsuperscript{275} Source: personal communication with pS-Eau.
pS-Eau also conducts its own VALEPRO (Valorisation de l’Epargne des Migrants par l’Appui des Activités Productives) programme, for which its received 800,000 € funding from the EU over a three-year period. The project is funded from the experimental B7 667 budget line, which ‘is designed to finance the fight against illegal immigration, but in the broad sense of the idea of prevention also finances co-development projects’\textsuperscript{276}. The programme targets five African countries, and pS-Eau implements this programme together with the Belgium Flemish Refugee Council (Overleg Centrum voor Integratie van Vluchtelingen or OCIV\textsuperscript{277}). pS-Eau supports economic projects of migrants from Benin, Cameroon, (Conakry) Guinea and Togo and the OCIV supports migrant projects in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The assistance comprises advice and training on setting up businesses, a 600 € grant for a feasibility study and a start-up grant of up to 3,500 € provided that the investor invests at least the same amount. At the first VALEPRO meeting in April 2005, three resettlement and two long-distance investment projects were selected for funding.

Since 2001, pS-Eau has also run the Programme Migrations et Initiatives Économiques (PMIE or Economic Initiatives and Migration Programme) to facilitate the implementation of economic projects by migrants both in their country of origin and in France. The programme is funded by the French Foreign Affairs Ministry and Ministry of Labour, Employment and Social Cohesion, the European Commission and the CCFD (Catholic Committee against Hunger and for Development)\textsuperscript{278}.

Since 1996, pS-Eau has coordinated a network, the Micro Enterprise Support Group (GAME or Groupe d’Appui à la Micro Entreprise) which combines 18 development NGOs, migrants associations and public authorities specialised in supporting economic projects of African migrants. The need for such a network was based on the observation that many commercial enterprises or development projects set up by migrants in their country of origin failed due to technical, administrative and financial obstacles. This revealed the importance of project preparation in France, of methodological and technical support and the need for close monitoring by a specialised operator on the ground. In the countries of origin pS-Eau collaborates with local partner organisations experienced in accounting, feasibility studies and the like. By conducting a feasibility study financed by the PMIE and in identifying a partner organisation in the country of origin, GAME assists migrants wishing to start an own enterprise or wishing to provide long-distance support to the project of someone living in the country of origin. Since the programme 2001 has been launched and 2004 33 grants were allocated to projects in 15 African countries. In 1999 GAME issued a practical guide called Se réinstaller et entreprendre au pays (Re-installing and setting up a business), which was updated in 2005\textsuperscript{279}.

A PMIE seminar in 2004 brought to light the fact that many projects face difficulties due to various problems such as lack of experience, vagueness and the often naïve character of business plans, the heterogeneous character and lack of quality of

\textsuperscript{276} Co-development Newletter, No 1.
\textsuperscript{277} See section 6.1.
\textsuperscript{278} See http://www.pseau.org/pmie/
counterpart organisations, high costs and the difficult access to the weakly developed local credit markets.\textsuperscript{280}

5.6. Migrations et Développement\textsuperscript{281}

The association \textit{Migrations et Développement} (M&D) was created in 1986 by Moroccan migrants in France, and was the pioneer diaspora movement developing substantial development activities. M&D has now evolved into one of Europe’s most prominent diaspora organisations committed to the development of regions of origin. It has even been suggested that it is the world’s most successful example of a development-oriented diaspora organisation.\textsuperscript{282} Originally established as an association to assist its members to return during the 1980s economic downturn, M&D has rapidly veered away from the return aspect. Since 1988 it has totally committed itself to release the potential of migration and migrants to promote development in regions of origin.

Over a twenty-year period, M&D has implemented development projects in 420 villages (comprising 105,000 people) in southwest Morocco (Anti and High Atlas), among which 118 electrification projects, 92 drinking water projects, 13 schools and 2 dispensaries. It has also helped to establish seven agricultural cooperatives, two artisan cooperatives and one rural tourism project comprising the constructing of 21 ‘rural lodgements’. The latter project was supported by the AFD and the EU. It has also implemented numerous activities to train local politicians, local civil servants and project participants as well as education projects for women. M&D has 3 staff members in its Marseille branch, 8 in its Morocco branch, and it provides the salaries for 13 schoolteachers. All except one employee are Moroccan. For the implementation of projects, M&D relies on approximately one hundred volunteers, mostly recently retired professionals such as engineers, generally of French origin.

M&D implements its projects through a \textit{participatory approach}. The villagers and migrants have to decide jointly on their priorities and they also have to provide part of the funding. The migrants, villagers and Moroccan institutions usually provide the project ‘hardware’ (such as pumps, tubes, furrow digging) while the funding bodies from the North usually finance the ‘software’ (such as social mediation, coordination, training and technical expertise.).

All local stakeholders have to constitute a village association before starting a project. During the design and implementation of projects, M&D functions as coordinator with other partners, such as local authorities and funding bodies, and assures the ‘capacity building’ through training of villagers who will be actively involved in a project. Each project must be based on \textit{intra-community solidarity}. This means that although services such as electricity and drinking and irrigation water are subject to fees, the poor villagers should be helped by others to access these services. A third principle is that projects should be implemented in partnership with local authorities.

\textsuperscript{280} De Bruyn and Wets 2004, pp. 46-47.
\textsuperscript{281} This section draws on Lacroix 2003, pp. 248-266 and Ould Aoudia 2006. See also \url{http://www.migdev.org}
\textsuperscript{282} Wets \textit{et al}. 2004.
The CCFD has supported *Migrations et Développement* since 1993. Over the past 13 years, M&D has succeeded in building substantial expertise in project implementation and obtaining substantial funding from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, AFD, private charities and European municipalities and Moroccan public institutions, as well as the European Union, which funded approximately half of the total budget of 1.127 M€ in 2002. According to an evaluation by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, most of the infrastructures created through M&D are still in good shape, including the institutions created to implement the projects – such as village associations and regulations concerning maintenance of technical equipments – also after projects have been formally finished. This seems to testify to a relatively high degree of ownership that partners feel towards projects.

Relations with local authorities are often described as difficult, because they might see projects as challenging their authority. On a national level, the situation is totally different, as M&D has gained increasing recognition from the Moroccan public authorities for its expertise in ‘social engineering’ proven through its success in rural infrastructure and other development and projects. Moroccan authorities now even consult M&D in implementing rural infrastructure development schemes. For instance, ONEP, the national Moroccan Waterworks company (*l’Office National d’Eau Potable*), which works mostly in urban areas, has consulted M&D with regard to its knowledge of rural Morocco, its capacity to mediate between different social actors and its accumulated technical and managerial expertise to implement public infrastructure projects through a participative approach.

5.7. Conclusion

Despite the changes in discourse and implementation, the continuity of *return migration* in French migration and development policies is striking. The French experience is particularly instructive, because on the one hand it shows the incoherence between the goals of promoting return migration and on the other the desire to involve diaspora organisations. The main reason is that the latter generally refuse to associate themselves with migration and development policies whose suspected real aim is to encourage return migration. Diaspora organisations are keen not to be used to legitimise and de-politicise such policies let alone to recruit (undocumented) candidates for return migration.

Through associating co-development programmes too closely with return programmes, politicians in the past have often discredited these programmes. Although French politicians have recently done their best to deny any link with return, the proposals by the French government in the Spring of 2006 to increase the return bonuses for undocumented migrants and the introduction of tighter, selective immigration laws while curtailing family reunification, will probably not help to dispel the suspicion that the real aim of co-development programmes is to reduce immigration and to increase return migration. In this context, it is important to reiterate that French co-development policies remain a fundamental part of the

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283 Lacroix 2003, p. 255. EU funding is channelled mainly through its MEDA programme.
284 cf. Lacroix 2003, p. 301.
285 In April 2006, the French government proposed to augment the return bonuses for irregular migrants from 150 to 2,000 €.
bilateral negotiations with countries of origin. Lacroix\textsuperscript{286} has argued that because the origin countries refuse to directly cooperate with return migration policies, co-development has become a sort of compensation for France’s restrictive immigration policies: There usually is a development element in the readmission agreements signed by France and African countries.

Lacroix concludes his analysis on the relations between the French government and diaspora organisations with the observation that the refusal of the latter to be mobilised for return migration policies has triggered a feedback process in which the co-development focus has gradually shifted away from return. This ultimately led to a formal disconnection between return and development policies in 2002\textsuperscript{287}. Nevertheless, this does not mean that return migration programmes have been abandoned, but rather that they have been supplemented by initiatives to support development projects initiated by the diaspora organisations as well as the government-led creation of the FORIM platform for diaspora organisations oriented towards the development of countries of origin. It is still too early to say whether these new ‘inclusive’ policies have been successful both in terms of building a bridge between governmental actors for development cooperation and in terms of the success of projects in countries of origin.

The example of \textit{Migrations et Développement}, however, shows how a migrant grassroots organisation can successfully engage in promoting development in regions of origin. It shows the potential added value of migrants through their profound knowledge of two societies, and their capacity to build local coalitions and to connect local communities to foreign funding bodies. It also provides a lesson against blueprint thinking: \textit{Migrations et Développement} has been particularly successful in implementing projects because of its participatory, local-oriented and small-scale approach. It also demonstrates that successful implementation of projects cannot be achieved overnight, but should evolve from a long learning process and a thorough knowledge of local contexts, power relations and cultural sensitivities. In the end, the personal engagement and perseverance of the migrants involved has been truly decisive in its success. It seems unlikely that an association like \textit{Migrations et Développement} could ever have been successful if it had been ‘invented’ or imposed by policy makers.

\textsuperscript{286} Lacroix 2005.
\textsuperscript{287} Lacroix 2003, p. 324.
Other national experiences

6.1. Belgium

The Belgian federal government distinguishes between direct, indirect and multilateral development cooperation. Direct bilateral aid is mainly the responsibility of the Directorate General of Development Cooperation or DGOS (Directie-Generaal Ontwikkelingssamenwerking), which in 2004 spent almost 61 percent of the total budget for Official Development Assistance (ODA), and is executed by the Belgian Technical Cooperation or BTC (Belgische Technische Coöperatie). Indirect bilateral cooperation is funded by DGOS but implemented by development NGOs and other organisations. In 2004, indirect aid amounted to 175 M€, representing 15 percent of the total ODA budget. Direct and indirect aid are targeted at 18 partner countries.

DGOS channels funds for multilateral cooperation to international organisations including the European Union.

Migration and development was never one of the policy priorities of DGOS until the Secretary of State for Development Cooperation created a special migration and development ‘budget line’ in 2002, which replaced the former 1997-2002 budget line for the Voluntary Return and Re-Integration Programme. This programme envisages promoting the development of partner countries through, amongst others, mobilising the development potential migrants represent. It also coincided with the establishment of a small policy unit (a steuncel) for migration and development. In his 2004 policy document the new Minister for Development Cooperation described migration as a ‘particular challenge’.

In the meantime a number of NGOs had independently taken steps to design migration and development policy. In 1999 together with the Solidarité Socialiste (OLSOC) and the Centre de formation pour le développement (ITECO) and Oxfam-solidaire, the Centre National de Coopération au Développement (CNCD) (itself a platform of Walloon development NGOs) established the Plateforme Migration et Développement (PFMD), which was sustained by a halftime staff member to promote the recognition and involvement of migrant NGOs in development cooperation. Establishment of the platform has facilitated the creation of the policy unit for migration and development in DGOS. Supported for the CNCD-led Plateforme Migration et Développement (PFMD) was stopped in 2003. The platform only targeted the French speaking community; similar efforts in Flandres have failed. The

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288 Unless we refer to other sources, this section draws heavily on De Bruyn and Wets 2004, pp. 46-47.
289 Algeria, Benin, Bolivia, Burundi, DR Congo, Ecuador, Mali, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, Palestine, Peru, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, Vietnam and South-Africa.
organisation *11.11.11*, the Flemish counterpart of the CNCD, has not initiated migration and development initiatives.

This has made it possible to allocate funds to migration and development projects in the framework of direct and indirect bilateral cooperation. Nevertheless, the focus in the policy document is on curbing migration through brain-drain prevention and encouraging return migration. Although the document also mentioned migrants and their organisations as potential partners in indirect development cooperation, a practical obstacle is that migrant organisations can only acquire NGO status if a majority of their board members are Belgian nationals.

A next step towards the elaboration of migration and development policies was the establishment of a special commission of the Belgian Senate on migration and development, which after eight hearings with relevant specialists published its report in 2004, entitled *Migrants and development: forces for the future*[^290]. The commission concluded that development NGOs are in general barely aware of migration issues. Although it was observed that migrant organisations have a great potential to contribute to development, they are seldom involved in development policies and have no access to project funding, due to the problems mentioned in the previous paragraph. The commission therefore concluded that migrants and their organisations should be recognised and be eligible for DGOS funding, and that a coordinating governmental body on migration and development should be established. The report also recommended a series of measures to facilitate remittances.

However, these recommendations have not been followed up by concrete measures. This might be partly explained by the fact the DGOS was not involved in the commission’s hearings. Also in 2004, De Bruyn and Wets published two comprehensive studies commissioned by DGOS on migrant remittances and the involvement of diaspora organisations in development cooperation[^291]. They have also been largely ignored in Belgian policy circles, although the Dutch AIV advisory report drew partly on their results[^292].

Thus far, the following organisations have been subsidised within the existent migration and development budget line:

In 1998. OCIV (*Overleg Centrum voor Integratie van Vluchtelingen* or Consultation Centre for the Integration of Refugees) launched the *OCIV Entreprendre* programme. It was initially set up to support the ‘re-integration’ of rejected asylum seekers and undocumented migrants to set up businesses in their countries of origin, mainly in Africa. This approach failed, mainly because the target group was not interested in setting up enterprises. The idea of return was subsequently abandoned and the target group became all migrants who had lived for longer than one year in Belgium. After candidates had presented their business plans to OCIV, the selected candidates followed a preparatory programme of training and seminars. After approval, the candidate was assisted financially by local partner organisations through a micro-

[^292]: See section 3.1.3. The AIV report also referred to and took over some core recommendations of the Belgian Senate commission.
credit or subsidy. Of 99,456 applicants, 210 potential entrepreneurs received training in business creation. The programme worked in collaboration with SME support organisations in nine countries (Senegal, Mali, Ghana, Benin, Togo, Guinea Conakry, Niger, Cameroon, RDC and Bolivia). Problems encountered included a lack of business attitudes, planning and preparation of entrepreneurs, inappropriate SME support programmes and financial support of the programme.293

After an evaluation and reorientation in 2002 and 2003 the programme was renamed Migratie & Ontwikkeling (Migration & Development), the emphasis shifted to identification of partnerships with migrant organisations. This programme targeted, advised and coached migrant organisations that wished to set up a development project with local partner organisations, and was funded by DGOS. The OCIV also collaborated with the French pS-Eau in the EU-funded VALEPRO programme, which supported economic projects of migrants originating from the Democratic Republic of Congo.294 Three years after its establishment, OCIV’s migration and development programme were suspended on October 1, 2005. The associated website migratie-ontwikkeling.org has equally been discontinued. Persons involved described the project as a success responding to an enormous demand. The decision to suspend the programme was presumably related to the OCIV decision to focus exclusively on the refugee issues in Flanders, coinciding with it being renamed Vluchtelingenwerk Vlaanderen (Refugee Work Flanders).

Similar to OCIV, CIRÉ (Coordination et Initiatives pour et avec les Réfugiés et Étrangers), a Walloon association of organisations working with refugees and immigrants, has worked with migrant organisations to establish development projects in countries of origin. In 2004, it launched the Migr’actions programme, which targeted migrant organisations from the DR Congo, Niger, Senegal, Cameroon, Ecuador and Bolivia. The programme comprises training, feasibility studies, assistance in the implementation of projects, guidance in fund raising and a grant of up to 10,000 €. Projects are implemented in collaboration with pre-selected local development NGOs.295

DGOS has also funded the Young Women's Christian's Association (YWCA, Intercultureel Vrouwencentrum Antwerpen) in Antwerp, which conducts migration and development projects focused on gender issues in Burundi and Rwanda. As far as we know, other major Belgian development NGOs such as Aquadev, Oxfam and Coprogram have not developed specific activities in this field. The only exception perhaps is VIC, a Flemish development NGO that has worked together with Moroccan migrants in Belgium in the implementation of projects in Morocco.

DGOS also provides funding to the MIDA programme of the IOM in the African great lakes region, which concentrates on virtual transfers (e-learning, etc.), remittances and competency transfers.296 DGOS has also funded a programme of Collectif des Femmes, an organisation favouring the re-integration of migrant and refugee women into the Belgium employment market, to help women willing to find work in their country of origin.

293 Source: http://www.refugeenet.org/pdf/Belgium-OCIV-Entrepreneur.pdf
294 See section 5.5.
296 See section 2.4. and http://www.belgium.iom.int/Mida2/
In 2004, the total DGOS budget for these projects was 1.71 M Euro, which is allocated as follows: 781,000 € for MIDA, 300,000 € for YWCA, 600,000 € for CIRÉ and 60,000 € for OCIV. On the Flemish and Walloon level separate budget lines exist. For instance, the Flanders government gives specific support via OCIV to the Moroccan community and through the YWCA for the African community.\textsuperscript{297}

In 2005, both the Voluntary Return Programme (1997-2002) and the current Migration and Development Programme of DGOS were evaluated. The first programme has allowed the creation of 289 micro enterprises through channelling 3.1 M€ of funding to OCIV, CIRÉ and \textit{Collectif des Femmes}. It is not clear how many enterprises durably succeeded, as the annual character of the funding was not an incentive to collect data on the viability of projects. The programme suffered from numerous problems, such as a weak assessment of candidates’ entrepreneurial capabilities, delays in payment and weak management and monitoring of projects by the NGO organisations lacking a business culture. The average cost per project was estimated at 10,644 €, which is high considering the fact that the grant given to the migrant is only 2,500 €. In general the migrants involved only contributed about 10 percent of the grant. It was also evaluated that in relative terms the impact of the programme on return migration was negligible.\textsuperscript{298}

The current DGOS Migration and Development programme has been evaluated as a good idea, which has, however, proven to be very difficult to implement due to lack of experience. The evaluation identified as obstacles the lack of coherence between the different projects funded under this programme, the lack of overall vision and the difficult communication between the DGOS and NGOs involved. The projects funded were also seen as cost-inefficient: about 40 to 50 percent of the budget allocated to migrant organisations was spent in the North as opposed to 19 percent for Flemish development NGOs. The evaluation also showed that, despite the attention given to the topic, the budget destined for training and implementation represented only 2.6 percent of the total budget of all the associations involved.\textsuperscript{299}

Despite past efforts, and notwithstanding a certain interest in the issue, DGOS has not yet succeeded in developing a more comprehensive agenda on migration and development. Stakeholders have described the Belgian policies as volatile, lacking vision and ‘very ambiguous and undefined’.\textsuperscript{300} Most programmes and initiatives such as the Migration and Development Platform have suffered from a lack of stability and are often terminated after only a few years. They have therefore scarcely had the opportunity to build the necessary expertise to achieve successful project implementation. This seems to be related to the lack of a clear long-term vision on the part of the government. In the meantime, migration associations feel they are not taken seriously and they face legal obstacles when trying to access indirect development funding.

Nevertheless, there remains a certain interest in migration and development within DGOS. This is testified to by the major international conference on migration and

\textsuperscript{297} OCIV 2004, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{298} Phlix and Dartevelle 2005, pp. 4-6.
\textsuperscript{299} Phlix and Dartevelle 2005, pp. 6-8.
\textsuperscript{300} OCIV 2004, pp. 4-5.
development DGOS organised in collaboration with IOM Brussels, the European Commission and the World Bank in Brussels in March 2006\textsuperscript{301}. It remains to be seen whether this event is also going to trigger a more elaborate policy framework for migration and development. So far, as can be deduced from the public addresses given at the Brussels conference by the Belgian Minister for Development Cooperation, an important focus of the Belgian policies remains long-term migration prevention through development.

6.2. Germany

Since the 1970s, Germany has developed significant assisted-return migration policies for \textit{Gastarbeiter} (guest workers), roughly comparable to similar policies pursued in France, Belgium and the Netherlands. Return migration projects for the \textit{Gastarbeiter} were terminated in the 1990s. The ongoing programmes address mainly university leavers or refugees, such as from Kosovo and Afghanistan. The current reintegration programme of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ, \textit{Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung}) targets nationals of developing countries who have either completed studies or gained professional experience in Germany and who want to return to their countries and apply their know-how in their countries of origin to promote development there.

For instance, AGEF (\textit{Arbeitsgruppe Entwicklung und Fachkräfte im Bereich der Migration und der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit}) was founded as an association of Experts in the Field of Migration and Development Cooperation, founded in 1992. AGEF’s target groups comprise refugees, labour migrants and foreign students. Since 1992, AGEF has run about 250 projects aiming to mobilise the potential of migrants to contribute to the development of their country of origin, as experts, as entrepreneurs or as trainers for vocational education and training. The main focus of these projects has been Eastern Europe, Southern Africa, Asia and the Middle East. Notwithstanding these general developmental aims, AGEF has been mostly active in implementing programmes aimed at facilitating return migration and re-integration partly similar to the Dutch NMI activities \textsuperscript{302}. Its activities also include employment finding. AGEF currently aims at creating a network of organisations and interest groups working with returnees\textsuperscript{303}.

However, the elaboration of a broader migration and development policy that dissociates development from return and includes diaspora involvement is in a preliminary stage compared to other northwest European countries. At the federal level, migration is not (yet) a core theme of German policies for international cooperation. However, as in other countries, the broader issue of migration and development has recently been placed on the (development) agenda. At the national level, German migration and development policies are still very much in the discussion, research and design phase, and to date no concrete policies have been implemented.

\textsuperscript{301} See \url{http://www.belgium.iom.int/InternationalConference/}
\textsuperscript{302} See section 3.1.3.
\textsuperscript{303} For more information on AGEF’s activities, see \url{www.agef.net}, \url{www.reintegration.net} and \url{www.getjobs.net}
BMZ has one policy advisor working on general issues of migration and development. Another advisor is in charge of the ministry's programme on the professional reintegration of returning migrants. The German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ; Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit) began to deal with migration issues in 2003 by establishing the Migration and Development project. It has assigned one staff member as well as one senior consultant to work in this field.

The first phase of the project focused on a general orientation towards the migration-development nexus through investigating the relevant debates taking place in academia as well as among international and national organisations. This investigation focused on the migration of the highly skilled, as this was seen as a phenomenon potentially endangering the efforts of development agencies in education and training in developing countries. In October 2003 GTZ organised a first conference in Berlin entitled Immigration of the highly skilled: Brain Drain or Development Engine for countries of Origin. In May 2004 GTZ organised an expert meeting in collaboration with the ILO, entitled Migration and Development - Working with the Diaspora in Berlin, which was attended by several members of important diaspora groups in Germany.

In the second phase, the concrete mechanisms through which development of sending countries can benefit from migration were investigated. GTZ also commissioned a study implemented by IMIS Osnabrück and HWWI Hamburg on the potential for cooperation in development policies with three main diaspora groups in Germany: the Serbians, the Egyptians and the Afghans. The third phase, which should start in 2006, will comprise an effort to mainstream migration issues into the development programme of the Federal government, which is projected to take at least two years.

The Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, a prominent German development NGO, has contact with migrant organisations but mainly in the context of conferences and debates on integration issues. As well as a Discussion group on migration and integration (Gesprächskreis Migration und Integration), it has also published a report entitled From brain drain to brain gain. None of the approximately 20 projects led by Oxfam Germany – which with only four permanent staff is one of the smallest members of Oxfam international – has a migration component. Oxfam Germany has also not developed any policy on migration and development issues.

Although at the federal level or among national development NGOs no concrete policies have been implemented to involve diaspora groups, respondents have mentioned that there is a large ‘grey zone’ in which at the municipal level migrant organisations are involved in development cooperation. For instance, the Berlin development NGO council includes a few migrant organisations based in Berlin. However, as far as we have been able to detect, there is no significant formalised cooperation between such organisations.

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305 For more information on the two meetings see [http://www2.gtz.de/migration-and-development/english/](http://www2.gtz.de/migration-and-development/english/)
6.3. Italy

Large-scale immigration and settlement of immigrants is a more recent phenomenon for Italy than for northwest European countries. This probably explains why many migrant organisations in Italy are relatively informal and mainly tend to fulfil an internal social-cultural, community-binding role. After organisations become more stable, they tend to focus on integration and on protecting the fundamental rights of their members. However, some migrant communities in Italy, such as Moroccans and in particular Senegalese migrants, are now also becoming increasingly involved in development activities in their countries of origin.

At the national level, Italian migration and development policies are relatively weakly developed. Most of the ‘co-development’ action is taking place at the local and regional level in the form of trans-local partnerships between Italian regions and municipalities in Italy and institutions in countries of origin of migrants, who often participate in such projects.

At the national level, migration policies have recently been dominated by a focus on migration control and on the return of undocumented migrants, as is corroborated by the recent agreements concluded between the Italian government and the Libyan government. Generally these policies do not include development objectives, although the Italian government has been involved in MIDA projects in Ghana and Senegal, which are operated by the IOM. A second national level initiative has been the Italian-Egyptian IMIS (Integrated Migration Information System Project) recruitment scheme for temporary labourers, which was funded by the Italian government and implemented by the IOM. Although principally designed as a labour recruitment scheme, the IMIS project comprised a component for capacity building of the Emigration Sector of the Egyptian Ministry of Manpower and Emigration in order to sustain its relationships with the Egyptian diaspora. This includes a website facility and creating a computerised matchmaking facility for labour recruitment. The project equally comprised research activities including a study identifying Egyptian-Italian co-development opportunities.

Several Italian regions have implemented recruitment projects in countries of origin. Beyond the problems involved in managing recruitment effectively – the number of migrants recruited through these schemes projects is low and the costs are very high – the majority of these projects do not take into account the impacts of such recruitment on countries of origin. Some of these recruitment programmes, however, contain components to finance development initiatives or to compensate for the ‘brain drain’

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307 Cf. Piperno and Stocchiero 2006. It should be mentioned that historically this has also been the case in many other countries, such as France and probably also Germany. Municipalities have been involved in co-development programmes for the past several decades, while national policies did not exist. I am indebted to Petra Mezzetti (CeSPI, Rome) for drawing my attention to this point.
308 Italian immigration policies have also been partly decentralised, whereby regional authorities are sometimes often directly involved in the recruitment of foreign workers, although national migration policies do exist. See Mezzetti and Piperno 2006.
309 See section 2.4.
through supporting education in localities where recruitment takes place, stimulating
the transfer of migrants’ competencies or specifically recruiting workers among
unemployed people\textsuperscript{311}.

At least 60 pilot schemes regarding decentralised trans-regional and trans-local co-
development have been identified. For instance, a project funded by the Italian region
Emilia-Romagna links private companies and agricultural cooperatives with
Moroccan joint ventures and cooperatives, which work jointly with migrants to
promote the strengthening and creation of Moroccan cooperatives and SMEs. Another
example is a (failed) project aiming at channelling remittances between Livorno and
the Moroccan town of Khenifra, where several local immigrants originate, into micro-
credit organisations. The region of Tuscany and the province of Livorno funded the
project\textsuperscript{312}. In other instances local authorities and NGOs have been involved in
assisted-return projects, which encountered many difficulties and sometimes failed\textsuperscript{313}.

On the whole, local and regional projects still tend to suffer from serious growing
pains in the form of institutional and financial shortcomings. On the other hand, they
illustrate the willingness and creativity of local authorities and of the increasingly
vocal migrant communities.

There are also examples of more successful undertakings. Erythros, an Eritrean-
Ethiopian migrant association, has successfully set up a project to take care of, to
provide a shelter for and to advocate the rights of marginalized populations, and in
particular prostitutes in Rome, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Birma. Interestingly, it has been
suggested that the fact that this association is not dependent on public funding and
relies rather on volunteering and own fundraising has made it more independent in the
selecting of projects. This is said to have contributed to its success. However,
successful co-development alliances of migrants with local authorities are also
known, such as the public infrastructure projects set up by a Senegalese association in
Tuscany. The fact that association members contributed financially to the micro-
projects themselves and that they were directly in control of its implementation on the
ground is said to explain this more successful experience\textsuperscript{314}.

In 2005, the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the IOM commissioned a project
to CeSPI (\textit{Centro Studi di Politica Internazionale} in Rome): \textit{Development &
Migration Circuits, Research, networking and public initiatives to enhance synergies
between migration management and development cooperation}\textsuperscript{315}. This project aims to
enhance synergies between migration management and development cooperation,
according to the following themes: Transnational partnerships for co-development;
migration and transnational welfare and sustainable migration management in Africa.
This will be done through research, networking and the raising of public awareness.
CeSPI and Coopi (a development NGO) are also collaborating in the project
\textit{Fostering social capital among migrants from Senegal}\textsuperscript{316}. This project was co-funded
by the EU Aeneas programme\textsuperscript{317}.

\textsuperscript{311} Piperno and Stocchiero 2006.
\textsuperscript{312} Mezzetti and Piperno 2006.
\textsuperscript{313} Bencini 2004.
\textsuperscript{314} Bencini 2004.
\textsuperscript{315} For more information, see \url{http://www.cespi.it/SCMeng.htm}
\textsuperscript{316} See \url{http://www.cespi.it/coopi-cespi.htm}
\textsuperscript{317} See section 2.8.
6.4. Spain

For reasons similar to those regarding the situation in Italy, Spain’s migrant communities are not yet as ‘settled’ as they are in northwest European countries. It is less than three decades ago that many Spanish migrant workers lived in northern Europe. The restoration of democracy and rapid economic growth after 1975 restored migrants’ trust in Spain’s future and led to a large-scale return movement of Spanish migrants. Since Spain’s accession to the EU in 1986, Spain has rapidly developed into a new destination for migrants, in particular from Latin America and Morocco. Like Italy, the Spanish government has yet to develop its migration and development or co-development policies.

In Spain, most of the action is taking place at the levels of autonomous regions and municipalities. The most active governments in co-development are located in the Community of Madrid, the Basque Country, Catalonia and Andalusia, not coincidentally all areas that have witnessed a high immigration rate. The autonomous regions do not coordinate their own co-development programs with those carried out by the Spanish central government. Through this lack of coordination, their programmes might differ from each other or overlap.

In Catalonia, the autonomous region with the highest immigration rate, local and national governments have recently developed policies to promote the role of migration and migrants in the improvement of development and democratisation in their countries of origin. The concept of co-development is now being mentioned in Spanish and Catalan policy documents on migration. Recent governmental policy documents (such as El Plan Director de la Cooperación Española) seem to indicate a shift away from the former emphasis on promoting and facilitating return migration and now state that settlement in Catalonia can coincide with transnational engagements of migrants. The Catalonian co-development debate is extremely animated, with four conferences and seminars being devoted to the topic in 2004 alone.

While at the government level the focus is still on policy development, several Catalan local authorities and development NGOs have already started implementing projects. As in Italy, the Senegalese communities are well organised in comparison to Moroccans, who are relative latecomers. Moroccan migrant associations have conducted a series of interesting co-development projects. However, other associations tend mainly to be concerned with their position in Catalonia and with issues like discrimination, employment, the place of Islam in the public space and the

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318 Except for the first two paragraphs, this section heavily draws on Østergaard-Nielsen 2005a and Østergaard-Nielsen 2005b.
319 Personal communication with Maria Josefina Perez-Espino, University of Sussex.
320 Østergaard-Nielsen 2005a.
321 ATIME (a trade union of Moroccan workers in Spain) and REMCODE (a related association) are an example of a nation (Spain)-wide network of Moroccan immigrants who have implemented seven infrastructure projects in regions of origin.
education of their children. This seems to exemplify that transnational civic engagement is mainly a phenomenon for settled and integrated migrants\textsuperscript{322}.

However, Moroccan migrant organisations in Catalonia work in an environment that encourages their involvement in co-development. For instance, *Xarxa Cornisa*, a network of development agencies, was established in 2004 to mobilise Moroccan migrants for development. In Catalonia, the *Fons Català de Cooperació al Desenvolupament* is probably the most active development organisation in trans-local development cooperation\textsuperscript{323}. Another important organisation is the *Unió de Pagesos* (Farmers’ Trade Union), which trains and coaches seasonal migrant workers, including Moroccans, to enable them to identify, formulate and implement projects\textsuperscript{324}.

The potential impact of Catalan and Spanish co-development programmes including migrants is undeniable, but it is still too early to make any definite judgement on the success of such programmes. As pointed out by Østergaard-Nielsen, more research is needed to evaluate the extent to which migrant associations retain autonomy and ‘voice’ during the formulation and implementation of co-development projects in collaboration with governments and development NGOs\textsuperscript{325}.

\textsuperscript{322} Østergaard-Nielsen 2005a.
\textsuperscript{323} See [www.fonscatala.org](http://www.fonscatala.org)
\textsuperscript{324} Østergaard-Nielsen 2005b.
\textsuperscript{325} Østergaard-Nielsen 2005b.
Conclusions and recommendations

Mobilising development actors to engage with diasporas

Within only a few years, the issue of migration and development has risen to the top of the agenda of development agencies, governments, multilateral agencies and migrant and diaspora organisations themselves. This has been triggered by an unprecedented surge in remittances and by an increasing awareness of the developmental potential of migration, in particular under the influence of researchers and institutions such as the World Bank. Positive contributions of migration have traditionally been strongly associated with the return of (entrepreneurial) migrants. It has, however, become increasingly clear that also settled migrants and their descendants often maintain a strong interest in the well-being of relatives and the development of countries of origin. This interest can be expressed through remitting money, ‘long-distance investments’, personal engagement in politics or civil society or through all kinds of development activities, either in the form of individual efforts or through projects initiated by migrants and diaspora organisations.

This study exemplifies the huge variety of spontaneous initiatives and shows the strong transnational engagement of diaspora members towards the development of countries of origin. Return is by no means conditional for development, migrant orientations have become increasingly transnational, and people can be simultaneously involved in several countries.

This also belies the notion that orientation of migrants to countries of origin is an automatic indication of their lack of social and economic integration into the receiving countries. This study indicates that it is not only unnecessarily harsh, but also factually incorrect to automatically interpret migrants’ commitment towards their countries of origin as a consequence of their inability or unwillingness to integrate. The reverse has turned out to be more likely: it is in particular the relatively successful and ‘integrated’ migrants who have the time, know-how and resources to remit money, to become active in diaspora organisations and to remain involved in the social and economic development of countries of origin.

The relevant question now is how can development agencies and governments in receiving countries act to further increase and solidify the development potential of migration. Based on the preceding analysis of the characteristics and outcomes of policies formulated and concrete actions undertaken by development actors in Europe over the past years, we will formulate a set of recommendation for further policies in
this field. However, before proceeding with formulating more practical orientations, it is useful to first identify a number of necessary points of departure of successful policies.

- **Mobilising development actors, not diasporas.** A first point of departure should be that development actors should not so much try to ‘mobilise’ diasporas for development, but rather link up with and build on the wealth of existing initiatives. It is important to recognise that many migrants are already mobilised for development on their own force. Most successful Diasporic development initiatives were spontaneous movements, as exemplified by AFFORD in the UK and Migrations et Développement in France. Development actors should therefore reinforce rather than direct their transnational engagement in development cooperation. Rather than ‘mobilising diasporas’, development actors should be ‘mobilised’ for engaging with diasporas in development cooperation and be open to actually learn from the field experiences of a highly successful diaspora development NGO like the French-Moroccan Migrations et Développement, which is now even consulted by the Moroccan government on implementing rural infrastructure development schemes.

- **The danger of patronising.** It would be a fatal mistake to think that diaspora organisations and their members should be taught how to ‘do’ development, let alone be steered in setting their development objectives or determining how to best spend their remittances. Diaspora members have strong personal convictions to devote their energy and resources to what they perceive as valuable for the development of countries of origin. After having survived independently for many years and having often been disregarded as ‘amateur’ development workers by the established development sector, diaspora organisations and their members are rightfully distrustful of the rather sudden interest in their activities and resources. Any attempt at ‘patronising’ – telling ‘what is best for them’ – is a recipe for failure. Such a policy is likely to put off the more successful and critical diaspora organisations, because they refuse to be ‘tapped’, and is likely to attract the less committed and less talented.

- **Recognising the unique and added value of diaspora organisations.** It is generally true that the ‘diaspora’ and ‘development’ sectors are weakly interconnected and that a cultural gap and even a certain level of distrust often stand in the way of successful alliance building between governments and development agencies on the one hand and diaspora organisations on the other. However, the implication should not just be that diaspora organisations should be trained to find and fight their way to development funding or should transform themselves into development agencies. This would testify to a myopic, development agency-centred or government-centred view. Successful alliance building also implies that the established development actors should recognise the actual developmental role and not only the potential of diasporas. If development actors truly believe that involving diasporas has an added value, this also implies that they should be open to learn lessons from them so as to establish a genuine two-way working relationship.
• **Avoiding double agendas.** Diaspora involvement in promoting development is valuable in its own right. In particular the French experience has shown that diaspora organisations are unlikely to cooperate with development policies whose hidden agenda is to curb migration or to stimulate return migration. Reducing migration through development is not only an unrealistic aim (because development will initially lead to increased migration\textsuperscript{326}) but will also almost certainly lead diaspora organisations to shun cooperation with development actors.

• **Gaining credibility through serious and durable commitment.** Consequently, if governments and development agencies are serious about involving diasporas in development policies they should show a serious commitment to giving them a real say in policy formulation and access to substantial funding. This should also be a long-term commitment, which should not be given up after the first disappointment. Considerable stamina is needed for projects to bear fruit, but this is the only way to gain credibility. This study has shown that the few successful initiatives in alliance building between diaspora organisations and the established development sector have been based on many years of mutual learning and understanding. Only in this way can trust and understanding gradually be built.

• **Increasing coherence between development cooperation and migration policies cannot be achieved be subordinating the first policy area to the second**\textsuperscript{327}. Recently, much of the debate on migration and development has focused on increasing coherence between the two policy areas. Migration and integration policies directly affect the development contribution of migration: migrants with access to jobs, the ability to travel freely and integration within the host society will be able to play more effective roles as development players than ‘those marginalized and stigmatised by laws, policies and hostile public opinion’\textsuperscript{328}. Although greater coherence would indeed be desirable, there is in fact a persistent and even increasing divergence between these conflicting agendas. For instance, the recent Dutch policies have been celebrated as an example of achieving greater coherence, while, in fact, the agenda of increasingly restrictive migration policies focusing on temporary and (forced and voluntary) return migration has been imposed on the development agenda. Highly restrictive immigration policies do impede circular movement and paradoxically push migrants into permanent settlement and restrict their mobility with negative consequences for their transnational engagement. Another incoherence is the fact that most (poor) target countries for development cooperation do not belong to main origin countries of migrants in Europe.

• However, it is not always possible to reconcile all the various interests at stake\textsuperscript{329}, and incoherencies at the official policy level of governments do not impede civil society actors such as development agencies and diaspora organisations from engaging in successful alliances to enhance development.

\textsuperscript{326} Cf. de Haas 2006.
\textsuperscript{327} Cf. AIV 2005, p. 56.
\textsuperscript{329} AIV 2005, p. 56.
impacts of migration and to collaborate in lobbying and raising awareness on such incoherencies.

- **Setting realistic expectations.** Last but not least, expectations must be set realistically so as to avoid disappointment and subsequent abandonment of the migration and development agenda. The imminent danger of the current ‘migration, remittances and development’ hype or trend is that it can easily result in disillusionment if development actors are not sufficiently aware of the manifold studies and experiences showing that migration is no panacea for development. At the family and community level, migration, remittances and migrant-initiated projects can contribute to wealth and small-scale development, and targeted policies by development actors can contribute to this; but migrants alone are unlikely to resolve more structural development problems. Past experiences, for example with the Dutch REMPLOD project, have shown that development in migrant-sending regions was a prerequisite for return and/or investment rather than a consequence of migration. The true development potential of migration will only be released if conditions in countries of origin structurally improve and migration policies do not obstruct people from circulating freely\(^{330}\); these broader issues are clearly beyond the scope of this study. We can therefore only assess the contribution of migrants and diaspora organisations to development at its true value, and if we place our expectations into a realistic perspective from the start. This is certainly important considering the extremely limited funds actually made available for ‘migration and development’ and for sustaining diaspora organisations.

**Moving on to action while building on previous experiences**

Provided that the above-mentioned conditions are fulfilled, development actors and diaspora organisations and their members can work together successfully. Too often, however, and with the exception of remittance-facilitating policies, migration and development policies remain limited to declarations of good intent. Development actors find huge difficulties converting intentions to involve diasporas in development cooperation into concrete action, as demonstrated by DfID’s difficulties in going beyond remittances. This is partly related to the aforementioned problems of mutual lack of trust, knowledge and recognition as well as differences in organisational culture and policy agendas, but also to a sheer lack of experience involving such cooperation. In order to successfully pass to action, the following general recommendations can be formulated:

- **Prevent the waste of resources by not stating the obvious.** It is abundantly clear now that migration, migrants, remittances, and diaspora organisations can potentially contribute to development in origin countries. There is no longer a need for yet another conference or study restating this fact. It is necessary to take one step further, and to devote energy to identify the conditions under which the positive consequences for development in societies

\(^{330}\) Cf. de Haas 2005.
of origin can be maximised and the negative consequences can be minimised, and the role the engagement of diasporas can play in this.

- **Increase awareness on previous experiences.** Selective amnesia regarding previous projects and research is one of the reasons development actors often continue to reinvent the ‘migration and development’ wheel. The issue of ‘migration and development’ is by no means new. Diaspora organisations such as the French-Moroccan *Migrations et Développement* in France (or US-Mexican hometown association) can boast over two decades of experience. Moreover, a number of governments and development agencies have been experimenting with migration and development policies for the past several decades. The Dutch Remplod project, a ‘migration and development’ programme *avant la lettre*, as well as UNDP’s TOKTEN were initiated three decades ago.

- **Learn from the experiences of others.** As well as a lack of historical awareness, there is also a lack of awareness of experiences in other countries. There are, for instance, parallels between the support of the French Panos institute and the Oxfam Novib and Cordaid in the Netherlands to diaspora organisations; the remittance programmes in the UK and the Netherlands; and between the entrepreneurial support, assisted return and ‘brain circulation’ programmes implemented by national governments or multilateral organisations such as the IOM and UNDP.

- **Build an online knowledge facility on diasporas and development.** One reason for the lack of awareness of previous and other experiences is that many resources on experiences and policies with regards to diaspora involvement in development are scattered and difficult to find. While conducting this study, for instance, it often proved difficult to retrieve policy and evaluation documents. In order to prevent the unnecessary and wasteful loss of memory regarding former policies, projects and research, it is useful to construct a central online facility, where relevant documents on diaspora organisations involved in development, projects, policies and research can be easily tracked down and retrieved.

- **Identify conditions for success.** Policies can only advance if we learn from and build upon previous and other – successful and less successful – experiences. Networks, conferences and research should focus on comparing experiences and on mutual learning as to which policies work to successfully support diasporas’ transnational engagement.

This study has identified four broad areas in which development agencies and governments can support and strengthen the engagement of diasporas and their members in the development of countries of origin:

1. Facilitate and reduce costs of remittances;
2. Support individual or family efforts to set up small enterprises in countries of origin, sometimes associated with temporary or permanent return;
3. Support collective development projects initiated or implemented by diaspora organisations and their members;
4. Support diaspora networks and the capacity building of diaspora organisations, and create durable alliances with established development actors.

This study has revealed that certain development agencies in particular countries and certain multilateral agencies are more experienced or have achieved success in particular policy areas. This enables one to formulate a number of recommendations on how development agencies can support diasporas in their transnational engagement of development. These recommendations can also serve as a basis for further debate and policy making.

**Facilitating remittances: a win-win situation?**

Facilitating and reducing costs of remittances seems the most tangible and therefore least problematic area of policy intervention. The implementation of such policies seems well underway, mainly because at first sight there are no obvious conflicts of interests between the different stakeholders: Governments, banks and migrants all seem to benefit from increasing the amount of remittances sent through formal channels. In this respect, other countries can particularly learn from the UK experience. DFID and other partners have shown a serious commitment to increasing transparency of the remittance markets, increasing competition, reducing costs and improving access of people to financial services. In particular the [www.sendmoneyhome.com](http://www.sendmoneyhome.com) website has been instrumental in improving access to information about remittances services and costs to migrants. This example has been copied in the Netherlands through [www.geldnaarhuis.nl](http://www.geldnaarhuis.nl). However, a number of issues merit consideration:

- **In contrast to popular belief, sending remittances through informal channels can be considerably cheaper and more efficient than formal channels. Therefore, the only feasible way to ensure that more remittances are sent through formal channels is to improve the banking system rather than to clamp down on the informal system without creating viable alternatives.** For instance, the African Foundation for Development (AFFORD) in the UK is negotiating with a number of Australian and American companies to provide a remittance transfer service to migrant workers that will enable them to send any amount of money from any part of the world for a fee of only one US dollar.\(^{331}\)

- **Avoid overly technocratic views on remittances that ‘commodify’ migrants and migration.** A narrow focus on the technical dimension of remittances risks losing focus on the fact that committed people – the migrants – are the real agents of a remittance-driven development. A bank, government and security-focused view on remittances are likely to alienate diaspora groups if they feel merely perceived as owners of resources ‘to be tapped’. It can also lead to an undervaluing of other aspects of the migration-development relationship: namely, the ability of diasporas to affect the civil society and politics through lobbying and advocacy work.

\(^{331}\) IOM 2005, p. 31.
• Projects trying to channel remittances into productive investments will fail as long as general investment conditions do not improve. Telling people how to spend their remittances is not only patronising, it ignores the fact that expenses on consumption, health care, education and housing may significantly improve well-being and that this may have positive multiplier and employment effects in migrant-sending communities.

• Generate balanced views on migration and poverty reduction. DfID in particular has recently emphasised the benefits of remittances for poverty reduction. Nevertheless, there is also evidence that most of the benefits of remittances often do not accrue to the poorest members of community and that they might under certain circumstances increase inequality or even fuel violent conflict. An uninformed and uncritical ‘celebration’ of remittances can lead to exaggerated hopes on their development potential or to the false suggestion that they are an alternative to development policies.

Individual return, circulation and enterprise projects

The oldest areas where migration and development policies have been linked are the assisted-return migration programmes implemented since the 1970s in various western European countries, whereby migrants receive diverse types of support for re-employment and the setting up of businesses. In this field, we can learn especially from the French experience; through a learning process of trial-and-error the focus of French co-development policies has gradually shifted away from a focus on return, which ultimately leads to a formal disconnection between return and co-development policies.

• Repeated experiences have shown that projects to assist migrant entrepreneurs are likely to fail if they focus on or are conditional upon return. Assisted return policies in France, the Netherlands and IOM’s experience with RQA and RQAN programmes have been repeatedly disappointing. As long as structural investment and political conditions in origin countries do not improve, few migrants sign up and many projects that have been implemented seem to fail. Migrants should be seen as a potential resource rather than as a problem. Their decision to return should not be prompted by the prospect of financial support, but by a genuine willingness to return and a capacity to be reintegrated. The French experience shows that diaspora organisations refuse to be mobilised for return migration policies.

• More promising results can be achieved in the field of entrepreneurial projects that are not conditional upon return. In particular the IntEnt programme in the Netherlands seems to be relatively successful, and French policy makers have recently shown serious interest in learning from this experience in investissement à distance. IntEnt’s relative success can be attributed to the following factors: (1) a serious selection process based on entrepreneurial attitudes and quality of business plans and (2) not giving grants but providing training, tailor-made advice and assistance to obtain
loans. However, structural improvement is possible through addressing the social and other constraints that entrepreneurs encounter in developing and implementing business plans.

- Some programmes to further brain circulation through facilitating a **reverse transfer of competencies through sending out qualified migrants on temporary consultancy missions** against local salaries seem to be relatively successful. Here it is useful to learn from the successful TOKTEN programme of the UNDP, which was established back in 1977. In recent years roughly similar programmes have been adopted by the IOM (MIDA), by the French government, by [www.africarecruit.com](http://www.africarecruit.com) in the UK and by the related [www.africanressource.org](http://www.africanressource.org) initiative by NEPAD and UNESCO.

- Evaluations of IOM’s MIDA programme indicate that they are successful only when they are ‘owned’ by the African countries and migrants who fully participate in the vision and implementation of the project. At the same time the political and economic stability in countries of origin and residence will greatly determine the level of diaspora participation. MIDA Italy-Ethiopia shows that top-down-designed brain circulation programmes are likely to fail because they do not take into account the actual needs and wishes of sending countries and of the migrants themselves. To improve a connection between a demand and an offer of competencies, the active involvement of diaspora organisations already active in deploying their members for development deserves to be encouraged.

**Support to development projects of diaspora organisations**

Development actors can play a useful role in sustaining development projects initiated by diaspora groups. However, it has proven difficult to put this idea into practice. This is due, on the one hand, to differences in scale, organisational culture and objectives of large, formalised state actors and development agencies and, on the other hand, to the relatively small-scale, flexible diaspora NGOs who often lack the resources to fulfil all the formal conditions for projects to be eligible for funding and who often are outside the information loop and development discussions. This has regularly led to mutual disappointment and to the swift discontinuation of projects.

To break this deadlock, the Dutch approach, in which co-financing development agencies such as Oxfam Novib, Cordaid and NCDO have been channelling substantial funding to development activities of diaspora NGOs, can perhaps serve as an example. The most innovative element of the Dutch policies is the establishment of accessible funding channels such as the KPA, the Front Offices and the Linkis facility, which have significantly increased the access of private development initiatives to government funding.

Although this was part of a general policy shift to lower the threshold between the professional development world and the Dutch civil society, a positive side-effect has been that this also allowed diaspora organisations to access development funding. In

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332 Thanks to Simona Vezzoli for her contribution to this review.
addition, the specific, decentralised features of the Dutch co-financing structure through which development agencies dispose of substantial funding give considerable leeway to support migrant organisation through conferences, training and project funding. While the Dutch example may serve as an inspiration on how to lower thresholds of the established development sector, the long-standing French-Moroccan experience of *Migrations et Développement* might teach us valuable lessons on how to successfully implement diaspora-initiated projects.

- For projects to succeed, it seems important that development actors do not impose the kind of projects to be funded but rather **link up with existing initiatives and new proposals from diaspora organisations.** The example of the French *Migrations et Développement* is a lesson against blueprint thinking: It is unlikely that it could have been successful if they had been ‘invented’ and imposed on diaspora organisations by policy makers, or if diaspora organisations had only been ‘used’ for project formulation.

- Also in this field, **project quality, ownership and the commitment of diaspora organisations towards projects is a condition for success.** Therefore, co-funded projects that have been selected through an open tendering system have been far more successful than co-opted projects based on 100 percent funding. The Dutch Front Offices comprised a general initiative open to all civil society development initiatives, which favours the much-desired mainstreaming and equality of diaspora involvement and seems therefore preferable to ‘special treatment’ programmes uniquely open to diaspora organisations.

- Although this is a contested point, **positive action to endorse and favour diaspora-initiated projects might contribute to creating a level playing field.** For instance, the experience with the Civil Society Challenge Fund (CSCF) in the UK suggests that diaspora groups face more difficulties in finding their way to development funding than other NGOs. The Dutch experience suggests two ways of positive action: capacity building through support and training in proposal writing and the guaranteed allocation of a certain percentage of all project funding to diaspora initiatives, such as the model followed by Oxfam Novib, Cordaid and NCDO.

- The example of *Migrations et Développement* shows that the successful implementation of projects cannot be achieved overnight, but should evolve from a long learning process and a thorough knowledge of local contexts, power relations and cultural sensitivities. Through trial-and-error, a successful model of project implementation has been engineered, in which the ingredients for success consist of a **participatory, local-oriented and small-scale approach, in which projects are not imposed by diaspora organisations** (which can be looked upon with considerable suspicion by local communities), but are designed and implemented in close and genuine consultation and with local communities and local authorities through the formation of joint associations.

- **Continuity of support and increasing funding to development initiatives of diaspora organisations** from the side of development actors is important
so as to show a true commitment, to build mutual trust and to allow for trial-
and-error; only in the longer term are efforts likely to bear fruit. Ad hoc, short-
term programmes such as the OCIV Migration and Development programme
in Belgium will have few tangible results apart from increasing frustration.

Strengthening diaspora organisations and alliance building

A final policy area consists of the efforts by development actors such as Oxfam
Novib, Cordaid, and NCDO in the Netherlands and Panos in France to strengthen
diaspora organisations and networks or platforms of such organisations. Such support
is not directly linked to specific development projects, but rather serves to provide
financial support and training to these diaspora organisations. This is usually believed
to improve their role in advocacy of migrant rights, to raise awareness on the role of
diasporas in development, and to increase their capacities to raise funds and
implement development projects. Whereas organisations like Migrations et
Développement in France and Seva in the Netherlands have been established by
migrants themselves, the support they have received from development actors has
strengthened their functioning and contributed to their growth. Diaspora platforms
themselves such as AFFORD also play a vital role in stimulating the development
engagement of diaspora members. In addition, many governments have established
national platforms of diaspora organisations so as to create representative bodies,
which can be consulted in policy formulation or involved in development projects in
countries of origin. On the basis of previous experiences, the following
recommendations can be formulated:

• Government or agency-led efforts to engineer consultative bodies or
migrant platforms do not seem to be the way forward to create alliances
between the established development sector and diaspora organisations.
Bodies such as FORIM in France, the LOM (National Ethnic Minorities
Consultative Committee) in the Netherlands, and Connections for
Development in the UK might play a certain useful role in dissemination and
awareness raising and in consultations during bi-lateral negotiations. However,
top-down-designed, entirely subsidised migrant platforms tend to have limited
or nonexistent legitimacy among their supposed constituencies, are not
allowed a genuine influence in policy development, and can actually reinforce
the separation between the ‘two worlds’.

• As with sustaining development projects, a more fruitful strategy seems to be
to support (through co-funding) and build on existing, spontaneously
created diaspora organisations or networks that are based on a true
commitment of its members who have already gained legitimacy through their
active role in advocacy (e.g. AFFORD) or development (e.g., Migrations et
Développement, Mama Cash, Ercmove, Seva, Selam network). Giving support
to capacity building seems important, so that diaspora organisations do not
become or remain dependent on funding by development agencies.
Diaspora organisations do not ‘represent’ diasporas, and development agencies are not their spokespersons. It is frequently argued that diaspora organisations do not necessarily represent migrant communities let alone their countries of origin. A careful choice of partners is certainly important, but representation does not really seem the issue here. As long as they function democratically, organisations primarily represent themselves, their members and their own objectives. In addition, development agencies do not represent national populations. Instead of identifying ‘the right interlocutors’ among organisations representing diasporas, a more fruitful step towards establishing effective cooperation seems to involve building alliances with truly engaged diaspora organisations sharing similar development objectives. Similarly, instead of acting as spokespersons of diasporas organisations, it seems a more productive strategy if development agencies support diaspora organisations in their own advocacy.

There is a delicate balance between strengthening and patronising diaspora organisations. It has often been argued that migrants are not necessarily the best development workers. Even if this is true in certain cases, this is very much a non-debate from the perspective of diaspora organisations that are already engaged in development. Moreover, such a stance is likely to be counterproductive, as it might sustain the organisation members’ impression of the established development sector as arrogant and patronising, trying to impose its own view of what development actually constitutes and what is good ‘for them’, and not willing to engage in a true alliance. Therefore, sustaining capacity building is only likely to succeed if it is based on a true willingness and openness to mutual learning among both diaspora organisations and development actors.

The power relation between diaspora organisations and development agencies is often a highly unequal one, with the latter having access to the development funding. This can negatively affect the independence of diaspora organisations. However, to reiterate AFFORD’s and AFP’s recent position: Most diaspora organisations interested in and supporting international development are not ‘wannabe’ development agencies (as is Seva in the Netherlands perhaps), and the challenge for development agencies is not to make diaspora organisations more like them but to work with them to build on their unique strengths and to minimize their limitations. Diaspora organisations have a distinct approach, focusing on both advocacy of the rights of migrant rights and the recognition of their role in development. Overzealous attempts at professionalising or pushing diaspora organisations into engaging in development can be counterproductive, and successful attempts at the incorporation of diaspora organisations can coincide with the loss of their unique strengths.

Diaspora organisations and their members already play a vital role in the development of countries of origin. This study has made clear that, through sensible and informed policies, development agencies have a certain scope to forge alliances with diaspora organisations to strengthen their mutual unique roles. While the French-Moroccan

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333 Such as recommended by the European commission (CEC, 2005).
334 See AFFORD and AFP 2005, p.5.
Migrations et Développement association embodies the highly successful way in which they can implement community-based and participatory development projects, the British-African Foundation for Development (AFFORD) embodies the independent, critical and original voice with which diaspora organisations advocate migrant rights and the recognition of their role in development. As Chukwu Emeka Chikezie, executive director of AFFORD, recently stated:

‘When analysing the role of diasporas in development, it is necessary to remember that the term ‘development’ is not uncontested…. Diaspora initiatives, which are often criticized as being too local in focus or too short-term oriented, should rather be seen as representing a different perspective on development…. In order to mobilize migrant communities and facilitate their participation in the development process, there needs to be a shift in attitudes. First of all, it is important to ensure that migrant communities are not seen as instruments to achieve government aims, but as potential partners to engage in dialogue, seek common ground and attempt to achieve shared objectives.’

335 IOM 2005, p. 43.
References


Van Dijk, P.J.C.; R.W. Koelstra; Paolo De Mas; Rinus Penninx; Herman van Renselaar and Leo van Velzen (1978) REMPLOD Project. Slotconclusies en Aanbevelingen. The Hague: NUFFIC/IMWOO REMPLOD.


Some key readings on diasporas, migration and development

In chronological order


Main recent events on migration and development


March 2006  International conference on Migration and Development in Brussels. Organised by the World Bank, the Belgian government, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the European Commission. See [http://www.belgium.iom.int/InternationalConference/index.htm](http://www.belgium.iom.int/InternationalConference/index.htm)

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